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Sunnnary 
When an economic proj ect is introduced to a commun ity 
from out s ide , all sorts of  things can go wron g .  One 
reas on is that it is very diff icul t to design a proj ect 
specif ically t o  the needs of a part icular group . Th is 
monograph tells of the experiences of the p eople o f  Atiu , 
an out lying island in the Cook I slands . In the las t 30 
years many new agricul tural proj ects have b een set up there . 
At iuans , l ike other Pacific Islanders , have b een very 
select ive ab out what t o  participat e in and what to ignore . 
Their responses to the se opportunit ies demons trates what 
proj e c t  characterist ics are attract ive and why . As  a 
result pract ical guidelines can b e  developed on how to 
des ign a new proj ect to elicit the mos t  enthusias t i c  
response from a particular commun i ty , how the p roj ect may 
be b e t ter adminis t ered , and the impl ications for more 
accurate proj ect des ign .  
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Introduction 
I de cided to st udy the prob lem of grower response to 
agricultural aid proj ects for two main reasons . The firs t 
was an interes t in the pattern of economic change in less 
developed communities and the reaction to new opportunit ies 
there . This is a subj ect that was s tudied firs t by 
anthropologists and later by sociologis ts . E conomis ts have 
not ye t formulated a successful general approach to the 
prob lem .  Analytical work has gone no further than the very 
bas ic analyses of the effe cts of technologi cal change in 
peasant communities by Mellor ( 19 69 )  and in more primi tive 
ones by Shand ( 19 65) . 
Case s tudies of response to technolog ical change have 
rarely managed to b lend the approach of anthropology wi th 
the te chniques of economics . One that does so  
success fully is the s tudy of Eps tein (19 62 , 19 73) on th e 
effe cts of irrigation on two Sou th Indian villages . I t  was 
this work that convinced me of the po tential of a 
microeconomic - anthropological approach to the subj ect . 
The second reason for th is s tudy was more pract ical . In 
my ob servation of Pacific Island communi ties , I was 
intere sted by the number of development proj ects that have 
mis fired . Many times adminis trators have introduced a 
profitab le new technology , only to find that producers 
are not very keen ab out using it . Traditional texts on 
aid (for example , Mikesell 19 68) rare ly cons ider the 
microeconomic response of recip ients to  proj e cts . Cos t­
benefit analyse s (even the specif ic adap t ations for 
developing countries by Lit tle and Mirrlees ( 19 6 8) and their 
followers) all make the b asic  assump tion of a comple te and 
usually spontaneous producer response to new opportunities . 
This is desp ite the work of Berg ( 19 6 1) and Fisk ( 19 64) in 
showing the theore tical reas ons for a variab le labour 
response and giving practical examples. There seeme d  a 
need for an inves t igation of producer response to differen t  
technological characteris t ics , to allow b e t ter des ign ,  
adminis tration and evaluation o f  aid proj ects . 
xi 
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My approach involve s the study of a particular community 
and its experiences with introduced proj ects . In selecting 
a community I was aware that the agricultural se ctor has 
beert the subj ect of most attempts at structural change , and 
that farmers have b een the most discriminating in 
responding to th is change . 
I vi sited agricultural proj e cts in five countries in the 
S outh Pacific befo re deciding to study the experiences of  
Atiu , a small island in the Cook group . On Atiu the 
administration had tried to introduce a numb er of new 
agricultural crops of various typ es over twenty-f ive years ; 
full re cords were kept of  the results of these proj e cts . 
This offered a unique opportunity to study the impact of 
a whole range of  variations on technological change . I 
returned to the island for six months in 19 74-75 to learn 
about the community , the proj ects , and growers ' reactions . 
Information came from the administration ' s histor ical 
files , stories of the old proj ects from growers and 
administrators invo lved in them , my observations of current 
proj ects and general economic activity , and a survey 
carried out among sixty growers of crops and lab our 
involvement . 
In Part I ,  I present a case study of  the is land and life 
there . In Part II , I construct a mode l to analyse the 
effects of the desigio and administration o f  agricultural 
p roj e cts on a community . I then test the results obtained 
for Atiu . Th is allows me to draw some conclus ions and to 
formulate policy implications in Part I I I . Constructing a 
model to explain some ob served behaviour and then testing 
the results according to the original ob servations is of 
course at least partly a circular proces s . 
The res ults are intended to be  generally applicab le to 
the analys is of deve lopment proj ects with variab le lab our 
response . However ,  the study was inevitab ly coloured by 
those  is sues that appeared important on Atiu . I f  the 
character of a community under study differs from the 
E ast Polynes ian culture of Atiu , and if the type of proj ect 
being cons idered differs from new cash crops , then the 
relevant aspe cts of  change to be investigated must differ 
from those studied below .  
The case study i s  at the s ame time descriptive and 
quantitative , in the belief that both these approaches are 
xiii 
neces sary . The model is b ased on a neoclassical constrained 
optimization , a method I originally had no intention of 
using . A numb er of other methods proved unproductive . I 
cons ider mine as -a turnpike app roach : by making some 
restricting assumptions I may use all the results of an 
estab lished method as far as I wish to take them . The 
prob lem is get ting b ack to my original destinat ion . The 
conclusion attemp ts this by cons idering the practical 
policy implications of the theoretical results . 
Finally , the whole approach res ts on the assumption that 
farmers in a developing country act j ust  as rationally as 
perfec t  competitors in a developed country . I f  any 
behaviour appears irrational in the light of some theory , 
then it is an indication that that theory has not managed 
to cap ture the essence of the sys tem. 
This work originally appears as my Ph . D .  thesis (The 
Des ign and Evaluation of Proj ects with Variable Labour 
Response , 19 7 7) . The main change for the adaptation to 
monograph form has been that the mathematical model has 
been omitted and part II relies instead on a b rief 
logical explanation . I wish to thank all those people , 
both on At iu and elsewhere , who helped me with the thesis 
and with the preparation of this monograph . 
Alan Bollard 
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Glossary of Atiuan terms 
administ rat ive tribal head 
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prest ige 
ceremonial centre of t ribal life 
chief of maj or lineage 
h ead of household 
church minister 
head of minor l ineage 
prohib it ion order , e . g . on crops 
subdistricts 
t aboo 
old priest 
travelling party 
t radition-reco rding body 
ancestors 
inspection 
feast 
commoner 
t ribe 
medicine ( tree spray) 
xv 

Glossary of not at ion 
f grower product ion fllllct ion 
u household utility fllllction 
i grower labour input 
� minimum maintenance labour 
y grower income 
e y expected level o f  income 
q real output 
-
q maximum capacity yield 
q* maturity capacity given current labour level 
E disturbance term in production 
a2 variance in product ion 
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Port1 
Case study of ATIU 

Chap ter 1 
Atiu the is land and the people 
The phys ical environment
1 
The fif teen islands of the Cooks lie 2 , 600 km nor theas t 
of N ew Zealand , and spread over 2 million square km of  ocean . 
Raro tonga is the main is land . Atiu is 180 km nor theas t of  
Raro tonga : i t  is a small is land populated  by  1 , 380 ( 19 75 )  
Cook I sland Maoris of Eas t Polynes ian origin . At a 
latitude of  20° the climate is warm , mois t and tropical 
in summer , drier and temperate during winter months . 
At iu is a raised coral is land , oval-shaped , 6 km long by 
5 km wide , and 2 , 695 ha in area . I t  is the apex of  an old , 
weathered volcano ris ing 3 , 000m from the sea b ed . A 
central cone of bas alt has b een deep ly eroded and a 
surrounding belt of exposed coral reef e i ther uplifted or 
left exposed above sea level ; a new fringing reef has 
formed . 
In the centre of the is land a series of flat- topped 
ridges radiate out from a maximum he ight of 70 m. The 
villages are s ited on the highest  parts in the very centre 
of the island . From these ridges deep eroded gullies 
drain down through bush-covered slopes and into lowland 
swamps on the inner margins of the makatea ( the old 
uplifted reef around the island) and , in one corner , into a 
lake . The makatea itse lf is about 20m high and a half 
to one km wide , s t udded with limes tone p innacles and 
depress ions . Outside this is the s teep and ro cky 
coas tline , encircled by a close reef that has several 
natural openings to  the o cean ( see Fig . 1) . 
1
Men zies ( 19 70)  provides  a much ful ler account of the 
physical geography and e co logical variations found on Atiu . 
3 
Area 
Geology 
Natural 
vege tation 
pandanus 
Cultivated 
Proje c t  crops 
Map 
Reference 
( s ee Fig . 1) 
Source: 
---
Coast al 
Reef 
Live coral 
Coconut, 
pandanus , 
toa, e t c. 
Tab le 1 
Ecological zones 
Makatea 
1,607 ha 
E leva ted, exposed 
and eroded limes tone 
Coconut, pandanus, 
candlenut , etc. 
Coconut, pawpaw, 
Tar>ua, kwnara, 
yam, banana 
Orange, cof fee 
Swamp 
119 ha 
Fine alluvium 
Native gras ses 
Taro, tarua, 
banana. coconut, 
puraka, kape 
Taro 
Adap ted from Menzies (1970), Grange and Fox (1953). 
Hill Ridge House 
slope tops Si tes 
728 ha 179 ha 62 ha 
Basaltic Deeply eroded 
alluvium basal t 
Fern. guava, Fern. guava, 
coconut, casuarina, 
etc. grasses 
Kwnara, Arrowroot. 
yam, yam, kumaT'a 
arrowroot 
Toma to, Fores try, 
coffee, peanuts, 
orange, pineapp les, 
vegetab le s vege tables 
Teenui 
Ngatiarua 
N t 
� Coastal Reef 
� Hill slope 
[±] 
Gill] 
/\fakntr>n (old 
raised reef) 
Ridge tops 
�Swamp  
11111 House sites 
F ig .  1 .  Map of At iu 
5 
l60°'N 
Al•u•·· 20"S 
•lll•ro1on9• �01<� 
km 
Source: Adapt ed from Menz ies ( 19 7 0 ) , Grange and Fox ( 1953) . 
6 
The dis tinct geo logi cal s tructures on the is land 
(Marshall 1930 ; Grange and Fox 1953)  affect the zones of 
economic cul tivat ion and pat terns of social organizat ion . 
The e cological zonation is so dis tinct that it may be 
usefully categor ized as in Tab le 1 .  
The s crub-covered ridge tops hold leached , inf er t ile 
soil , long thought to be incapable of good crops . 
However , pineapples have been grown there recent ly 
with heavy fert ilizer use . 
S teep slopes running down from the ridges to the 
valleys cover much of the is land ; par t is in dense 
bush , par t is cleared for planting . Mos t  roo t crops 
and tree plantations are here . 
The swamps contain a mois t easily cul tivated alluvial 
s oil . Swamp grass grows wild , and the carefully 
irrigated taro patches are cons tructed here . 
The makatea is heavily wooded and contains a few 
pocke ts of very fer t ile  loam where a f ew crops are 
grown although mos t  is very rocky . P igs are kep t ,  
and people hunt for crab s  and honey o r  gather b erries , 
fruit and leaves . 
The reef is a rocky shelf with large pools  containing 
small fish and seafood . 
In the open sea , the mos t  adventurous spear and hand 
l ine for fish . 2 
Demography 
Populat ion growth . McArthur ( 19 68) gives an 
authoritative account of population change in the South 
Pacific . She quo tes several independent early e s t imates 
that sugges t the populat ion on Atiu may have been as high 
as 2 , 000 in the eighteenth century . These were probab ly 
exaggerated but they do sugges t that the is land could 
2For fur ther detail on identification of vegetation see 
Barrau ( 1 9 6 1) ; he uses At iu as an example of  a typical 
Polynes ian raised coral atoll . 
7 
1800 
Est imate of total numb ers born on At iu 
900 Population res ident on At iu 
1875 1925 1975 
Fig . 2. Populat ion of At iu , 1850-19 75 
Sources : E s t imates of Atiuan-born from Regis ter of Births 
and Deaths , Atiu . Res ident population from : 
1852 , 1876 Gill estimates , 1881 Harris est imate , 
all quoted in McArthur ( 1968) ; 189 6-19 61 Censuses , 
Appendix 3 to Journal o f  House of Representat ives ; 
1966 and 19 7 1  Censuses , Cook Is lands Government ; 
19 75 Population Count , Atiu Administration . 
support at sub s is tence level a higher population than 
today ' s .  
In the 1840 s miss ionaries reliab ly established the 
population as being between 900 and 1 , 200 . For the next 
seventy years it  dropped slowly but s ignificantly . There 
was some early migration to Raro tonga and Tahit i ,  and the 
population was also adjusting to introduced European 
diseases that were so virulent in some parts of  the Pacific . 
(There was an outb reak of dysentery in 1891 . )  The 
population reached its lowes t  in 19 15 ( see Fig . 2) . 
Gradually the b irth rate s tab ilized and the death rate 
8 
dropped as people received bet ter care , especially in 
old age . The infant death rate remained very high as 
late as the 1960s when it too dropped . In the las t thirty 
years the annual rate of natural increase has risen from 
around 2 . 4  to 3 . 6  per cent . 
Growing migrat ion has been b alancing th is natural 
increase .  For a long time At iuans have travelled freely 
within the Cook Is land s ; in 19 66 630 Atiuans lived on 
neighb ouring islands and only 208 non-locals lived on Atiu . 
There is an Atiuan community in Tahit i .  Cook I slanders 
have always had free access to New Zealand ; increas ingly 
this is their des t ination . I t  is  es timated there were 
about 500 Atiu-born immigrants in New Zealand in 19 7 1 . 
B irth , death , and population data from At iu sugges t that 
annual populat ion loss from migration was abou t 50-60 
for the last thirty years , providing a safety valve for 
population pressure . 
Population distribution . Total population has no t 
changed very much , but its dis tribut ion has . The most  
obvious effe c t  of growth and migration has  been to de crease 
the labour force and increase the number of dependants too 
young or too old to work . Table 2 shows a s teadily 
increasing dependency rat io , ris ing to 62 per cent in 
19 75 . 3 Ye t b irth and death figures suggest that  this ratio 
was as low as a quarter for all Atiuan-born inhab itants and 
migrants . Clearly the migrants have been drawn almo s t  
exclus ively from the work force . The age dis tribut ion 
histograms in Fig . 3 confirm the increasingly top- and 
bo ttom-heavy population on Atiu . 
Table 2 
Dependency ratios  (per cent ) 
1896 1936 194 5  1 956 1966 1 97 5  
3 5  4 6  5 1  
Source : Population censuses . 
54  60  
3The dependency ratio is  here def ined as the proportion 
younger than 15 years or o lder than 65 . 
62 
1896 1975 
M M 
- 60 
- 40 
- 20 
Fig . 3 .  Age dist�ibution , 1896 and 1 9 75 
Sources : 189 6  Population Census , 19 75 Population Count . 
The p eople live in villages built in the middle of the 
island , each at the apex of a segment of land cons tituting 
9 
a district . As- shown by Table 3 population and land area 
differ considerably between villages . So , for example , land 
is more closely cultivated in Teenui than in Ngatiarua . But 
each household holds land in different villages and mos t  have 
more than they can use ,  so this is not a pressing problem . 
1 0  
Table 3 
Dis tribution of population , 1975 
Village Household Population Land (ha) 
Nga tiarua 24 124 675 
Tengatangi 38 281 4 05 
Mapumai 28 181 4 05 
Areora 53 391 890 
Teenui 57 403 320 
Total 200 1 , 38 0  2,695 
Source : 1 9 75 Population Count . 
Political and social his tory 
This section summarises some generally accep ted 
interpretations of Atiuan pre-contact and recent his tory 
and the effec ts  this historical experience has had on the 
soc ial and economic s truc ture of the i sland . Knowledge of 
genealogies , local myth and legend are highly regarded on 
Atiu today ; such things are actively researched and recorded 
by the twrru korero group . I have based this sec tion on 
comments  by several expert Atiuans , by early traders , 
miss ionaries and adminis trators , and on Land Court records . 4 
Pre-Contact experience . Genealogical evidence sugges ts  
initial settlement of  Atiu took place about the thirteenth 
century A . D .  During the s ixteenth century a second group 
arrived and , af ter fierce warfare , defeated the original 
inhabitants and es tablished themselves . They created seven 
titles  known as mataiapo , one for each of their related 
descent groups . The island was then d ivided into seven 
dis tric ts with a mataiapo responsible for each , the island 
to be governed j ointly by them . This period ( the ' Rule of  
Mokoero ' ) las ted through twelve chiefly reigns and was 
far from peaceful . 
4 Crocombe (1960 , 1 964 , 1967 , 1972)  has done the 
authori tative record ing . 
1 1  
Eventual ly two factions developed : the three northern 
districts rallied against the four southern . About the 
mid-eighteenth century the original settlers , who had been 
living in caves , tried and failed to resume control . The 
vic torious southerners elevated their senior mataiapo to the 
new high chiefly rank of ariki (entitled Ngamaru) . Soon 
af terwards the northern distr icts demanded their paramount 
mataiapo be made an ariki (Rongomatane) ,  and this was done . 
To avoid a split or a confrontation several les ser mataiapo 
were created so that each ariki had control of his own 
group of distr icts  and had at least  one mataiapo in every 
o ther village . This system of checks and balance s  in 
all egiance remains today . Some years later a second northern 
dis tric t also elevated its senior mataiapo (Parua) to the 
rank of ariki , making three on the island . These three 
( interrelated )  l ineages still hold the titles today , and the 
order in which they were created reflect s  their s tatus and 
the precedence o f  their villages . 
Each ariki had his own akaere ( an intermediary between 
chie f  and community) who organized day-to-day business . At 
the island level a chief akaere acted as liaison between the 
ariki; at the village l evel , lesser akaere carried out 
chiefly commands .  A karakia , or mas ter of  ceremonies , was a 
dignitary important in ceremonies such as the installation 
of the ariki. Below these were the rangatira , each the head 
of a minor segment of his chief ' s  l ineage . 
Thi s  tribal arrangements has continued until today . I t  
has never been a stable unif ied s tructure , but rather a 
collection of  three small hierarchies in a s tate of 
continual change and readj ustment to one ano ther and to 
out siders . 
Atiu maintained a tradition of  conques t and colonization 
among the surrounding islands . At one period Atiuans 
controlled the 100 km-distant atoll of  Manuae . They used 
the nearby uninhabited island of Takutea as a f ish and 
bird reservoir . They are known to have travelled as far 
south as Rarotonga . By the early nineteenth century they 
were in po sses sion of the neighbouring islands of Mauke 
and Mitiaro , controlling political life there , and preying 
on them for food and women . Occasional revolts were 
rep ressed savagely ; reprisals continued until the 1840s when 
they were s topped by the influence of  missionaries and the 
arming of the Mauke people . Yet Atiu ariki continued to 
exer t  influence over these islands throughout the nineteenth 
century . 
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Early European contac t 1820-1900 . In 1 7 7 7  Captain Cook 
briefly vis ited the is land ; he was followed by infrequent 
explorers . Because there were neither harbour nor obvious 
resources ,  there were few traders . Mo re important were the 
missionaries of the London Missionary Society who arrived 
in the 1820s and soon converted the island to Christianity . 
This had two consequences : 
( i )  The people lived i n  scat tered groups mostly o n  the 
lower s lopes of bush near their gardens . 
Mis sionaries resettled them in five adj oining 
villages at the centre of the island , each still 
in its own district . This unified island l ife 
as never before . 
( i i )  In contrast to o ther islands , Atiu was left to the 
care of Tahitian or Cook I sland pastors . They 
wielded less prestige and polit ical influence than 
Europeans and most  came under the influence o f  an 
ariki; this was the only way for them to get land . 
New contact with outside had given the ariki new ideas 
of chiefly rights they might explo it . They began to exert 
influence over the church , which offered them direct and 
strong control over a centralized populat ion unified by 
religion . In earl ier times chiefly acquisitions from 
commoners (�t{nga) were a basis for economic redistr ibution 
and immediate consumption . There was no accumulation of 
weal th for its own sake . But trade offered opportunities 
for thi s .  The chief s became the middlemen in the export 
of produce such as arrowroo t ,  coconut oil , and fresh prov­
isions , even running market houses . They did this by using 
their traditional roles as trustees of the land and 
mobil izers of labourand by controlling ( through land and 
marriage) the operations of  the f ew European and Chinese 
traders to live on the island . 
This economic ac tivity climaxed with the reign of 
Ngamaru Rongotini Ariki who , for a variety of  personal 
reasons , wielded more power than any one previous chief . 
He clashed wi th the church in collec ting tithes and trying 
to a ssume a religious  role for himself .  He organized and 
encouraged production of copra and other produce for many 
years , and in 1895 bought an 8 7-ton trading vessel on 
behalf of the island . While Atiuans respected his power 
and position , they found his increasing demand s for cash 
and labour oppressive , especially in his later year s . 
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These chiefs  also exercised the only adminis trative and 
j udic ial power through ariki courts which levied fines . 
Until the Brit ish Pro tectorate came to Atiu in 1888 they 
were the only civil authority . The British declared they 
would no t interfere with ariki government . From 1 8 92 Atiu 
received a small subs idy for administration from the 
Rarotonga Federal Parliamen t .  All government posts (j udge , 
postmaster , police) were ariki nominees . 
The period of transition , 1900-5 0 .  Atiu became part of  
New Zealand in  1901 . Crocombe ( 1 967)  calls this a 
watershed in Atiuan history : annexation changed Atiu from 
the dominant member in the surrounding group into a small 
part of  a small colony of a small nation . At the same 
t ime internal chiefly power and leadership d iminished : the 
Raro tonga-based Res ident Commis sioner made a deliberate 
attemp t to curb the power of  the ariki and eliminate atinga . 
New Zealand law now applied to the island . Tariff s ,  
trade and revenue were put under New Zealand control . 
Pos i t ions held by At iuans through the chief were taken over 
by outsiders . A European trader was appointed resident 
agent to take over responsibility for adminis tration and 
for the ariki court s ;  in 1906 he was also made magistrate . 
The Native Land Court was set up , and by 1919 it had begun 
inves tigat ion into Atiuan lands . This struck at the very 
roots  of chiefly power , because it awarded to l ineages a 
title to planting lands that was held independently of the 
wil l  of the ariki . This eventually eroded customary food 
and labour tribute paid to him . 
With few chiefs of  high cal ibre , l imits on their power , 
and no attempt s  to train islanders in adminis tration , At iu 
was left  without effective local leadership . The res ident 
agent could wield a lot  of personal influence over the 
island ; but islanders held no sanc tions over him as they 
had over their own chief s ,  and they tended to wi thdraw from 
European economic life. Atiu was governed in this way 
until 1 9 65 in a sys tem Crocombe (1967 : 11)  calls ' a  passive 
but benevolent paternalism , the authoritarian government of 
a leaderless people ' . 5 
5rn 1965 the Cook I slands achieved internal self-government , 
and today Atiu elec ts two members to the Legislative 
Assembly in Raro tonga . 
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Rel igiou s schism and economic recession aggravated the 
social climate . The Roman Catholic Church gained a 
foo tho ld in one village in 1919 as part of a protest 
movement . When a Seventh Day Adventis t Church was set up 
later , interdominati�nal antagonism was rife . 6 Economic 
production dec lined to a single cash crop (oranges) , and 
when these orange trees began to die mys teriously in the 
late 1 940s , a movement of political discontent arose which 
Crocombe interprets as a cargo cult . Thi s was a 
transitional period of  social withdrawal and readjustment . 
The aid proj ec t s  introduced over the next twenty-f ive 
years were intended to appease i t . 
6To day approximately three-quar ter s  of the population 
belong to the Cook I slands Christian Church (London 
Missionary Socie ty) and a six th are Catholic s .  
Chap ter 2 
Socio-economic organization 
The household 
The household has been a basic unit  of economic and social 
organi zation for some time , espec ially s ince European con­
tac t . I t  is currently in transition between an ex tended 
and a nuclear family . This loo se grouping , based on kinship , 
often includes temporary or permanent visitors , gues ts , 
dis tant relatives and adolted children . I t  is a flexible 
grouping and very mobile .  
This poses a problem o f  def inition : the same group of 
people frequently do no t eat and sleep together . The more 
signif icant economic group ing - those who grow crop s to­
gether - is not always based on kinship or neighbourhood . 
A household is  arbitrarily def ined here as that group of 
peop le who regularly eat together . 
By this measure there were 190 households averaging 7 . 3  
persons on Atiu in 1 97 5 .  This number has hardly changed 
over the las t twenty-five years . What has changed is the 
composition : there are more older people and many more 
children , but fewer working age adults . The dependency 
ratio has ri sen s·ignif icantly . 
I t  is always pos sible to identify a household head who 
makes dec isions , usually the oldest  ac tive male who hold s 
the land r ights . He plans and direc ts planting by the 
family . S ince an extended family may plant the same crop s 
on scattered plo t s  of  land , the head mus t  ensure suff icient 
of each is grown . 
1During my six months fieldwork household composition 
changed signif icantly , though each household retained the 
identity of its  head . 
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S everal branches of a family may work together only on 
certain occasions , for example to cul tivate a j ointly-owned 
orange plo t .  Then a respected senior member will organize 
and co-ordinate the work . Several household s  may plant 
together . This is  of ten a useful arrangement between friends 
or neighbours with adj oining lands , rather than a formalized 
kin relationship . An elderly childles s  grower may gain 
security this way . 
Clearly household grouping is an arrangement of c onven­
ience rather than of s trict convention . An extended house­
ho ld may appear loosely-knit , but it  can combine for 
economic strength . The family of Iva provides an example .  
Iva i s  a 7 0-year-old Atiuan , the head o f  a large exten­
ded family household typical of household size and organiz­
ation in the pas t . Eighteen people live in three family 
houses built round a compound . Iva lives with his wif e  and 
an elderly woman friend . They do lit tle economic work , 
though Iva has the right to control planting decis ions and 
affairs of the land . They receive old ag e p ensions worth 
$800 yearly and a small rent from the government for land it 
uses as a plant ing nursery . 
In the same house l ive the las t of  his sons to remain on 
Atiu , and his wif e ;  they are childless . The 3 0-year-old 
son is a casual labourer on the government p ineapple scheme 
earning $800 in 1974 , and he also sell s a f ew vegetables . 
He co-ordinates the family p lanting to ensure enough o f  each 
crop is grown on the scattered plo ts . He grows subsis tence 
crops and raises the family pigs . His wife is  a teacher 
earning a salary of $1 , 2 7 0  per year . They regularly buy 
food s which are pooled with the res t of the household and 
cooked by the women for the collec tive meal s . 
In ano ther of the houses l ives Iva ' s  45-year-old daughter 
with her husband who has a permanent labouring j ob with the 
Agriculture Department . He earns $600 annually . He does a 
minimum of subsis tence plant ing which causes ill-feeling 
with Iva ' s  son , but he looks af ter his own pigs and grows 
coffee on his own land ($250 wor th in 1 974) . He also 
receives some money from relatives in New Zealand . They 
have nine children . 
The third house is  s till being built and is occupied by 
two of Iva ' s  grandsons aged 2 0  and 1 7 . The older one was 
working recently in New Zealand and he brought back $4 00 to 
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pay for  building materials ; he  now doe s  occasional labouring 
on Atiu . The younger one earned about $55 0 labouring for 
the government in 1974 . The two boys spend a lot of time 
working on subsis tence crop s on their own land under their 
uncl e ' s  general d irection . They have no p igs or tree crops . 
They too buy food and eat with the others . 
When some urgent work ( such as picking oranges for a 
shipment} arises , all the family including children may help . 
They may also all work together in village  work parties , 
excep t for the son-in-law whose  allegiances lie in ano ther 
village . The to tal income of this extended household in 
1 974 was $4 , 83 0 ,  a relatively large amount and secure 
because it came from many sources . 
The household work force . Everyone in an Atiuan house­
hold does some work : young children help around the house 
and f eed animals as they play . They are very useful in 
fru i t  picking . 2 Frequently on holidays the whole family 
works together , the children learning the rudiments of 
agricul ture . While of school age , a boy helps his father 
in mos t  plantation work , and at about 15 years he is given 
his own taro plot on a s eparate piece of land , to be 
cul tivated under direction if neces sary . This is symbolic 
of at taining manhood . 
Retirement from work is gradual ,  depending on heal th 
rather than age . A man over 6 0  may hand over everyday 
management to his son , but continue to do light tasks on 
the plantation , and continue an active interest in all land 
affairs . When he is too old to work he will be supported 
by his children or other kin . 
There is a defined d ivision of work by sex but it  is no t 
a rigid one . Women do some of the lighter and more tedious 
time-intensive agricultural j obs  and also most of the 
cooking and housework. Half the teachers on the island are 
women and there are a f ew nurses , but there is not much more 
opportunity for them to earn money . Most women spend a lo t 
of time working at community tasks- , especially the regular 
sewing c ircles . Table 4 specifies the role of women and 
the time they spend working . 
�y field survey showed children contributed signif icantly 
to gardening work in about 2 0  per cent of households in an 
average week. 
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Table 4 
Division of labour by sex, and female 
work patterns , 1 975 
Female work 
( av . ) 
Hours % Women 
Male role Female role weekly involved 
Cul tivation Mo st agricul- Weed ing and 1 . 0 20  
tural work harvesting , 
feeding 1 . 5  5 0  
animals 
Hunting and Collec ting Fruits and ) 
gathering f irewood , nuts , handi'- ) 
hunting craf t mat- ) 1 . 2  5 0  
crabs , erials , reef ) 
honey , reef food s ) 
and sea 
f ishfng 
Employment Most wage Few teachers ,  
work nurses , shop-
keepers 2 . 6  8 
Home Heavy cooking Most cooking , 
and food cleaning and 
preparation child care n . a .  100 
Source : Field notes , f ield survey , 1 975 . 
These roles are flexible and this compensates for the 
large variation in household s i ze caused by extens ive mig­
ration . Some households have four or f ive adul t males 
l iving in adj o ining dwellings and planting large areas ; 
they can afford to specialize in planting , f i shing or wage 
work . At the o ther extreme , thirteen households have no 
economically active male at all . Many of these received 
large remit tances from emigrant husbands and children who 
feel obl iged to save and send whatever they can . At leas t 
one woman does all her own planting ; and several men , 
husbands of teachers , sit  at home all day ostens ibly baby­
sitting . Children may be borrowed or adop ted to help with 
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work.  Old couples and a few cripples on  the island are 
supp lied food by relatives and neighbours . 
A son wanting to migrate f ir s t  asks permiss ion of his 
family . Permission might be withheld because the son is the 
last adul t male  lef t at home . A temporary migrant works very 
hard and saves regularly . A permanent one sends back money 
especially at Christmas , b irthdays , funerals , but these 
remittances may decline over time . His family in Atiu is 
free to write to him requesting money or gifts . 3 
How do Atiuan men spend their day? Mos t  rise early to 
take advantage of daylight . Many have taken on regular 
wage j obs in the last few years and these are disrup ting 
es tablished work patterns . These labourers work from 7 a . m .  
to 3 p .m .  on the government agricultural schemes ; only then 
can they walk or r ide down to their p lanting lands to do 
regular chores like feeding animals and gathering food 
crop s . They may then choose to work on their own , or work 
with a group , rest or drink. Those without regular employ­
ment , especially the older men , follow more tradit ional work 
habits :  they spend much of their day on the p lantat ions , 
working early and late but resting through the ho t test hours . 
The field survey showed that in an average week a grower 
would spend 22 hour s working for wages , 14 hours p lanting 
and fishing on his own , and ano ther 5 hours engaged on 
connnunal work . 
Household capital . Despite differences in earning 
ability , At iuans own very s imilar hous es . Mos t  built a 
s tandard block house with a loan from a government rehous­
ing scheme that began in 1962 . To build a house a man asks 
his relatives for their help . He pays for material s and 
kil l s  several p igs for a large umukai (feas t )  on complet ion . 
He feeds the builders ; the mas ter builder , who is paid by 
the government to supervise the scheme , receives the b ig­
ges t  pig as well as gif ts such as woven mats and shirts . 
Informants comment that today it is increas ingly necessary 
to hire workers from outs ide the family to build a house . 
Houses are s imply furnished with furni ture built at home 
to a s tandard design , with local handicraf ts , and with a few 
3 These may be s izeable : one informant enthus iastically told 
me he had written to his daughter in New Zealand asking for 
a small boat with an outboard motor , and next he intended 
to ask for a truck to carry it . 
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s tore goods - a transistor radio , a kerosene cooker , some­
times a sewing machine . Cheap motorbikes are increas ingly 
popular for leisure and for transport to the plant ing land s ; 
there were about fifty in 1974 . S everal returning migrants 
have brought back lawnmowers and three people had small 
electricity generators . A few men have built water tanks for 
their homes and purchase of a kerosene refrigerator may be 
tolerated . However , there are derogatory comments about 
people who are too acquisitive . 
Land on Atiu 
In early days land meant power . Today land tenure i s  
still a sensitive and complex issue difficult f o r  a n  out­
sider to probe . Land remains a source of pres tige and non­
monetary wealth . Land tenure in Atiu has been thoroughly 
researched by Crocombe (see Crocombe 1 9 6 0a , 1 964 , 1 9 6 7 , 
1972) . For these reasons this section is mainly a summary 
of published knowledge . 
Land tenure and the Land C ourt . Lands on Atiu are d ivid­
ed into different blocks , each controlled by a lineage . The 
three ariki with the four senior mataiapo each head a land 
district containing a village (one large village sprawls 
over three distric ts) . Each district is divided into several 
tapere ( subdis tric t s )  controlled by a s eparate lineage under 
a mataiapo. Each tapere is based on a valley and ideally 
radiates out in a segment shape from the centre of the 
island to the coast , containing a cross-sec t ion of the 
different ecological zones of planting and gathering lands . 
Control over land is the basis of  social hierarchy . 
Table 5 shows the correlation between tribal rank and land 
rights . 
In 1 902 a Maori Land Court was established in Rarotonga . 
The Court has s ince surveyed Atiuan lands (mostly s ince 
1951) , and has ves ted ownership of each block in one or more 
family heads in proportion to their accep ted claim .  Each 
family has rights in several blocks . Crocombe (1960a) 
est imated the average commoner was at that time a right­
holder in six blocks of land in his own village and f ive 
blocks outside . Members of ariki families held rights  
in twenty-nine blocks on  average . 
Table 5 
Tribal rank and land rights on Atiu 
Title No . Rank Land rights 
Ariki 3 Paramount District ( incl . 
tribal 4 mataiapo ) 
chief 
Mataiapo c . 30 Chief of Tape re 
maj or 
l ineage 
Rangatira c . 80 Head of ) Unspecified 
minor ) right s  in lineage ) 
Me tua c . 11 0  Head of ) various 
household� blocks (on 
Unga c . 1150 Commoner ) av . 1 1) 
Source : Crocombe (1 960a , 1 964) . 
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Several factors have complicated the workings of the 
Land Court over time . Awarding legal rights to all natural 
and adopted heirs irrespective of their need , their present 
abode , or their intentions to use the land , has led to a 
mul tiplication of owners . Individual shares have become 
smaller . In 1959  the average block of planting land ( 2 . 5  
ha) had eighty shareholders ; today this fragmentat ion is 
worse . 
The decisions of the Maori Land Court lacked the f lex­
ibility of pre-contact cus tom ;  traditional practice had 
been to inherit  from only one parent . Also absenteeism or 
ineffective cultivation meant a grower lo s t  his land rights . 
Some informants claimed that the European surveyors of the 
Land Court were misled over boundaries by the few English 
speakers among the Atiuans . 4 
4one informant told me his family los t  land rights because 
his grandmo ther , the title-holder , was too drunk on the 
day of the survey! 
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I t  is only because migration has eased pressure o n  land 
resources that this clumsy system has survived . A landowner 
who migrates may lend his rights to o thers in the block . 
Another shareholder who takes over an emigrant ' s  land with­
out permis s ion risks a dispute . In principle a landowner 
should obtain the permission of all o thers before he plants  
on  that block. The many scattered shareholders makes this 
impos s ible . In 1959 a quar ter of land rights were held by 
residents of the local village , a quarter by o ther villagers , 
and the rest by migrants .  Today absentee ownership is  even 
worse . 
Land rights . In this sett ing , land ' ownership ' has never 
been a rigid concep t . Rather it is an exp ression of the 
varying rights of different people to use d ifferent types of 
land for different purposes . For example , Crocombe d iffer­
entiates between the r ights of the tribe , of the major and 
minor lineages , and of the household , all over one p iece of 
land . Again rights in a house s i te d iffer in nature to 
rights over planting lands , swamp rights , and reef r ights . 
Fur thermore , there are differences , in short-term cropp­
ing rights ,  rights to hunt and gather , rights to fish , rights 
to extract tribute or payment , and rights to travel . The 
Land Court ves ted all these rights  in the landowners . But 
in practice such rights are determined by the shadow prices 
of resources : crops growing wild and plentifully (passion­
fruit , nut s , guava , pawpaw, breadfruit)  may be occas ionally 
picked by anyone for family consump t ion but not to sell . 
Anyone can refresh themselves but no t collect and s tore 
crops that grow wild but are scarce or coDDilercially val­
uable ( coconuts , wild coffee , nat ive oranges) ;  crops that 
have been planted and cult ivated (oranges ,  root crop s )  
should no t b e  touched . Today anyone may gather foods off 
the reef or fish the sea anywhere , though passages through 
the reef belong to the ariki. Certain resources occur only 
in particular places and they belong to the local land­
owners . A special spring containing fibre-s trengthening 
chemicals is more than enough for the whole i sland and 
there is free access . But a cave containing coveted fresh­
water eels which could easily be overfished is jealously 
guarded by the right-holders . 5 
5 Access to a special resource may require payment ;  a minute 
of the Maori Land Court read s : ' When anyone wants  t imber 
or lime from this land , they make the ir reques t  to us 
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Even the final use of land is relevant ; rights to exploit 
a blo ck to raise funds for the church are more l ikely to be 
granted than rights to exploit it for private gain , for 
example . 
The changing nature of land ' ownership ' may induce unus­
ual economic behaviour . For example , planting a tree crop 
like oranges or coconuts may be used to es tablish or confirm 
an individual ' s  long-term claim over a plot of land . I t  
would b e  antisocial for another right-holder to interplant 
his crops among these trees unless they have been abandoned . 
There are cases of competitive p lanting among orange growers : 
one branch of a family plants a plo t  of oranges on a piece 
of land . Another branch immediately plants ano ther plot 
next to i t , to reassert their claims and interest . Such 
plo ts  are poorly maintained . 
Traditional rights do no t guarantee that o ther landowners 
will no t claim a share of a grower ' s  harvest . To avoid this 
the Court introduced the ' occupation right ' - the agreement 
of all owners that  one person should have sole right to the 
proceeds of a tree crop . 
Distribution of land . Clearly land distribution was and 
s t ill is  far from equitable . I t  was formerly based on a 
stratified rank system ,  and has since been affec ted by luck 
of inheritance and the arbitrary rulings of the Land Court . 
But every grower has sufficient land to raise his crop s . 
Only one case was observed where a shor tage of a particular 
class of land actually cons trained product ion . 
Land i s  considered to have a pedigree ; to treat it as a 
traded good in the European s tyle would be sacrilege for 
many Polynes ians . Land may not be bought or sold , and is 
rarely rented . Crocombe (1960a : l5)  comments : 
Due to the large numbers of r ight-holder s , almo s t  
half of whom have migrated t o  Raro tonga , New Zealand 
and elsewhere , it is virtually impossible to 
nego t iate a lease , which is  the only legally recog­
nised form of transfer of land r ights .  This leads 
5 ( Continued) 
today as they d id to our tupuna (ances tors)  in the past . 
Such persons used to bring p ig s  to p ay my tupuna' 
(Minute Book 2 ,  p . 14 ,  1950). 
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to info rmal arrangements  about the use of land 
for cash cropping which are not only short-term 
and insecure , but also conducive to exhaus tive 
techniques of  land use . 
Flexible land cus toms , tradit ions of hospitality , and 
wide kinship ties mean those who lack them can usually borrow 
lands , so that in p ractice land dis tribution is reasonably 
efficient . Several cases where growers borrowed specified 
pieces of land from kin for short-term cropp ing were no ted . 
In mo st cases the borrower would g ive a few kits  o f  p roduce 
on harvesting in acknowledgment .  Worst  off were the 200  
islanders born outside Atiu : they had to plant on  their 
wives ' lands or borrow from friends . I t  was common to lend 
tree crops to a les s  well-off relative . I t  was also common 
for two men , of ten bro thers , to plant a crop together and 
then spl i t  the proceeds in proport ion either to the work 
done , or their relative need s .  
Res traints can b e  exercised over Atiuans who tried to 
take advantage o f  land cus toms . Any grower showing too keen 
an entrepreneurial skill in amassing undis tributed wealth 
could find other ti tle holders making it  hard for him to 
increase  his land holdings . 
The explo itation and control of the land is at 
present s t ill generally workable because of the 
respect accorded to the elder resident members 
of the family , but this respec t is  fading and 
there is  already a not iceable trend for the mos t  
acquisitive right-holder t o  take control of the 
land . This trend is jus t  emerging on Atiu 
(Crocombe 1 964 : 128) . 
The Village 
The village al so provides a basis for work and co-opera­
tion . At iuans bear deep allegiance to their village of 
birth as a social unit . This allegiance continues despite 
considerable intermarriage, with some men living and plant­
ing on their spouses '  land in other villages . The f ive 
villages are joined geographically but they are so cially 
dis tinc t entities . 
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V illage meeting houses . Each village is wedge-shaped , 
sprawling down a ridge away from the centre of the island . 
At the apex of each stands the meet ing house on a grassy 
sect ion . These large verandah-sided halls are the focal 
point for village l ife . They are owned by the church and 
controlled by the deacons , but are used mainly for secular 
activi t ies . Here take place wedd ings and funerals ,  men 
hold church and village mee ting s ,  women sew and talk , 
children play .  They are frequently in need of maintenance 
and it is  a continuing job to raise funds for them . 
The meeting houses were originally buil t by the Cook 
I slands Christian Church around the turn of the century . 
In 1952 a young deacon returning from overseas found them 
badly dilapidated and sugges ted rebuilding them . He encoun­
tered opposition from the elders in Teenui , his own village , 
bu t he used his prestige (he was heir to an important island 
ti tle) to enlist  a group of forty young men of the village 
to help him .  They cut timber from the bush . They earned 
money clearing sites for c itrus  plo ts ; building material s 
cos t  them $ 4 0 .  The deacon used his rudimentary drawing 
knowledge to redesign the building . Then , donating their 
labour , the group substantially rebuil t the heavy hall . 
Teenui village was very proud of the result . O ther villages 
were also impressed and organized local groups to rebuild 
their own meeting houses . The Teenui deacon agreed to 
supervise work on these too . 
In early 1975 the Teenui village fund raising connnit tee 
decided their meeting house needed new seats . They ordered 
the men of the village to help with contract taro patch 
making at  a time that would no t interfere with normal work . 
The next Saturday at 4 a . m .  deacons blew conches around the 
village to wake everyone up . About thirty-five men (half 
the local population) assembled with tools at the meeting 
house  in the dark.  A truck drove them down to the taro 
swamp . There they worked in two gangs digging and slash­
ing . By 7.30 a .m .  they had made three taro pat ches for 
whi ch the owners paid them $ 37 .  I t  was generally agreed that 
this was a good effor t .  This work was repeated for the next 
three Saturday mornings ,  by which t ime people were becoming 
tired of it . 
On Eas ter Saturday a dance was to be held . The young 
unmarried g irls of Teenui spent a week practising song and 
dancing items for i t .  The older women tutored them , and 
much of the village turned out to watch the evening 
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pract ices in the meeting houses and t o  go s sip . The items 
brought contributions from the audience of $ 2 0  to $ 3 0 : not 
very profitable but enj oyable for all , and an important way 
of pass ing on tradit ional culture . With all the money earned 
wood was bought from New Zealand , and proper seats  made for 
the meeting house . 
Village commit tees . The formal body that organizes village 
life is the village commit tee . This comprises a number of 
locally elec ted representatives plus the village mataiapo. 
They have the power to organize village labour for public 
works and have done so extens ively in the past . 
In the 1 950s every adult male was required to do public 
work organized by the village commit tees without payment 
each Monday morning . They made communal rubbish t ips , 
bathing holes , water tanks and village roads ; the govern­
ment paid for materials .  After lapsing for a period the 
committees were revived in the late 1960s for another period 
of intens ive work : they made concrete blocks for house­
building , maintained main roads , cleared plantation tracks , 
l ined new washing holes , built large holding tanks in each 
village, improved the landings ,  and built drains through the 
village taro swamps . 6 In 1974  village committees  were st ill 
active , though they were tainted by political intrigue and 
this earned them disrepute . 
An active village always needs money for one proj ect  or 
another ; fund-raising efforts and communal work parties 
organized by the village committee s , by the akaere , and by 
energetic individuals are important unifying forces in 
village life . In 1 97 5  one village was raising money for 
four d ifferent funds at once : for their meeting house , 
their roads , the church,  and a travelling cultural party . 
The bush beer schools . Next to the household s  the most 
important work groups are undoub tedly the bush beer schools .  
There are s ix of these on Atiu , and they correspond roughly 
to village boundaries , with drinking habit s  s trengthening 
6Remaining records show this involved considerable effort :  
in 1 9 7 1  village work took p lace roughly once a fortnight , 
when about 30  workers would turn out for each village. 
In only 6 months they worked a total of 1 6 , 000 man hours , 
volunteering labour then worth $ 5 , 000 . 
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village allegiances .  Each school is approximately centred 
on a taro swamp and mo s t  of its members plant there , though 
men may visit other school s .  
Home-brewing is illegal , and at one t ime all drinking was 
done covertly deep in the bush . Drinking groups were in­
formally organized , usually friends or neighbours who liked 
to work toge ther . They made an orange brew fermented wi th 
hop s , and this used a lo t of oranges . 7 
By the 1960s drinking had become much more open . The 
schoo ls formalized pas t patt erns of allegiance and work , and 
today they are well organixed to cope wi th the high level of 
social drinking . Each s chool offers relaxation among a 
sympathetic group of men ; it  presents opportunity and incen­
tive for connnunal work ; it allows drunkenness and escape 
from economic reality . 
A s chool contains twenty to forty members , elec t s  
officers and keeps accounts . One or more times a week mem­
bers mix a brew of beer in a large tree trunk , combining 
purchased hops and sugar with local fruit (malt is an 
increasingly popular substitute) . After a few days the brew 
is  ready to drink . To pay for it members work as a group 
once or twice weekly , making taro patches for one ano ther : 
this is  a heavy , dirty , arduous job and it is made more 
pleasant by company . The plot owner is charged for the work , 
depending on its size and difficulty and also on his ability 
to pay .  Any member aosent from the work is fined . 
For example , in the Mapumai-Tengatangi area a bush beer 
schoo l  was operating in 1975 . For the three weeks after 
Chris tmas they had not worked , and their funds dropped to 
$ 5 . So  the chairman organized them into making taro patches 
every Tuesday and Thursday afternoon ; they earned $ 63 over 
the next three weeks . They brewed two 3 0-gallon tree trunks 
of beer a week , and they would drink it on Thursday and 
Friday evenings and all day on Sunday . A typical brew 
( 3 0  lb of sugar , l Olb of mal t  and a half packet of hop s) 
cos t  $ 24 . 
When money is  no t needed , the men may work on one ano th­
er ' s  plots unpaid . Or they may agree to be paid in food : 
71 estimat e  up to 3 , 000 cases per year were used this way , 
a signif icant part of product ion . 
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there i s  always plenty of work to do . The field survey 
shows the economic importance of this work :  7 0  per cent of 
all growers hired bush beer gangs at some time . The gangs 
buil t 4 0  per cent of all taro patches in 1974 . On average 
grower s spent 1 . 5  hours per week working in these gangs , 
cons tituting 1 0  per cent of their subsis tence work . 
They earned money working on members ' taro plot s , rotat­
ing between the Mapumai and Tengatangi ends of the swamp . 
For example at  one work party : the first  of the workers 
s trolled down to the taro swamp when their government work 
finished at 3 . 3 0 p . m .  Nine men started to work on the 
appointed patch . After a while the number rose  to twenty­
three . The men worked systematically : about ten worked at  
any one time while the o thers res ted . Two of the older men 
slashed the weeds and two o thers carried them to be dug 
under as compo s t . Then came six young men doing the heavy 
digging . I t  was hard and ho t work , but a fairly large taro 
patch of 4 00 shoots  was dug over ready for planting in an 
hour . Everybody washed in the swamp . Men adj ourned to a 
nearby shel ter and began to drink the brew made two days 
previously . Prayers were said , thanks given , and accounts 
read out . The plo t  owner paid $ 1 5  for the work , and those 
who had arrived too late to work were fined $ 1 . 5 0 .  Drink­
ing continued till after dark . 
Drinking takes place in the evenings and weekends espec­
ially on Sundays . Most  members finish drunk . The field 
survey suggests three-quarters of adult males drank in the 
schools , and in an average week in 1 9 74 each spent about 
ten hours there drinking or drunk . 8 While drinking , men 
goss ip , philosophize , pray , and pass on economic and 
politi cal news . Each s chool has some older men who no 
longer participate in the work , but who supervise the 
drinking ; they may withhold beer to censure bad behaviour . 
There is  also opportunity for them to pass on the old 
stories o f  the island . 
Government schemes have recently induced changes in work 
behaviour : time is more precious and money more easily 
obtained . Faced by this the bush beer s chools have al tered ; 
the drinking role is increasingly more important than the 
work o rganization . As units of social organization they 
are s tronger than ever today . 
8 And many more hours recovering from what was described 
as an ' overhang ' .  
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Infonnal work groups . In past years group s  of young boys 
or teenagers in a village would form themselves into a 
company and off er to work on taro patches in return for 
payment . Sometimes they would accep t  food or alcohol in­
stead of money . Usually such groups are fanned for a 
limited time with a specific purpo se in mind : to earn 
money for the Boys Brigade , to earn fares for a tr ip , to 
buy instrl.llllents for a band . They would usually work in 
the early morning or late afternoon several days a week . 
I t  is  difficult to be precise but informant s  sugges t 
about half a do zen such companies were operating in 1974 , 
mos t  of them schoo l-leavers .  There are fewer today because 
of the availability of regular wage employment .  The field 
survey showed nearly 10 per cent of growers hired companies 
to work on their taro in 1974 . 
Women ' s  groups .  The bush beer schools  and work companies 
are s trictly for men . The women group together at village 
level in the sewing and handicraft c ircles : they gather at 
the meeting house or on a verandah and spend an enjoyable 
afternoon talking and working on assigned projects . Mos t  
will attend classes o n  public health and child care . They 
form committees which carry out the health and handicraft 
inspect ions . During shortages they may declare certain 
foods should be preserved and they can arbitrarily impose 
penalty fines . They may also try to influence the men when 
they feel that excessive drinking is  going on , or too many 
oranges are being used . 9 
The co-operatives . Though now largely defunct ,  co­
operatives were at one time very act ive on At iu . They were 
fir s t  set up in 1956 at the inst igation of a co-operatives 
officer on Rarotonga . He picked out Atiu because of the 
strong communal spirit there . After several village meet­
ings and a training course for officers ,  a thrift and loan 
co-operative was established in each village . Members 
inves ted a small amount and undertook to save 4 shillings 
per month . After one year these savings could be with­
drawn : alternatively members might request small short­
term loans out of the asse t s . 
9The story is gleefully told of the day the women marched 
down to the bush beer schools , tipped all the beer out , 
and then threw garlands of flowers over the mortified 
drinkers . 
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Interest in  the co-opera tives was keen and mo st families 
soon j o ined . The co-operatives offered the first source of 
credit available to mo st  Atiuans . Members used the loans 
of $ 1 0  to $ 20 mainly to buy basic  agricultural tools or 
household furniture . They borrowed $ 1 , 600 over the next 14 
years ,  no t a large amount , but enough to teach the princi­
ples of a repayable loan . Loans were no t secured but s ince 
o thers could not borrow until they had been rep aid , social 
pres sures discouraged defaul t ing . This was the main 
achievement of the co-operatives . 
The co-operatives assumed other funct ions too : they dug 
fishponds in the swamps and stocked them with fish for a 
fu ture food source . Over the next decade they tried to 
raise breeding p igs , they opened a bulk purchase s tore for 
members , dried copra , made handicrafts , purchased seeds and 
encouraged plant ing programs . All these s chemes met with 
i nit ial enthusiasm but ultimate failure , usually because of 
their poor design and adminis t rative difficult ies . In 1966 
the village co-operatives were formally liquidated . Member­
ship and asse ts at that t ime are recorded in Table 6 .  
Table 6 
Village co-operatives , 
Members 
Ngatiarua 41 
Tengatangi 4 1  
Mapumai 58 
Areora 80  
Teenui 48 
Atiu total 2 68 
Source : Co-operative files . 
1 966 
As sets ( $ )  
240 
3 7 6  
1 7 8  
664 
892 
$ 2 , 35 0  
I n  1 9 5 7  1 7 5  members o f  the five village co-operat ives 
j ointly subscribed $ 660 in shares to set up the Atiu 
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Co-operative Marketing Society . I t  aimed to introduce , 
encourage and market producer crop s . I t  exported small 
quanti ties of tomatoes , peanuts , and later taro and co conuts 
to Rarotonga , Tahiti and New Z ealand . I t  organized almost  
all copra production , building kilns , paying members to  
bring in  nut s , and employing labour to cut  and dry them . 
Later , a connnittee was set up to organize copra making on 
the uninhabited offshore i slet of Takutea . A gang of men 
would work there several months a year cut t ing copra and 
planting palms . Other ventures were tried : the co­
operative operated a bakery for several year s , and bought 
pigs to butcher and sell . A co-operative retail s tore was 
se t up : in 1 9 7 0  i t  had 269  shareholders with $ 1 , 7 80 in 
shares . 
In 1971  ano ther thrift and loan co-operative was set up , 
this time only for regular wage earners : its  thirty-seven 
members depos it 50 cents per month and may withdraw this 
at any time . Salary earners have a s imilar s cheme where 
they depo sit  regular amount s  into the Co-operat:i,l.re Bank in 
Raro tonga . 
Co-operatives on Atiu have been much more successful 
than on mos t  Pacific I s land s . This suggests unusually 
s trong communal feeling and unity of purpose . Today the 
s to re is the only surviving outward evidence of co-operative 
act ivity . The rest have been vic tims of mismanagement and 
waivering enthusiasm . But they did provide experience to 
learn the European concepts  of money savings and loans and 
the impersonal sale of surplus crop product ion . 
The tribe 
There are three tribes (Vaka) on Atiu . Each is headed 
by an ariki and assoc iated with one distr ic t , though its  
1 0  members are scattered all over the i sland b y  intermarriage . 
Every Atiuan recognizes primary allegiance to one or more 
tribes ( ideally the tribe of his parents ,  the tribe asso c­
iated with his village and with his planting lands) . It is 
difficul t  for an outsider to gauge the precise role of the 
lOThe 3 ariki t itles are Ngamaru of Ngat iarua , Rongomatane 
of Tengatangi and Parua of Mapuma i . In addition the 4 
senior mataiapo titles each heading a district are Paerangi , 
Aumai and Tinokura of Areora , and Makop i  of Teenui . 
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tribe in a society changing with migration and monetization . 
Some Atiuans appear confused themselves . 
The basis of chiefly power lay in ariki control over 
land s .  The Land Court eroded this power . Recognition of 
ariki status today is reflected in tribute payments . 
Attitudes to these vary cons iderably accord ing to how each 
individual feels he stands to gain or lose by them . Gen­
erally , however , when a p ig is killed the head is given to 
the ariki , 11 and so is the firs t bunch of bananas harvested 
and sometimes other first  fruits and vegetable s .  Par t  of 
unusually large fishing catches and prestige items such 
as conger eels are g iven too . 
The personalities of ranking tribal members has also been 
important in the decline in chiefly status . Today one ariki 
i s  a young g irl married to a non-Atiuan and absent from the 
island ; another is an elderly woman ; a third is criticized 
for his acquisitive attitude and political s tance . It is 
said that the ariki should no t concern himself with such 
mundane things as earning money . 
The akaere , the admini s trative head of the tribe , retains 
the crucial role . He calls tribal meetings , pas ses on news , 
and imposes tribal decisions about planting ordinances , crop 
preservation orders , wandering animal prohibitions . Mos t  
important , h e  organizes the ceremony and feasting involved 
in the inves t i ture or funeral of an ariki , extracting the 
neces sary pigs and labour . The ability of this person to 
mobil ize resources and handle day-to-day bus iness of the 
tribe has determined its  effec tiveness as a contemporary 
unit of social organization . 
An ineffect ive akaere has no recourse against  a recalcit­
rant tribe today . One akaere was observed to call on his 
tribe to  help put up a fence round the marae , the ceremonial 
centre of tribal life . Only a few people turned up to help : 
he finished the j ob himself late in the day . He later 
bemoaned that such a thing could not have happened in his 
father ' s  day . I t  may be symbolic of declining tribal 
influence that the three marae are rarely used , and their 
buildings are unoccup ied and ill-kept .  
11And , one informant j oked , the test icles go to the local 
government representat ive . 
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S ince 1950 , many high ranking tribal members have felt it  
their soc ial responsibility to participate in the new 
introduced agricultural proj ects . For example , a di sprop­
or tionate number of ariki and mataiapo hold citrus plo ts . 
But having planted the crops their ability to maintain them 
has been unimpress ive . The tribe as a unit has only rarely 
been used in cash cropp ing . 
For example , one of the economical ly mos t  act ive tribes is 
the Ngati Te Aka . The ariki of the Ngati Te Aka tribe is 
Ngamaru , the firs t created and mos t  powerful title . Accord­
ingly this tribe and Ngatiarua , its as sociated village , are 
always awarded precedence in Atiu ceremony . The tribe has 
an akaere , s ix mataiapo and s ixty-four rangatira t itles . 
The current ariki is an elderly woman who appears to be 
popular but not powerful . The tribe ' s  s trength comes from 
the personality of o ther senior t itle holders . For example , 
the akaere is a keen planter , has a prest igious j ob in the 
Agriculture Department , and holds other titles in his own 
village . His power was seen when the previous ariki (Paora) 
d ied recently and he organized a large funeral , extract ing 
sixty pigs for the feast . 
The tribe holds valuable land in the centre of the island . 
The government rents some of it . On the ceremonial marae the 
tribe built a large and expensive ariki house . I t  was never 
finished and the ariki prefers to live elsewhere . The tribe 
agreed to j oin in the f irst  two agricultural aid proj ects . 
On tribal lands they p lanted a fores try p lo t  (now dead) and 
a c itrus plot . I t  was intended that each rangatira would be 
responsible for the upkeep of two orange trees . The tribe 
would hire labour to p ick the oranges ;  two-thirds of the 
pro ceeds would go into a bank account for tribal use . The 
sys t em worked poorly : today that plot has deteriorated 
badly , and it  is lent out to tribesmen without their own 
plot . 
Crocombe (1967 ) concludes that the tribe has not been a 
s trong unit  s ince the 1900s : most  connnoners today would no t 
support an increase in its powers .  
The church 
The church continues to play an important role in Atiuan 
life . Mis sionaries brought the gospel in the 1820s and 
Christianity has spread rapidly , bringing changes in cul tural 
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outlook and village organization . Bu t in soc ial rank the 
orometua (minis ter) has been subordinated to the wishes of 
the ari ki ; and in economic habit the church reinforces the 
tradit ional importance of working together for spiritual 
salvation . 
The oldest  and the established dominant denomination i s  
the Cook Islands Chris tian Church (originally London 
Miss ionary Socie ty) . In 1919 a Roman Catholic church and 
school were built and they now have about 2 5 0  members , 
mos tly in one village . More recently the Seventh Day 
Adventis t Church was founded by about 1 00 discontent s .  The 
Morman Church tried but failed to gain a foothold . The 
churches today do not actively compete for parishioners 
( indeed they co-operate as far as helping to maintain one 
ano ther ' s  churches) . And they do not encourage the active 
competition for fund-raising that occurs in Wes tern 
Polynesia . 
Atiuans take services seriously , and spend a lo t of t ime 
preparing for ,  attending , and later discussing church . 
There are five hours of services per week . Most women and 
children and about half the men at tend church regularly . On 
average men spent one and a half hours per week there in 
1974 . 
The church has an organized hierarchy of members ; 
minis ter , elder , deacon , assis tant deacon , Sunday school 
teacher . The orometua is accorded much respect . He is an 
important participant in mos t  village activities . Parish­
ioners take turns to provide him with food , and if necessary 
they will lend him land or tend his garden . His home may be 
a refuge for destitute people or orphans . 
The deacons are the main policymakers . There are about a 
dozen and they hold regular meet ings on religious and so cial 
issues . They are elected for their high standing in the 
community , and they appear to lead opinion in economic 
matters too , though they show no special expertise there . 
They organize work for the church and can if necessary mob­
ilize vas t resources . For example , in 1967  one of the 
deacons decided to redesign and rebuild the Cook I slands 
Chris tian Church building , the largest in the Cook I slands . 
This was a massive j ob .  The deacons arranged for each 
village to provide forty volunteers to  work in rotation one 
day a week . They hired twelve permanent tradesmen , super­
vised by the de signer . They raised $ 6 , 000 locally to pay 
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for materials and another $ 200 was sent from relatives in 
New Zealand . The whole job was finished in three months . 
The churches run most  of the youth activities : Sunday 
schools , Girls ' and Boys ' Brigade , Boy S cout s . These organ­
izations are taken very seriously and o ccupy a lot of time 
for children and adults . They are often used to raise 
funds .  On holidays the church is the centre of social 
festivit ies . I t  is also the body around which are organ­
ized the popular tere parties for cultural , sporting , and 
social exchange between islands . For example in 1971 , 
forty-four members of the Cook Islands Christian Church 
raised a to tal of $ 6 , 000 and travelled as a choir to Tahit i 
for three weeks . 
The internal hierarchy of the church is  open and mobile 
comp ared wi th the rigidity of tribal rank . This offers hope 
and reward to a hardworking , conformis t  Atiuan . 
The island 
In early history the i sland faced internal d ivision and 
it held little identi ty except in t imes of war with o ther 
island s ; but today it  serves increasingly as a unit  of 
socio-economic organization . This  is partly due to the 
formation of the Cook I slands as a self-governing group , 
and to the political oppos i tion that unites most  Atiuans 
against the Rarotonga-based government (although politics 
have at  times divided the island} . Atiu elects two 
representatives to the Cook I slands Legislative Assembly . 
These  are respected men but they are too frequently absent 
in Raro tonga to influence Atiuan l ife much . 
The adminis trative head of the island is the resident 
agent , for a long t ime a New Zealander but now an Atiuan . 
Crocombe ( 1 967 : 11 0) connnents : 
Despite the drawbacks of the chiefly system the 
chiefs had obligations to , as well as rights over , 
their followers , and the people could to some 
extent exert sanc tions agains t them . But they 
had no sanct ions agains·t the Resident and no 
acces s to him .  Their only power lay in refusing 
to act . 
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The res ident agent still wield s much potent ial power but 
his effec tive position depends on his personal ab ility . 
Recent poor holders have cheapened the off ice and today o ther 
more dominant personali ties have emerged in At iuan lif e .  
A locally elec ted I sland Council , with one member per 
villag e and the resident agent and ariki ex officio, f ills  
the role of  a local authority . I t  employs people on public 
works , receiving a gran t from central government and raising 
a smal l revenue from local taxes . I t  organizes the boating 
and reef ing crews that service the off-shore ship s . I t  
adminis ters the health and planting inspect ions . Whenever 
the whole island is involved in some work proj ec t ,  the 
I sland Counc il co-ordinates it . 
For example during 1 974-75 a contingent of New Zealand 
Army eng ineers built a large harbour on Atiu , as par t of 
the pineapple scheme there . At a stage during concrete 
pouring the army requested a few local labourers to help on 
a Saturday . The Is land Council met and decided that all 
island men should turn out to help . The i sland counc illors 
announced this decision around the villages : in at least  
one village the men had to  cancel other voluntary communal 
work they had planned for that day . 
At 5 a . m .  on Saturday 150  men a ssembled at the meeting 
houses and trucks carried them to the beach . For four 
hours they worked enthusias tically in groups , collec ting 
rocks , crushing gravel , and carrying heavy concrete at a 
run . Laughter and the urging of onlookers maintained a 
pace that would have been impos sible o therwise . The army 
sup ervised the work ,  each island councillor urged on the 
men from his village , and certain dominant individuals -
a deacon , an agricul tural off icer , an ariki shouted command s 
at  whoever would li sten .  The f inal result was cons idered a 
tr iumph for the island as a whole . For the next four weeks 
the work continued , each village providing 5 0-60 men . 
Other ins titut ions such as the primary and j unior high 
schools and the ho spital call on island support . The 
kindergar ten rel ies totally on voluntary donations ; it  was 
set up in 1 96 9  on several hundred dollars raised by the 
villages . The sports  clubs and a weekly drinking clubl2 
also encourag e an island spirit . 
1 2with the grandiose title "The Enuamanu Cosmopolitan Men ' s  
Drinking Club ' . 
Chapter 3 
The At iuan economy 
During the period of first European contact on At iu sub­
sistence (non-monetary) producti-0n p revailed . Gradually 
cash cropping became a maj or occupation . Today however , 
this has been superseded by the non-agricultural sec tor : 
wage labour and inj ec tions of money from abroad . 
The subsis tence sec tor 
Untitled At iuans worked lands at the discretion of chiefs 
and in return for tribute payments . They grew a small range 
of reliable short-term crop s that had been known and grown 
for many generations . They used a s imple techno logy based 
on wooden planting tool s . 1 Sometimes their planting was 
direc ted by the chief s ;  it was also constrained by social 
norms and there was little opportunity for individual var­
iat ion . The arrival of missionaries , trader s ,  and wes tern 
administra tion including the Maori Land Court , inevitably 
altered subsistence life . In an undocumented sector it is 
hard to be sure what these changes were ; the comments of 
older growers suggest the following , although the changes 
were gradual . 
Grower s used to spend a lot  more time away from the vill­
age working on their lands ; of ten the whole family lived in 
temporary huts on the plantations and worked together . Fre­
quently group s of  friends , neighbours ,  relatives worked 
together in informal companies on one ano ther ' s  land in 
ro tation , and then drank together . Wes tern institut ions such 
as school and regular wage labour changed these work habits . 
More  work is now done individually : the 1974 survey reveal­
ed that men spent 4 . 5  hour s per week , on average , working by 
themselves in their gardens and ano ther three hours in 
communal subsistence labour , mo st  of it on taro plo ts .  I t  
1 See Allen ( 1 969)  for a full description of indigeneous and 
introduced technologies on a neighbouring island . 
3 7  
38 
also appears tha t people work more intensively today wh en 
they are faced with more demand s on the ir time . 
Technical change accompanied organizational change . 
Cu ltivators used techniques requiring minimum labour effor t . 
For example , arrowroo t ,  which requires a large cleared area , 
used to be less popular than it  is today and was grown main­
ly to make starch . Many crops , espec ially less sought-af ter 
roo t s , were not cul tivated at all , bu t were lef t to grow 
wild , provid ing a reservoir of  food for an emergency . Taro , 
the staple roo t  crop , was grown in a different way . Ins tead 
of bu ilding up compos t ed patches , taro shoo ts were planted 
straight into the swamp . This was eas ier , f or growers 
lacked tools to dig up the swamp and shoo ts could be au t­
oma tically replanted as they were harvested ; but smaller 
tubers resul ted . 
The availability of basic iron hand tools ( especially the 
machete and spade)  al tered cul tivation techniques making it 
easier to clear bush,  eliminate weed s and contour and ditch 
the taro swamp . The introduction of the horse meant prod­
uce could be transpor ted f rom d is tant planting land s . In 
the last few years it  in turn has been superseded by the 
mo torbike . Table 7 indicates the possession of iron tools . 
When the administration introduced the proj ec t crop s in 
the 1950s , they imported several trac tors with hoes , 
ploughs and slashers . These were available for private 
hire . The hope was that use of  machinery together wi th 
other techniques of mod ern plant cul ture would diffuse 
through the subsis tence sec tor . Machinery could be easily 
observed at  work and was welcomed as a labour substitute . 
The survey showed that 60  per cent of  grower s hired some 
mechanical equ ipment in 1 974 . This was mainly to clear 
ridge-top plantations , and resul ted in a big increase in 
arrowroot planting . 
However , the advantages of o ther techniques were les s 
obvious . C onservative growers feared to experiment with 
unknown prac tices on a vital food supply . In 1974 no 
growers used fertil izer on their subsistence crops , most 
relying on plot ro ta tion and composting to overcome fertil­
ity deficiencies ; only a f ew sprayed against d isea se , the 
res t having no way to c ombat such recent problems as the 
tar>o bl ight . 
Table 7 
Posses sion of agricul tural hand tools 
Axe 
Machete 
Hoe and rake 
Fork 
Shovel and spade 
Pruning saw 
Reap hook 
Value at  1 97 4  prices a 
Number per household 
1950  1975  
1 . 2  1 . 0  
1 . 7  2 . 8  
0 . 1  1 . 3  
0 . 7  
1 . 5 1 . 8  
1 . 4  
1 . 0  1 . 4  
$ 2 0  $ 3 7  
3 9  
aln addition each household had o n  average $ 1 7  invested in 
heavy equipment : wheelbarrows , knap sack sprayers , citrus 
ladders , mowers ,  etc . 
Source :  FAO survey , 1 95 0 ;  f ield survey , 1 97 5 .  
There i s  little variation in choice o f  crops grown . In 
1 9 7 4  everyone grew taro and bananas ,  most grew taro tarua, 
arrowroo t  and either yams or kumara . Only a third of grow­
ers p lanted anything el se , usually tomato es or o ther 
introduced vegetables . Table 8 gives estimates of areas 
under crop s compared with an earlier survey for conf irma­
tion . 2 
The season allocation of  work is determined by the warm 
we t summer months and the dry cooler winter . Taro and 
arrowroot may be planted in any season and mature in nine 
months and a year respec tively . Taro tarua, bananas and 
yams are all planted during the second part of the year and 
are harvested a year later , though the yam crop may be lef t 
2 Data such as these are very prone to error . Crop areas are 
difficult to estimate and the accuracy of some earlier 
measures is doubtful . With these qualifications in mind 
the data may still be useful . 
4 0  
Taro 
Taro tarua 
Kumar a 
Yam 
Tomatoes 
Arrowroot 
Bananas a 
Table 8 
Subsistence crops ( in hec tares } 
1 9 6 6  1 974  
21  19  
10  1 2  
6 4 
4 1 
2 3 
9 18  
9 41 
aThe 1 966 f igure f or bananas covers new plantings only ; 
the 1 9 7 4  f igure includes all bearing banana shoots .  
Source :  Agricul tural Census , 1966 ; field survey , 1 97 4 . 
in the ground for up to three years in storag e .  Vege table 
crops and kurnara are planted earlier in the year and mature 
in s ix months or les s ;  consequently kurnara is the f ir s t  
crop to b e  replanted af ter a hurricane . The result is  that 
the work load is spread over the seasons , but the food 
supply may be shor ter during the f ir s t  half of  the year . 
There is  less reliance today on the wild crops that  used 
to be an important part of  the d iet . Some of  these have 
been relegated to inferior emergency foods . But a lot of 
time is  s till spent in seeking ou t and gathering native 
foods , fuels and raw materials for handicraf ts and med ic­
ines , most  of it  in the wilds of the makatea . There are 
fruits (coconuts , breadfruit , pawpaw, mango , capsicum , 
guava ) , berrie s ( coffee) , nuts  (ches tnuts , cashews ) , stems 
( sugar cane) , leaves (flax ,  pandanus , young kurnara leaves ) , 
young fern frond s ,  and roo ts  (puraka, kape, tii) . Men hunt 
for honey or crabs , and catch eel s in the swamps .  Women 
and children collec t firewood , or shells and seafoods on 
the reef . 
Fishing is  done by the men : methods include rod f ishing 
off the edge of the reef , net ting in the rocky pools  of the 
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lagoon , or handlining from a canoe in the open sea . Fish 
are an important source of protein in the diet and are con­
sidered a del icacy . Bu t the work is time consuming , risky ,  
and sometimes dangerous . Because o f  this i t  i s  a declining 
ac tivity . On average two to three hours p er week are spent 
fishing . I t  appears that  the number of canoes has declined 
from one per two households in 1950 to about one per four in 
1974 . However , mo st  households s till have access to one . 
All Atiuan households keep fowls and a few p ig s . About 
half keep goats for special occasions . P igs are usually 
penned in the far off maka tea, and they must  be fed daily . 
Consequently a family spends about eight hours a week car­
ing for pig s . This appears likely to make p ig raising a 
more specialized occupat ion although at present there is 
little trade in live s tock .  Table 9 presents a lives tock 
census data . 
Table 9 
L ives tock 
1950  1955  1960  1966  1 9 7 5  
Poul try a 5 , 188 2 , 8 67 4 , 7 7 7  4 , 535 n . a .  
P ig s  1 , 87 1  1 , 32 8  1 , 822  1 , 8 7 0  1 , 35 9  
Goats 4 54 3 9 7  4 5 2  5 9 8  7 63 
Horses 95 72 74 59 22 
Cattle 1 3 5 1 
�umbers are es timates only and depend on the season during 
which the census is taken . 
Source : Agricultural C ensuses . 
Evidence suggests subsistence production has declined 
slowly in the past owing to the pressures of cash cropping , 
and continues to decline because of the at trac tion o f  wage 
labour . The evidence of  Table 10 supports this view (with 
the qualifications of foo tnote 2) . 
However , subsistence production remains important in 
Atiuan economic life today . A rough estimate of its  value 
at current market prices is $ 900 per household per year or 
40 per cent of to tal income ( see Table 11) . Note that this 
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Table 1 0  
Area p lanted in taro (hec tares ) 
1 954 1 9 6 6  1 97 0  1 97 4  
26  21 20 19 
Sources :  FAO Survey , 1 954 ; Agricul tural Censu s , 1 96 6 ;  
Agricul tural Survey , 1 97 0 ;  field survey , 1 974 . 
1 .  
2 .  
3 .  
4 .  
5 .  
6 . 
7 .  
Table 11 
E s t imate of sub sistence income , 1 97 4  
Taro 
Tarua, arrowroo t ,  kumara, 
Bananas 
European vegetables 
Fruit , seafood , f irewood , 
Fish 
Livestock 
yam 
nuts  
$ per household 
192  
114 
44 
18 
2 9  
2 9  
4 8 0  
$ 906 
No te : 1-4 are calcula ted from crop production survey , es­
timated at  market prices , even though no t all the produce 
is fully traded ; 
5 and 6 are calculated at fac tor cos t  from labour survey ; 
7 is valued a t  l ikely marke t price , g iven probable· turnover 
of stock of animals . 
All values given here and afterwards are in New Zealand 
dollars , corrected to 1 9 74 values unless o therwise 
specif ied . 
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estimate is somewhat hypo thetical as no t all components are 
commonly traded . 
Cash cropp ing 
Traders arrived late on Atiu and held little sway over 
the populace .  Opportunities to earn money were controlled 
by the ariki and were usually for conununal benefit . In the 
late nineteenth century non-perishable indigeneous crops 
were sold through the few Chinese and European traders . For 
example , Findlay ( 1884) records Atiuan exports of 10 tons 
of coconut oil , a ton of co t ton and a ton of arrowroo t . 
For a long time offic ial reports told of  the potential 
production of the i sland but the inability of the admin­
is tration to extract it . 3 I t  took the dominance and mana 
of one ariki, Ngamaru Rongotini , to organize any s izeable 
surplus for trade . For example in 1902 Atiuans exported 
118 tons of  copra , 5 tons o f  coffee , 1 , 000 gallons of 
limej u ice , and 1 , 962 cases of  oranges , under his direc tion . 4 
Over the next few years , bananas , candlenuts , kwnara and 
pineapples were also exported . Records of  export volumes 
in the early twentieth century appear in Table 12 . Reliable 
price data to estimate incomes are no t available . 
For the first decade of  the twentieth century expor ts 
were high though f luctuating . Money earned was mainly spent 
on communal proj ects . The goods traders offered made little 
difference to permanent consumption patterns . In 1 910 
Ngamaru d ied and a European resident agent was appo inted ; 
ariki influence decreased . Atiuan growers realized they 
could now earn money on their own account , and that the best  
way to do  this was to concentrate on  the oranges and copra , 
the mo s t  profitable crop s . Over the next decade erratic 
but of ten considerable effort  was spent in producing these . 
(Orange produc tion per capita was as high as in the best 
years of the recent Citrus Replanting Scheme . )  Atiuan 
growers had their f irst  personal exper ience of external 
produce markets , and they suff ered some learning pains . 
World War I brought sharp movements  in price and shipping 
shortages . In 1 91 9  growers complained of traders forming 
3e . g .  see Appendix 3 to Journa l of House of Representati1Jes, 
1 9 02 , p . 4 9 ;  1 9 08 ,  p . 11 .  
4 Report of New Zealand Department of Agricu l ture, 1 903 , 
p . 4 2 6 .  
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Oranges 
( cases) 
1901 n . a .  
1902 1 , 962 
1903 4 , 000 
1904 n . a . 
1 905 3 , 14 1  
1906 9 , 3 3 3  
1907 13'  762 
1908 10 ' 974 
1909 4 , 19 14 
1 9 10 
1 9 1 1  
1 9 1 2  
19 1 3  
1 3 , 5 66 
14 , 0 72 
14 ' 7  2 2  
8 ,  9 7 5  
1914 2 , 19 6  
1 9 1 5  5 , 604 
1 9 1 6  
1 9 1 7  
5 ' 7 1 6  
2 , 2 5 8  
1 9 1 8  2 , 2 40 
1 9 19 
1 9 2 0  
19 2 1  
1 9 2 2  
1 9 2 3  
1924 
1925 
1926 
1 9 2 7  
1 9 2 8  
1 9 2 9  
1 9 30 
9 ,  102 
14 ' 509 
9 , 2 1 7  
1 3 , 200 
9 , 2 61 
Copra 
( t ons) 
1 1 8  
n . a .  
n . a .  
1 4 4  
30 
4 1  
1 4 5  
2 0 4  
2 0 3  
1 7 0  
149 
2 60 
4 3  
2 7  
150 
106 
n . a .  
n . a .  
n . a . 
n . a .  
1 5 7  
Coffee 
( lb )  
1 1 , 000 
n . a .  
n . a .  
2 , 0 7 3  
1 0 '  900 
5 , 1 60 
5 , 900 
3 , 300 
1 1 , 000 
900 
2 , 000 
2 , 600 
3 , 000 
T ab l e  12 
Volume of exports , 1900-1930 
Limej uice 
( ga l . )  
1 , 000 
n . a .  
3 , 150 
3'  7 80 
5 4 0  
100 
Kumar a Coconuts 
( case s )  (no . )  
1 , 200 
2 , 000 
Bananas 
( cases) 
21 
198 
28 
2 7  
Candlenut 
( tons )  
900 
620 
Pineapples 
( cases ) 
3 1  
Source : Report o,"' N e '.J  Zea land Department o f  Agriculture, 1903 ; Appendix 3 to the . Journal o f  t h e  House of 
Representatives, 1905-1930 . 
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monopolies to set artif icially low produce prices ; 5 for a 
period oranges were shipped through a Raro tongan co-oper­
ati ve . 
During the 1 930s depression hit the New Zealand market ; 
in 193 2 the orange price dropped to a quarter i t s  previous 
level . Growers were perplexed ; suspec t ing injustice they 
slashed their production and received very low returns . 
Complaints of poverty were made to the New Zealand govern­
ment . In 1937 they set up the Fruit Con trol S cheme ; the 
government would buy and market all Atiuan oranges . Growers 
responded to the higher and more s table prices , and by the 
end of the decade oranges had entered a new boom . 
Then , in the late 1 94 0s , a second crisis s truck : the 
native orange trees became badly diseased and yields fell 
mysteriously . This caused economic dis tress and social 
discontent . Growers switched to copra which they produced 
individually and in bulk through the co-operatives for the 
next twenty years . 
To meet this situation a series of  new crops were intro­
duced as aid proj ects s tarting in 1 95 0 .  This marked a 
watershed : the end of the trade in wild-growing native 
produce and the beginning of  s cientifically cul t ivated 
introduced cash crops . No longer could an Atiuan go out 
into the bush and be sure of f inding a crop that had self­
seeded and grown wild there , then gather it , and with a 
minimum of process ing , sell it  to the trader for a reason­
ably assured and innnediate return on his labour . The 
generations of accumulated experience and knowledge built 
up about indigeneous crops were no longer relevant and 
somet imes misleading . The newly introduced crops required 
much more planning and cultivation than the old , and they 
were very sensitive to the new Atiuan environment . Inev­
itably the p eriod was marked by uncertainty and confus ion , 
as described in Chapter 4 .  
Over the next twenty-f ive year s mos t  growers earned some 
money from a variety of proj ect crops . Mos t  important were 
the oranges  planted by three-quarters of households under 
the C itrus Replanting S cheme . The s tory of cash cropping 
on Atiu is largely the s tory of orange production . 
5 See Merchants , Plant ers and Traders of  the Cook Islands , 
1 92 0 .  
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Fo r a few years in the 1950s mo st  growers cul tivated tomat­
oes . In the late 1 96 0s and early 1 9 7 0s a few growers har­
vested and sold coffee . For a couple of  years many growers 
exported their taro to Rarotonga , and a few planted pine­
apples .  More recently a few growers have earned high 
incomes growing vege tables . Figure 4 and Table 13 record 
the composition of  cash crop income s ince 1 9 3 0  in money 
terms . It has been subj ec t to violent fluc tuations , a 
moderate increase in the 1 9 50s- and 1960s , then a recent fall 
as opportunities for wage income become available in the 
1 9 7 0s . 
The non-agricul tural activit ies 
The public secto r .  The adminis tration on Atiu , inspired 
by New Zealand concep ts of government paternalism , has 
always been pervasive ; it has grown to the level where 
today it provides 7 0  per cent of Atiuan income . 
The adminis tration has employed a number of  Atiuans on 
salaries for some time . Half of them are teachers , the 
rest adminis trators , agricul tural , heal th and public works 
s taff . This reflec ts the range of services made available 
to At iuans . Today there is a wide gap between the wage of 
a labourer (about $16 per weekJ and a government salary 
(averaging $ 1 , 400 per annum) . For example in 1973  the 5 0  
salary-earners grossed more than did the 1 7 0  regular and 
casual labourers .  
In the past , few wage j obs were available . In the 1 940s 
group s of men travelled to work for a period on a phosphate 
island in French Polynesia . The only other work was load­
ing the occasional ships . Then in the 1 960s a series of  
proj ects boo s t ed j ob opportunities-. First the revamped 
citrus scheme needed labourers to prune and spray . Then 
in 1 9 64 labourers were employed to set up the coffee 
proj ect . In 1965 the government housing scheme began . And 
from 1 9 7 0  the pineapple incorporation started to absorb 
workers . This las t proj ec t is so large and labour inten­
s ive that it is the maj or employer today ; today all who 
want wage work can get  i t  and the pineapples  suffer from 
a labour shortage . In 1 974-75 this was temporarily 
aggravated by the men working for the New Zealand Army 
buil ding a harbour on Atiu . About a third of households 
now have a regular wage or salary earner and most  o thers 
have at least one casual wage earner . 
$000 
[)(J oranges 
E=-=-:J copra 
tomatoes 
taro 
15 � cof fee 
10 
5 
1111 p ineapples 
[:·T:"!:n vege tab les 
I 
1935 45 5 5  6 5  
Fig . 4. Agricultural incomes , 19 30-7 4  
Note : Net money income received b y  growers (not total expo rt receipt s ) . 
is the area between the lines . Area under the top line repres ents 
income . 
Source : Table 13 . 
7 5  
Revenue from each crop 
total agricultural 
Table 1 3  
Agricul tural produc t ion and income, 1 930-74 
Oranges Copra Toma toes Cof fee Taro Pineapples V ege tables Other produce Total Ag . income 
Cases ( $ )  Tons ( $ )  lb . ($)  lb . ( $ )  Cases ( $ )  Cases ($)  ( $ )  ( $ )  ( $ )  
1930 9 , 2 61 7 ,  7 7 9  1 5 7  2 , 662 36 1 0 , 4 7 7  
1931 10, 028 7 , 621 1 7 7  1 , 7 02 9 , 323 
1932 2,  7 24 54 5 1 2 9  2 , 064 2 , 609 
1 9 3 3  1 2 , 903 2 , 58 1  2 8  4 4 8  3 , 029 
1 9 34 2 , 983 448 1 1 9  4 67 
1 9 3 5  7 , 831 1,  958 1 , 9 58 
1 9 3 6  9 , 664 1 , 93 3  2 1 7  3 , 4 7 2  5 , 4 0 5  
1 9 3 7  1 6 , 2 8 7  4 , 88 6  81 1 , 2 9 6  6 , 182 
1938 2 1 , 1 9 6  7 , 4 18 7 , 4 18 
1 9 3 9  1 7 , 114 6 , 84 6  6 , 84 6  
1940 2 2 , 1 3 6  8 , 854 8 , 8 54 
1 941 2 9 , 4 3 7  10, 303 1 0 , 3 03 
1942 1 1 , 1 7 6  4 , 688 4 , 688 
1 9 4 3  7 , 84 1  4 ,  088 48 864 4, 9 52 
1 944 1 1 , 8 01 7 , 62 7  14 4 2 0  8 , 04 7  
1 94 5  12 , 91 6  9 , 307 9 , 3 07 
1 94 6  3 , 987 2 , 9 3 9  4 4  1 , 7 6 0  4 , 699 
1947 8 , 07 7 8 , 4 38 1 5  600 34 9 , 07 2  
1 948 3 , 2 3 6  4 , 4 2 6  61 4 , 88 0  9 , 306 
1949 1 , 7 31 1 , 98 2  5 9  6 , 254 150 8 , 38 6  
1950 1 , 2 6 7  1 , 4 5 0  5 9  6 , 4 90 7 .  940 
1951 42 5 , 04 0  2 4 6  5 , 28 6  
1952 505 530 50 6 , 500 7 , 030 
1953 40 5 , 120 5 , 120 
1954 700 910 95 11, 780 12 , 690 
1955 327 211 24 2 , 880 1 , 995 2 , 394 5 , 485 
1956 989 400 42 4 , 872 2 , 988 3 , 586 8 , 858 
1957 2 , 579 1 , 294 6 6  6 , 864 3 , 510 4 , 388 12 , 546  
1958 7 , 35 6  1 , 84 5  75  7 , 500 104 94 9 ,439  
1959 6 ,  7 92 2 , 380 71  10, 650 234 187 140 140 13 , 357 
1960 98 3 6  8 2  9 , 840 338 237 10, 113 
1961 4 , 140  1 , 739  70  7 , 000 71 43 77 80 85 8 , 947 
1962 9, 838 5 , 509 24 2 , 400 7 6  7 , 98 5  
1963 10, 480 8 , 803 41 4 , 592 156  13 , 551 
1964 10, 758 9, 037 82 9 , 676 18 27  365  19 , 105 
1965 24 , 334 1 7 , 88 6  3 0  3 , 660 111 28 21 , 574 
1966 23 , 800 1 7 , 493  12  1 , 3 92 213 47 69  68 60 19 , 060 
1967 19, 570 14 , 384 4 456  1 , 040  280 106 128 15 , 248 
1968 7 , 4 74 3 , 87 2  1 3  2 , 145 1 , 34 7  3 7 7  6 , 394 
1969 23 , 227 8 , 455 1 , 197 323 190 243 9 , 021  
1970 1 2 , 758 4 , 197 3 540 13 , 881 2, 7 7 6  245 490 8 , 003 
1971 13, 936 4 , 2 92 6 , 17 6  1 , 420 1 , 194 2 , 67 5  1 , 058 943 9 , 330 
1972 11 , 301 4 , 351 38 , 735 6 , 198 1 , 596 3 , 910 7 04 592 15 , 051 
1973 1 3 , 4 1 3  7 , 32 3  10, 892 1 , 307 710  7 68 9 , 398 
1974 5, 839 3 , 3 52 8 , 584 1 , 373  41 50 3 , 434 8 , 209 
Note: Crop income refers to net revenue paid to grower , not to total crop value. 
Other produce includes intermittent exports of arrowroot, kumara, coconuts, taro ta:rua, passionfruit. 
Source: Files of Atiu administration . 
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The New Z ealand Government established a s cheme o f  minor 
social transfers : old age , destitution , and war pensions . 
The Cook Islands Government boosted these into an impor tant 
source of income , especially for old people whose children 
have migrated . This compensates for the lo s s  of  security 
from the breaking up of  the extended family unit . 
The private sec tor . The private sec tor on Atiu is  small 
and s tatic . There are two branches of large Rarotongan 
s tores . The co-operative runs a store ; in the past it  also 
ran village bulk stores and employed men to make copra . 
Private individuals have made short-lived attempts  to open 
s tores of  their own . These  have f ailed because of  low 
turnover ,  low legal profit  margins , and requests by relatives 
for credit . In the 1960s the police decided to open private 
s tores  in several villages : only one survives . 
In 1 9 72 one enterprising grower formed a small company 
with Raro tongan friends and set up his own store . He was 
s tric t in emphasizing that he would not give relatives 
goods and that debts  mus t be settled weekly . At the same 
t ime an Atiuan living in Raro tonga raised a large commercial 
loan there and re-lent $ 4 00 to each of several At iuans , to 
open small s tores in the front of their houses and buy their 
goods through him .  Currently there are five private stores 
operating . 
In 1974  a t iny growers ' market was buil t , and half a 
do zen vegetable growers occasionally sell produce there . 
Other growers report misgivings about such buying and sell­
ing , for it  conflic t s  with traditional views of gif t-giving 
and requests . 
In the past up to s ix bakers have been turning out a few 
loaves on tiny back-yard ovens made out of old o il drums . 
Today there is  only one : a much larger mechanized unit , 
with a staff of  four . Run by a returned At iuan migrant , i t  
produces over 1 000 small loaves o f  bread a day fairly 
regularly . With an average weekly turnover of  about $ 4 00 , 
i t  makes a good profit . 
The only o ther private businesses are two bands that play 
at  dances and special occasions . One consists  o f  eleven 
growers who formed a work group and raised $ 4 00 to buy 
ins truments . Later , one of the shopkeepers bought electri­
f ied instruments and a generator to run them , then taught 
1961 
1962 
1 963 
1 964 
1 965 
1 9 6 6  
1 96 7  
1 968 
1 96 9  
1 9 7 0  
1 9 7 1  
1 97 2  
1 9 7 3  
1 974 
Remit t­
ances 
14 , 7 54 
18 , 3 9 6  
2 1 , 2 3 0  
2 2 , 838 
2 9 , 524 
3 2 , 4 3 0  
31 , 852 
3 5 , 7 6 2  
3 7 , 02 0e 
33 , 800e 
2 5 , 8 00e 
23 , 090e 
34 , 741 
5 9 , 7 08e 
Pensions 
1 , 600 
1 , 600 
1 , 750 
1 , 750 
2 , 330 
2 , 730 
6 , 57 0  
5 , 54 0  
6 , 04 0  
7 , 14 0  
7 , 1 90 
7 , 94 0  
9 , 4 9 0  
22 , 87 0  
Table 1 4  
Total incomes ,  1 961-74 (dollars) 
Salaries 
12 , 100 
14 , 52 0  
1 7 , 850 
18 , 000 
24 , 7 60 
26 , 150 
37 , 4 00 
3 7 , 300 
3 5 , 900 
4 6 , 160 
52 , 000 
51 , 4 8 0  
5 7 , 000 
7 3 , 02 5  
Regular 
wages 
6 , 000 
5 , 760 
5 , 400 
6 , 400 
8 , 400 
9 , 1 2 0  
11 , 880 
1 3 , 44 0  
1 0 , 800 
13 , oooe 
1 3 , 250 
1 7 , 000 
1 3 , 000 
1 6 , 200 
Casual 
wagese 
6 , 000 
3 ,  7 2 0  
3 , 000 
3 , 000 
5 , 7 00 
7 , 600 
7 , 200 
2 , 03 0  
2 , 050 
9 , 300 
9 , 60 0  
2 2 , 600 
2 5 , 850 
6 6 , 27 4  
Private 
sec tore 
1 , 000 
1 , 3 00 
1 , 500 
1 , 7 00 
2 , 000 
3 , 000 
4 , 300 
4 , 800 
5 , 3 00 
5 , 800 
6 , 100 
7 , 000 
9 , 000 
12 , 2 7 0  
Total 
non-Ag . 
41 , 454 
45 , 2 9 6  
50 , 7 3 0  
53 , 688 
72 . 7 14 
81 , 030 
99 , 202 
98 , 87 2  
9 7  , 11 0  
115 , 2 00 
113 , 940 
1 2 9 , 110 
1 4 9 , 081 
25 0 , 34 7  
Agricul­
tural 
income 
8 , 947 
7 , 985 
13 , 551 
1 9 , 105 
21 , 574 
1 9 , 060 
15 , 248 
6 , 3 94 
9 , 021 
8 , 003 
9 , 330 
1 5 , 051 
9 , 3 98 
8 , 2 09 
To tal 
income 
50 , 401 
53 , 281 
64 , 281 
7 2 ,  7 93 
94 , 288 
1 00 , 090 
114 , 45 0  
105 , 26 6  
1 0 6 , 131 
12 3 , 203 
1 2 3 , 2 7 0  
144 , 161 
158 , 4 7 9  
258 , 55 6  
Sourc e s :  Files o f  Atiu administrat ion , f ield no tes . 
No te : 1 .  Mos t of these f igures are calculated from payment vouchers ; where some component had to be 
e s t imated because of lost records , the f igure is marked ' e ' . 
2 .  Mos t  remi t tances are traceable from money orders not cheques ; a small amount is carried 
home and cannot be traced because Atiu uses New Zealand currency . Hence the f igures quo ted 
are underestimates . 
3 .  Casual wages were paid out mainly for work o n  the C i t rus Scheme 1 9 61-64 , the Housing 
Scheme 1 9 65-67 , and the P ineapple Incorporation 1970 on ; in 1974 a lot of men worked on 
the harbour proj ec t .  
4 .  Pensions include $ 3 , 2 7 0  paid out t o  land-owners i n  1974 a s  rent for incorporated land s �  
52 
$000 
160 
120 
80 
40 
Fig .  5 .  
� casual wages 
f��{:J regular wages 
� s alaries 
DIIIJ private sector 
1966 
Governmen t sector 
Salaries and wages , 1961-75 
74 
N ote : Income from each source is represented by area 
between the lines . Area under top line is  cumulat ive 
wage and salary income . 
Source : Tab le 14 . 
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his wife to sing and his daughters to play . Little money 
but a certain prest ige is to be had this way . 
There is  lit tle entrepreneurial talent and initiative on 
Atiu compared to  many Pacific islands . Even in a small is­
olated Polynes ian conununi ty such as Tonga , there is a con­
tinuous supply of men with small savings setting up new 
businesses , albeit suffering a high failure rate (Bollard 
1976) . One reason is that the paternal public  sector on 
Atiu dulls initiative and rewards conformity . 
Another reason is  that many potential entrepreuneurs have 
migrated to Rarotonga or New Zealand af ter encountering 
soc ial resistance to their ideas on Atiu . But they s t ill 
play a part in the Atiuan economy through the money they 
remi t . When a person migrates he usually sends or brings 
back savings to his parent or wife : the amount depends on 
their  needs and the length o f  absence . About 80 p er cent of 
households receive remittances , and today they cons titute 
one-quarter of to tal money income . 
Figure 5 and Table 14 show the rapidly ris ing value of 
non-agricultural incomes . Crhey increased six-fold from 
1961 to 1974 in money terms . }  There has clearly been a 
s truc tural shif t in the monetized economy away from self­
employed cash cropping towards wage labour for the gov­
ernment . This  is  demonstrated by table 15 which records the 
principal occupations of At iuans·. 
Table 15 
PrinciEal o ccuEat ions 
1956 1975  
Male Female Male Female 
Full t ime planter 2 6 6  7 6  
Wage labourer 17 11  1 2 0  9 
Private sector 8 1 10  7 
Salar ied 32 5 34  17 
Total 323 17 240 33 
Source : Population Census , 1 95 6 ;  Population Count , 1 97 5 . 
1902 
Oranges 655 
Copra 2 , 400 
Coffee 
L ime j uice 
Total income 
(money 
3 7 0  
7 0  
1930 
Oranges 
Copra 
Lemons , etc . 
Wages ( e s t . )  
Table 
ComEarison o f  money 
1950 
7 ' 7 7 9  Orang es 
2 , 662 Copra 
36 Wage s 
2 , 000 Salaries 
Remi t t s , 
e tc . a 
16 
incomes 2  1900-74 
1970  
1 , 4 50  Oranges 4 , 197  
6 , 4 90  Copra 540 
4 , 200 C o f f ee 2 ,  7 7 6  
4 , 04 0  Taro 490  
Wages 28 , 100 
14 , 900 
Salaries 4 6 , 160 
Remi t t s , 
e t c . 401 940 
price s )  $ 3 , 49 5  $12 , 47 7  $ 31 , 080 $ 123 , 203 
Real income 
per cap ita 
( a t  1974 
prices) $34 $51 $ 7 1  
Cl.rhis f igure includes wages of men temporarily working on a phospha te i sl and . 
Sources : M i s c el laneous rec ord s o f  Cook I slands a nd New Z e a land governmen t s .  
$120 
1 974  
Oranges 3 , 35 2  
P ineapples so 
Cof fee 1 , 3 73  
Vegetables 3 , 4 34 
Wages 94 , 744  
Salaries 73 , 025  
Remi t t s , 
etc . 82 , 57 8  
$258 , 55 6  
$188 
55 
Changes in income composition 
The pattern of money earning has changed since f irst 
moneti zat ion . For example in 1902 most product ion was s t ill 
non-monetized but cash cropp ing was beginning to realize a 
small income . By 19 30 a handful of people were receiving a 
little in casual wages though cash cropp ing was es tab lished 
as the main activity . Non-agricultural incomes had increas­
ed s ignificant ly by 1950 . In the next twenty years real 
money incomes nearly doub led , though cash cropping contri­
buted only a small part . This trend cont inues . By 19 74 
to tal incomes had risen dramatically but cash crops earned 
only 3 per cent of this . 6 This pattern may be seen in Tab le 
16 . Sub s is tence incomes cannot be  documented but have appar­
ently fallen only gradually over this period . 
By 19 74 the average Atiuan household contained one or two 
income earners who were part-time subsistence farmers and 
part-time wage earners working for the government . In addi­
tion most  collected a little casual income from orange plots 
and sub stant ial unearned income in pens ions and remittances .  
Table 17  
Average household income , 1974  
Regular wages and salaries 
Casual wages 
Cash crop income 
Pensions 
Remit tances 
Total 
Source : Field survey , 1 97 4 . 
$ 4 7 0  
3 4 9  
7 3  
12 0 
292  
$ 1 , 304 
3 �  
27 
6 
9 
2 2  
1 00% 
Analys is of d isaggregated incomes by households shows 
that income distribution is s ignif icantly skewed : the mos t  
common range of income is  less than $400 . Almos t  every 
6 19 74 was an atyp ical year because of the Army Harbour 
Proj ect . 
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$000 
200 
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Note : 
Source : 
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[[ITJ 
• 
agricul tural income 
s alaries and wages 
une arned income ( pens ions , r em i t tances ,  
land ren t )  
1 9 6 6  
Fig . 6 .  Total ,incomes , 1961-74 
Area under top line represents cumulative to tal 
incomes . 
Tab le 14 . 
74 
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household earns under $ 1 , 600 . A small number earn over 
$ 2 , 4 00 .  Figure 7 shows this . Income disparity may increase 
with increasing opportunities for spec ialization . At the 
same time incomes may become more equitable as there is 
le s s  regard for traditional rank and privilege . 7 
households 
30 
10 
2000 4000 
Fig . 7 .  Dist ribut ion of incomes , 1 9 7 4  
Note : His togram of dis tribution of money incomes only . 
Sources : Field survey , Adminis tration payment vouchers , 
other f i les of  Atiu administrat ion . 
7The coefficient of  variat ion , a normalized measure of dis­
persion (= standard error/mean) was . 98 for incomes in 
1 9 7 4  and . 97 for incomes in a small and biased survey in 
1 96 6  (Menzies 1 9 7 0) . This does no t suggest any marked 
change in the recent distribution of income . 
Chap ter 4 
The agricul tural aid proj ects 
Native orange production 
Sinc e the nine teenth century orange trees have grown wild 
on Atiu . They seem to have originated from sweet naval 
orange seeds from ei ther the Med iterranean or Chile , left 
by the early missionaries and traders . They spread na tur­
ally and prolif ically through the bush , growing very tall 
( 1 0  metres and more , wi th high-spreading canopies) . They 
yielded heavy crop s of low quality , seedy , thin-skinned , 
fungus-covered oranges .  
Each household held picking rights over two or three 
groves containing perhaps thirty or forty trees. They did 
no t cul tiva te these at all . A former D irec tor of Agricul­
ture wro te ' citrus produc tion wa s looked upon as one of the 
g if ts of nature which did no t require the aid or labour of 
man ' (Baker 1 952 : 18 5 ) . The trees grew hardy , adap ting 
themselves to weed competition , water shortages , and the few 
indigeneous pest s . In this respec t , orange trees were 
similar to the coconut palms , native coffee and o ther wild 
fruit trees which grew on Atiu ; they fitted usefully into 
a ga thering economy . 
The day before a ship was due to arrive , a family would 
walk down to one of their orange groves and roughly clear 
the undergrowth from the mature trees . The oranges could be 
shaken off the small trees ; young children had to climb up 
the big ones , and pick into kero sene tins or throw the fruit 
down . No niceties of modern ci trus handling here . The men 
laboriously carried the cases of fruit up the gullies and 
through the bush to the nearest road acces s . From there the 
local traders trucked them down to the beach . Here they 
were repacked and weighed by the family , and then boated ou t 
to the ship lying off shore . Oranges were consigned to New 
Zealand , so harvesting was dependent on the irregular and 
infrequent shipping l inks . 
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For half the twentienth century native oranges dominated 
the cash economy . At first  they brought high returns ; then 
prices began to drop . Traders allegedly formed a monopoly 
to keep the price down . They encouraged islanders to buy 
from them on cred it  so they would be forced to consign them 
their oranges to pay off this deb t . When cargo space was 
limited each trader allocated each grower a quo ta based on 
the money the lat ter owed him .  Prices to the grower dropped 
to a fraction of the fruits ' resale value in New Zealand . 
Occas ionally shipments would net no payment at all . Agit­
ated growers threatened to withhold oranges . 
With the star t of the Great D epress ion prices plummet ted 
again . Growers became increasingly indebted to trader s , and 
reacted by shipp ing less and les s . By 1934 they received on 
average a twentieth of 1930 incomes . Allegations of poverty 
and profiteering promp ted the New Zealand Government to send 
a parl iamentary delegat ion to inves tigate the fruit growing 
indus try . l As a result , the Fruit Contro l Scheme was set 
up in 1937 . The adminis tration undertook to buy , transpor t ,  
and market produce ;  they al so employed a citrus expert on 
Rarotonga to improve the crop . Over the nex t  few years , 
prices  tripled and so d id Atiuan production . 
During the 1940s production again declined , this t ime 
more serious ly . The native trees s tar ted to die off myst­
eriously . Many theories have b een advanced . Mos t  trees 
were over seventy years old , near the end of their lif e .  
N o  one had transplanted seedlings and natural regeneration 
had been too slow. Death had been hastened by two recent 
hurricanes , by the clearing of orange groves for o ther crops , 
and by the increasing rat population eating fallen seed 
oranges . Also several European growers on Rarotonga , in 
importing new strains of citrus s tock from overseas , had 
unwi t t ingly introduced new pests  and diseases to which 
native trees had no natural immunity .  
The Agriculture Department advised growers to prune their 
trees down to a stump a few feet high . Growers received this 
advice susp ic iously ,  but from 1947 to 1949 most of them did 
so . I t  appear s that the number of trees bearing fruit 
halved from forty per household in 194 0 to twenty in 19 50 . 
Desp ite rap idly rising prices production dropped from 30 , 000 
cases to 1 , 000 . Rumour was r if e : Europeans were trying to 
take over Maor i lands ; a myster ious poison had spread through 
1see Report on the Cook Is lands Fruit Industry , 193 6 .  
6 0  
the soil and n o  crops could b e  grown . Economic instability 
threa tened polit ical ins tabil ity . Agitati'on l ed to the 
protest Cook I sland Prog ressive As sociat ion being set up in 
Rarotonga . 
The origin of the C itrus Replanting Scheme 
The New Zealand Government ac ted to defuse the situat ion 
by revital izing the orange growing industry through the 
whole lower Cook Group . First they offered to assist , in 
replanting oranges , any grower who could arrange a clear 
individual title to his land . This was impossible for 
most , and the scheme was dropped . Then the adminis trat ion 
proposed to lease a large area of growers '  land , br ing it 
into orange production , and then pay the landowner s half 
the proceed s . D is trust of government mot ives led growers 
to rej ect this too . 
Eventually the provisions of the C i trus Replanting Scheme 
were set tled . An ind ividual grower could obtain secure 
tenure over customary land by the consent o f  all owners to 
this sole right to proceed s  from a plot . This was formal­
ized through an occupat ion right through the Land Court . 
A condition was tha t  the land be used ' in a husband-like 
manner ' .  Then the government would provide trees , with 
advic e and services to grow them . The scheme aimed to 
standard ize plo t s  at 90 trees ( 0 . 4  ha) on Rarotonga and 
4 5  trees ( 0 . 2 ha) on the outer islands ; this implici tly 
a ssumed ind ividual istic and c ompetitive smallholder farming . 
I t  wa s to be f inanced by the New Zealand Government . 2 
Operations began on Raro tonga in 194 6 .  In 1 948 the 
Direc tor of Agriculture travelled to Atiu to introduc e the 
scheme there . The resident agent held a meeting of all 
int erested growers ,  and they lis tened to the details . 
Members o f  the C ook I slands Progressive Association also 
travelled to Atiu , agitating against the scheme . They 
warned growers that the government ' s  first  move on Rarotonga 
had been to chop down all the old trees . Many older Atiuans 
oppo sed the scheme , fearing they would lose not only their 
trees but also their lands to the government . The Resident 
Commiss ioner on Rarotonga wrote to the New Zealand S ecretary 
2Finance to talled $ 1 , 000 , 000 from tied loans , $ 25 0 , 000 f rom 
tied grant s ,  and roughly $ 500, 000 from general grant s f or 
the f irst  2 0  year s , for the whole Cook I slands . 
of I sland Terri tories ( 1 94 9) : 
There has been considerable opposit ion on the par t 
of  grower s to the inauguration of any scheme of 
c i tru s replanting on Atiu ;  until this year the 
grower s were f irmly of the op inion that their 
deter iorated trees would recover naturally and 
that no effor t  on their par t  was necessary . Dur­
ing the Direc tor of Agricultur e � s visit in May 
last , the growers professed to see that pruning 
exist ing trees and replanting are necessary , bu t 
i t  is  s till doubtful whether there has really 
been a change of hear t .  
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Ano ther visit the following year eventually convinced mo st 
growers to j o in the scheme . Bu t at  lea s t  half a dozen of 
the mos t  respec ted older men still oppo sed i t , and refused 
to j oin . The adminis trat ion planted eight demonstration 
plo t s  in the only village that had been surveyed so f ar by 
the Land Court , mainly on the lands of inf luential middle­
aged grower s .  
Proj ec t services 
Having obtained an occupa tion right over a p iece of land , 
the plo t owner had to c lear it . This was done either by 
contrac t gangs raising fund s or by work groups taking turns 
to break in one ano ther ' s  land . The administration suppl ied 
trees , fer t ilizer and sprays , gave technical advice ,  and 
sprayed the trees . A trac tor could be hired to help cul­
tivation . Materials were charged at  cos t to an individual 
account held for each grower . Interest was charged at  5 
per cent on the balance 6-monthly . When the fruit was sold , 
the adminis tration automat ic ally deduc ted three-quar ters 
to p ay off the deb t ; the grower received the res t .  
Over the years the scheme became more and more lax . As 
the growers neglect ed weeding , pruning , spreading fertil­
izer , and even p icking , the Agricul ture Depar tment took 
over these duties . Increas ingly , costs were subsidized : by 
1975  trees still co st only 30 cents ( the 1950  price) , fert­
ilizer had a 5 0  per cent subsidy , and spray was free . The 
interes t rate dropped to 0 . 5 per cent , and the repayment 
rate to 50 per cent of proceed s . 
The government under took to buy , grade , p ick , fumigate , 
and ship the oranges to New Zealand , where they assured an 
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open market . In 1961 , the Greggs Company of New Zealand 
built a j uicing and canning fac tory in Raro tonga (I sland 
Foods Limited)  to process orange j u ice . From 1962 all 
At iuan fruit was consigned there . This meant lower quality , 
less ripe fruit was marketable , and shipping costs were 
lower . 
Os tensibly,  the proj ect involved only new orange varie­
ties - the locally developed Raro tonga Seedless graf ted on 
to lemon rootstock , and the impor ted Late Valenc ia orange 
intended to leng then the harves ting season . However , these 
new varities brought with them a whole collec tion of  new 
citricul tural prac tices that amounted to a revolu tion in 
farm management . 
This wa s no t made clear in the early meetings , and most  
growers d id not anticipate it . Whereas the old trees had 
borne fruit wi thout any cul tivation the new variet ies de­
pended crucially on how they were cared for . Being much 
smaller , the new trees were easier to pick , but they were 
very easily smothered by surrounding bush . They needed 3 -
monthly weeding , annual fertilizer and pruning , and spray­
ing aga inst an increasing range of d iseases and insec ts . 
Fur thermore , it only needed a few seasons of neglect to 
damage them permanently . At iuan growers  had never exper­
ienced an inpu t-intensive crop like this  bef ore ; even if 
they had been prepared to work as hard as required , they 
were no t convinced of the usefulness of f er t ili zer s and 
sprays . 
In the meeting s ,  owners were told they could expect their 
trees to s tart bearing in the f if th year and reach a maximum 
yield of f ive (7 0-pound ) cases in the tenth year . Yields 
this high may now be possibl e with proper management . But 
in the 1 94 0s it was a wildly optimistic estimate to make to 
Atiuan growers , even higher than controlled field trials in 
developed countries had yielded . They talked of these yields 
wi thou t suggestion of the likely var iations between years 
from climate , shipping , disease and administrative mis­
management . In fact , trees on Atiu turned ou t to be more 
slow growing and more variable than predic ted , yielding on 
average only two cases per tree . 
The administrat ion overestimated financial returns too : 
they predic ted a net re turn to the grower of $ 2 0  af ter f ive 
year s and $ 1 60 debt-free af ter eleven years . In fact mo st 
growers  received no returns for abou t eight year s ,  and today 
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80 per cent of plots st ill owe money . Figure 8 contras ts 
advertised and ac tual net returns to the grower . As a 
resu l t  growers had t o  dec ide their s t r a t eg ies on inco r r e c t 
information . 
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Note : Returns received for f irs t 12 years from the C i trus 
Replant ing Scheme , weighted for different age plots , 
in money , not real terms 
Source : Tab le 18 . 
Grower response 
Af ter the first eight plots  had been planted in oranges 
the reluctance and suspicion toward s the scheme weakened . 
More and more grower s j oined in until after five years the 
numbers tailed off as only the more reac tionary ones were 
lef t . In all ,  80  per cent of household s planted p lo t s . The 
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Year 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
1 0  
11 
12 
Table 18 
P erformance of Citrus Replanting S cheme 
Value of 
Inputs 
( $ ) 
7 1  
2 7  
2 9  
3 1  
4 1  
41  
45  
46  
46  
46  
46  
46  
Planned 
Value of 
Ou tpu t 
($ ) 
4 1  
8 1  
1 01 
122 
141 
1 62 
203 
203 
Net 
Return 
($ ) 
- 7 1  
- 2 7  
- 2 9  
- 3 1  
0 
+ 4 0  
+ 5 6  
+ 7 6  
+ 95  
+116 
+157 
+15 7  
Value o f  
Inpu ts 
($ ) 
25  
31  
33  
54 
71 
80 
99 
113 
118 
1 11 
84 
57  
Ac tual 
Value of 
Output 
( $ ) 
18 
25 
24 
34 
4 5  
6 3  
9 5  
Net 
Return 
( $ ) 
-25 
-31 
-33 
-54 
-7 1 
-62 
-74 
-8 9 
-74 
-66  
-21  
+38 
Note : Planned figures are 1946 estimates . Ac tual f igures 
are we ighted for d ifferent plot ages , and are in money , not 
real terms . 
Taking 1967 as a typical year , the average mature plo t  
yielded 7 , 97 0  lb . Af ter the adminis tration had deducted 
expenses , the grower received $87 . 7 0 for about 15 days ' 
work:  an average revenue produc t of labour of $ 1 . 00 per 
hour . 
Source : Files of Atiu Adminis tration . 
rapid rate of tree planting and the way this compensated 
for the demise of old trees is  seen in Fig . 9 .  The most  
ou tspoken early opponents did  no t j oin , but many of the ir 
children did . Most  people j oined before they had had t ime 
to assess yields from the demons tration plo t s : they were 
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influenced more strongly by o ther c ommunity member s than by 
financ ial inducements . 
Mos t  growers worked hard on their plo t s  for the first 
year or so , then the surge of community enthusiasm began to 
fade . Grower s had never experienced this type of intens ive 
cultivation before : realizing the cost on their time they 
star ted to let plots deteriorate . The trees had not yet 
begun to fruit , so the effect of this neglec t  was no t 
obvious . 
Then in 1 955 the first oranges were sent off  to market . 
But where was the money that had been promised? Even the 
best grower s took home only abou t $ 5 .  Neglec ted during 
their crucial early years , the trees bore far less than 
6000 
3000 
' 
' 
\ 
' 
Number of Citrus Replanting 
Scheme trees actively maintained 
Es timates of  number of bear ing nat ive orange t rees 
1938 50 62 
F ig .  9 .  Maintained orange trees 
Source : Table 19 . 
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Table 19 
Grower EarticiEat ion in C itrus ReElant ing S cheme 
No . of Maintained Pr ice to Value of Expor t s  Accum . 
Year trees p l o t s  grower inputs f . o . b .  debt 
(t/lb)  ( $ )  ( $ )  ( $ )  
1950 1 , 017 22  1 , 2 90 1 , 2 9 0  
1 951 3 ,  671 81 3 , 34 0 4 , 634 
1 952 4 , 58 7  102 4 , 814 1 0 , 458 
1953 6 , 839  155 5 , 8 04 1 6 , 2 6 0  
1 954 6 , 98 0  158 5 ,  7 04 22 , 7 64 
1955 7 , 067  1 60 0 . 3 11 , 978 137 34 , 654 
1 95 6  7 , 155 1 62 0 . 3 12 , 33 0  7 63 45 , 962 
1 957 7 , 24 5  1 64 0 . 3  13 , 258 1 , 32 9  56 , 910 
1958 n . a .  1 64 0 . 4  14 , 302 7 , 158 65 , 7 74 
1 959  n . a .  1 64 0 . 5  2 2  ' 07 6 7 , 12 0  81 , 14 6  
1 9 60 n . a .  1 64 0 . 5  23 , 924 11 0 1 04 ' 964 
1 961 n . a .  1 64 0 . 6 16 , 284 5 , 21 6  115 , 7 86  
1 962 n . a .  1 64 0 . 8 10 , 900 1 6 , 528 118 , 620 
1 963 n . a .  1 64 1 .  2 9 ,  714 1 7 , 606 1 2 2 , 4 92 
1 964 7 , 131 164 1 . 2  4 , 464 1 8 , 07 3  119 , 328 
1 965 n . a .  1 64 1 . 1  1 , 04 0  45 , 993 1 04 , 342 
1966 n . a .  164 1 . 1  1 , 05 6  44 , 98 2  9 0 , 988 
1 967  n . a .  1 64 1 . 1  9 , 923 3 6 , 987  86 , 741 
1968 n . a .  1 64 0 . 7 9 , 938 1 0 , 830 81 , 599 
1969 6 , 582 162  0 . 5  7 , 260  33 , 006 78 , 958 
1 9 7 0  n . a .  150  0 . 5 10 , 980 17 , 325  81 , 990 
1 9 7 1  n . a .  137 0 . 4 4 , 119 18 , 222 7 6 , 925 
197 2 n . a .  135 0 . 6  1 0 , 1 62 16 , 441 78 , 994 
1 97 3  n . a .  135 0 . 8  10 , 4 7 6  21 , 825  71 , 776  
1974 6 , 085 131 0 . 8  5 , 358 9 , 8 62 7 2 , 607 
Price paid to grower f . o . b . price - debt repayment -
administrative levies . 
S o u r c e s : F i l e s  o f  A t iu Admin i s t r a t ion , f i e l d  no t e s . 
--- - - -
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the adminis tra tion had pred icted . Wi th the true produc tion 
information j ust  beginning to accumula te , growers took stock 
of t he i r  p o s i t ion . I t  wa s no t wo r t h  wor king t o o  hard f o r  
this sort of money : better to accept low yield s off poorly­
kept trees . 
As real prices received by the grower rose over the next 
decade , so output lagged several years . As they fell af ter 
the mid-1 960s , so did production (allowing for climatic 
variation) , as Fig . 1 0  shows . I t  is not clear how far 
price and produc t ion response were connec ted . But the level 
of marke t intell igence was not high : the survey found only 
one man who could give even a rough idea of the current 
price per pound of oranges ,  and no one understood how the 
complicated and changing deduc tions and repayments worked . 
Nevertheless , growers did have a general impression of  real 
price changes . 
S imilarly , paying interes t  did no t deter growers from 
accumulating high levels of  debt . Mos t  people interviewed 
did not know how their plot debt s tood nor how interest 
operated . Consequently , materials charged to them appeared 
ar tif ically cheap (as in effec t they have been since many 
growers have never paid off their debt s ) . S ome plo t s  have 
now accumulated massive deots , several over $ 1 , 000 . The 
very bes t  plots took seventeen years to become debt-free 
ins tead of  nine as predic ted . 
As new more glamorous crops became available , grower 
interest faded . In particular , the lure of wage j ob s  wi th 
the new P ineapple Incorporation drew men away . In such 
cases , growers worked a bare minimum on their orange trees , 
sometimes only picking the fruit for home consump tion or to 
make bush beer . 
Growers who migrated usually lef t their plo t s  to relatives 
who of ten already owned o ther plot s . Under absentee owner­
ship , such trees yielded significantly less ( see Menzies  
197 0) . By 1 961 a quarter of plot  owners had lef t for 
Rarotonga or New Zealand . By 1975  only 20 per cent of plots 
were still cultivated by their original owners .  On average , 
each plo t had had two owners ratified through the Maori Land 
Court and at least one o ther unofficial one . The effect  was 
less commitment and less continuity in a crop where commit­
ment and continuity were all-important . 
68 
( OOO) 
cases1 
I 
20 1 
1 0  
E f f e c t ive orange pr ice ( cen t s / lb )  
re ce ived by growers 
, ,  
, ,  
Volume of exp o r t s  ( 40lb cases) from 
C i t rus Replanting Scheme 
/ 
/ 
1958 66 
Fig . 10 . Prices and volumes of orange exports  
Source : Tables 13 , 19 . 
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Faced with this fading enthusiasm ,  the government respon­
ded by as suming a more ac tive role , f ir s t  caj oling and then 
taking over duties themselves .  In 1 964 a new resident agent 
organized the I sland Council and village commit tees to exhort 
orange growers to work harder , using planting inspec tions , 
competitions and increased grower prices . These resul ted in 
several years of high productions which were ended by the 
hurricane of 1968 . 
By 1 9 7 5 , the Agriculture Department had progressively 
taken over spraying and spreading fertili zer , then slashing 
weeds and pruning trees , and they even ring-weeded several 
plots  manually . Mo st grower s seemed to pref er to work for 
wages , then pay for these j obs to be done . 3 A coup le of 
owners even paid labourers to pick the crop . There were 
al so half a do zen plots who se  owner s had grown old or 
migrated , which had been taken over completely by the 
Agr icul ture Depar tment . 
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Only about a do zen men c ontinued to take orange cul tiva­
tion seriously . Mos t  of these were  full-time growers who 
needed the money and managed all their crops knowledgeably . 
They received a net return of around $ 100 to $ 200 per year 
from their trees . There is no evidence that grower s of 
higher tribal rank produced more , though they were statis­
tical ly more likely to be par tic ipants . 
The gradual decline in production over the la st decade is 
probably irrevocable . Trees are now 2 0  to 25  years old , 
neglec ted, and incapable of responding to new inputs . Sur­
veys show tha t the rate of depreciation of the stock of 
trees has been equivalent to 1 00 bearing trees falling out 
of production each year for the las t  ten year s ,  ma inly pre­
cipitated by weed strangulation . The decision to wi thdraw 
from the proj ect is no t made suddenly ; a grower gradually 
gives up weeding his crop and then picks it  less regular ly , 
sometimes not bo thering to sell it . Weeds take their toll . 
Soon there is no thing worth looking af ter . By 197 5  nearly 
a quarter of the plo ts  were in this sta te , �! though well 
below the advertised tree life of 4 5  year s . Figure 11 
shows this decline . 
The Citrus Replanting Scheme appear s near its end . How 
successful has it been? I t  has been a f inancial failure , 
though in a wider economic sense it  generated important 
knowledge for growers on the problems of modern crop cultiv­
ation and for adminis trat ion on the problems of proj ect 
design . 
3Evidenc e of this recent decline of grower involvement comes 
from my f ield survey of  orange grower s (results of  a 1969 
survey by Menzies in brackets) . Growers ring-weed ing own 
plo t , 57 per cent ( 100 per cent) ; cul tivat ing own plot , 
1 0  per cent ( 6 0  per cent ) ; pruning own plot , 15 per cent 
( 9 0  per cent ) . 
41 arbitrarily def ine the withdrawal date as the year re turns 
fall below 20 per cent of the average level for at least 
two successive years and never again reach 50  per cent of 
the average . 
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Fig . 11 . Number of maintained proj ect plot s 
....... 
0 
Table 2 0  
SunnnarI of economic Ero j ects  
Type of  Short or  Expected Maintenance Governmen t 
innovation Risk long term productivity required role 
I Oranges new variety medium long high medium high 
II  Forestry new genu s low long low low low 
I I I  Tomatoes new crop high short medium high for 
period 
IV Peanu ts new crop high short low low 
v Taro marketing of low shor t high low 
traditional 
crop 
VI Coffee new variety high long high medium high 
VII Orange Extn . new strains medium long high medium high 
VIII Private new crop medium medium high high low 
pineapples 
IX Vegetables new crop s high short high medium 
x P ineapple wage labour zero very shor t medium comp l e te 
Incorporat ion 
"' 
I-' 
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Subsequent economic proj ec ts 
The C i trus Replanting Scheme was only the first ( though 
a maj or one) of a diverse range of ten agricul tural proj ects 
involving new or improved crop s and crop prac t ices that 
were  implemented over the period 1 95 0-75 (and ano ther two 
were planned but no t implemented ) .  Table 20  summarizes the 
technical charac teristics of  each of them . 
This sec t ion describes each proj ec t in turn . The 
technical details provide the data on which the models of 
Par t Two are tested . 
Pro j ec t  I I : Forestry. When it  appeared the Cook I s ­
land s would become a large c itrus producer the resident 
agent on Atiu , an ex-New Zealand forester , suggested 
p l ant ing forestry trees on the leached unused f ernland s . 
Thi s would conserve the soil and yield a sof t wood for 
milling into fruit cases . 
The resident agent set up a two hec tare experimental 
farm , then imported and planted a variety of fast-growing 
seedlings . From these , he selected the leguminous 
albizzia tree . With the support of teachers on the island , 
he outlined a scheme to growers ,  to plant seedlings on land 
with settled ownership . The administration would d isc the 
plo t . The owner had to d ig holes , plant and stake the 
trees under supervision , maintain a f irebreak , and weed the 
plot several times a year for the first two years . Af ter 
several more years the administration would help prune the 
trees . At age 1 0  they could be thinned to yield the first 
timber . Another f ive years and they could be milled . Table 
21 recons truc ts the expec ted returns to a grower from an 
average plot of 0 . 5 ha (4 7 0  trees ) . 
Five Atiuans , all keen growers and large landowners , 
agreed to plant trial plo t s . Seeing this , the o thers grew 
keen . In the next year 2 50 growers  applied to j oin the 
scheme put ting forward 134 hec tares , a considerable part  
of  the island ridge-top s .  Many lo s t  interest , however , 
as they had to wait  for seedlings . Over the nex t  eight 
years 131 plots were planted (see Table 22) . 
Table 21 
Expected re turns to labour f rom f orestry , 1 9 60 
Revenue : royal ty on thinning s (year 1 0) 
(year 1 5 )  
$ 60 . 00 
$150 . 00 
Costs : 
royalty on timber 
total 
establishment 
maintenance 
$ 33 . 60  
(for 15 years) $ 18 . 00 
to tal 
Net annual returns to labour 
No te : Assumes no interest paid . 
Source : Report on Atiu Fores try Proj ec t ,  1 960 . 
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$210 . 00 
$ 51 . 60 
$ 1 0 . 60 
Once established , the trees grew well , even though they 
were rarely weeded , and neither pruned nor thinned . Several 
plo t s  were acc idently burnt each year . When the resident 
agent lef t ,  p lantings stopped . By 1960 a repor t suggested 
that there were 4 0 , 000 trees still in reasonable condit ion , 
some 25 to 30  metres high , and they should be ready for 
milling in the early 1980s . 
But no succeeding resident agents were interested in the 
proj ect . No one encouraged growers ; no one provided the 
promised sawmill .  Trees were cut down for firewood and 
canoes , and cleared for crops . The Pineapple Incorporat ion 
cut down mo st of what remained . As an estimate ,  perhap s 
1 0  per cent of trees are lef t ,  symbols of false expectations 
and shor t-sightedness . 
The proj ect was cheap , costing about $ 8 , 000 for the nur­
sery and $ 800 f or trac tor work in a decade (excluding wage s 
and salaries ) .  I t  probably increased soil f ertility and 
hal ted erosion . And it taught growers to be wary o f  admin­
is tration claims . O therwise it was a failure . 
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1951 
1 952 
1 953 
1 954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1 958 
1959  
1960 
1 961 
1 9 7 0  
1 9 7 1  
1 9 7 4  
Table 2 2  
Grower par ticipation in fores try proj ect 
No . of  trees No . of plo ts 
1 , 000 5 
4 , 44 7  6 
12 , 63 9  21 
22 , 237 44  
28 , 1 00 n·. a .  
n . a .  97 
54 , 3 01 1 08 
5 7 , 200  n . a .  
n . a .  128 
60 , 4 18 131  
61 , 12 9  131 
3 0 , 000e 
11 , 000e 
6 , 000e 
Sources : Department of Agriculture Files ; f ield notes . 1 97 0 ,  
1971 f igures are estimates o f  trees cut for p ineapple scheme . 
Proj ect III : Tomatoes . Tomatoes had been grown for years 
in Rarotonga but apparently no t on Atiu . The resident agent 
grew them in his nursery in the 1950s , and he offered seed 
to those interes ted . Growers could hire machinery to clear 
the land . The crop required constant weeding , and improved 
with fer tilizer . As interest grew the adminis trat ion de­
duc ted a small levy from each case of tomatoes and credited 
it  t o  the grower ; when he had suf f ic ient credit to buy a 
bag of f ertilizer , this was is sued to him . However , in 
prac tice issues were irregular and d id not meet the different 
crop requirements . Table 23  estimates ac tual returns to 
labour from an average ( 0 . 1 ha) plot in 1 955 , a typical year . 
Table 23  
Estimated re turns to labour from tomatoes , 1 95 5  
Revenue : 
Cost s : 
518 lb at  5 . 5  cents $ 28 . 5 0 
clearing and seeding $ 3 .  00 
harvesting $ 2 . 30 
total $ 5 . 30 
Ne t annual return to labour $ 2 3 . 20 
Approximate labour required 8 days 
Average revenue produc t of labour 
on average plot $ 0 . 48/hour 
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No te : This assumes all produce reaches market and that the 
grower works a six-hour day . 
Sources : Files of Atiu Adminis trat ion ; Atiu co-operatives ; 
field no tes . 
By 1956 most  growers had a small tomato plo t ,  and they 
sold their crop through private traders . In 1 958 the co­
operatives took on an active role . They sold seed s , then 
supervised planting and inspec ted crop s . They arranged 
shipping and marketed the crop direc tly in New Zealand and 
Tahiti . Because it could las t  only a week withou t refrig­
eration it was dependent on frequent direc t shipp ing . Fruit 
that ripened between ships was was ted . Several informants 
es timated half of  produc tion rotted . Af ter the Rarotonga 
fruit processing fac tory was opened in 1961 , New Zealand­
owned shipp ing became much less frequent . The price to the 
toma to grower dropped . Growers lo st  interest ; af ter the 1 96 0  
hurricane , exports ceased . Table 2 4  shows grower involvement .  
The tomato proj ect was less planned than o thers , growing 
from a need for a shor t-term grower income before orange trees 
matured . It cost  the adminis tration little . Some growers 
received good returns , bu t the fluctuations in climate , prices 
and shipping , made it  extremely r isky .  
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Table 24 
Grower par ticipation in tomato proj ect 
No . of growers 
1 955 84 
1 95 6  1 04 
1 957 152 
1 958 9 
1 959  16  
1 960 12 
1 961 4 
Sources : Files of Atiu Administrat ion ; C o -operatives . 
Proj ec t IV : Peanuts . 5 In 1953 the resident agent im­
por ted seed from Fij i ,  and es tablished a peanut crop in the 
government nursery for several years ; this was the first 
time peanuts had been grown in the Cook I sland s .  Public 
mee tings were held to interest growers in a home plo t . 
The seeds were distributed free to growers .  They were 
planted in small plo ts  on the unused fernland plateau . 
Discs could be hired to break in the land . But sowing , 
weeding and harvesting had to be done by hand . The lat ter 
wa s espec ially tedious : af ter five to nine months the plants 
were dug , dried and stocked , of ten by children . Al though 
originally intended as an export crop , they were grown by 
many famil ies only for their own use . I t  is es timated a 
third dried their own nuts  and sent them to Raro tonga at  some 
t ime . Thi s was a risky proposit ion . More reliable was the 
small market for selling small bags of roasted peanuts out­
side dances on Atiu itself . Table 25  estimates ne t returns 
to the grower from peanuts off  an average plot of 0 . 2 ha 
sold in Rarotonga in 1 95 9 .  
5 Few records remain from the peanut scheme . My knowledge is 
limited to informants ' connnents and grower surveys . Con­
sequently the data of this section are less reliable than 
for other proj ec ts . 
Table 2 5  
Estimated returns to labour from peanuts , 1959 
Revenue : 
C o s t s : 
1 2 7  lb at 1 6  cent s 
establishment 
freight and marketing 
total 
Net annual return to labour 
Approxima te labour required 
Average revenue produc t of labour on 
average plot 
$6 . 00 
$ 2 . 00 
$ 2 0 . 3 0  
$ 8 . 00 
$12 . 30 
8 days 
$ 0 . 26/hour 
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No te : This assumes only 1 0  per cent of produc tion marketed . 
Sources : Files of Atiu Administration ; field survey . 
1957 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1 964 
Table 2 6  
Grower par ticipat ion i n  peanut proj ect 
Estimated no . 
of growers 
2 6  
113 
174  
113 
25  
126  
Sources : 1957-61 , f ield surveys ; 1 964 , files of Atiu 
Administration . 
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Af ter several years ' interes t ,  growers abandoned the 
crop . The original resident agent had lef t , returns were 
risky ,  and the j ob was tedious . Then , in 19 64 a new res­
ident agent tried to revive the scheme . New seeds were sold 
to grower s .  Loans of up to $ 2 0  were offered through the 
Economic Development Fund to hire equipment and buy f ertil­
izer . The I s land Council bought spec ial peanut lifting 
equipment . Many growers app lied for loans and es tabl ished 
plo t s . But there was poor seed germinat ion and rat s  proved 
troublesome ea ting nu ts off the plants . I t  is said that in 
1964 planters neglec ted to hold over any seed for the 
following year , when only one plant er repeated the experi­
ment . The sample estimate of planter involvement from 
grower surveys presented in Table 2 6  is  very rough . 
Pro j ec t  V :  Taro . A growing urban market for taro in 
Raro tonga in the early 1960s encouraged a few younger 
grower s to export their surplus taro there privately . Most  
grower s had misg ivings about the ethics o f  selling a 
trad i tional subsis tenc e crop to o ther Cook I slanders . 
Then , as Raro tongan plants were hit by a taro bl ight , 
the Raro tongan market became suddenly very lucrative . In 
197 0 the price almo s t  doubled to $ 2 . 00 per kit .  In 1 968-
69 for the first  time a few of the more respec ted older 
growers had sold their crop s . This appears to have convin­
ced o thers of the legality of the pract ice . In 1 97 0 ,  
seventy-two grower s j o ined in . The Agriculture Department 
arranged shipments to Raro tonga , and sold the crop there , 
remit t ing the prof it to the grower . By 1971 , each grower 
was expor ting on average 660 lb of taro, and his labour 
earned an averag e revenue produc t  of about $ 0 . 94 per hour . 
This proj ect aro se spontaneously in response to a dis­
equilibrium market . The innovat ion involved was the break 
with tradi tion to market a subsis tence crop in the Maori 
economy . For this reason the initial response was slow 
( see Table 2 7 ) . The end of the proj ec t was sudden : the 
Raro tonga blight s truck Atiuan taro . In one season the 
island lo s t  its surplus , and no more was expor ted . Today 
growers are s till experimenting to try and beat this 
di sease . 
Table 2 7  
Grower part icipat ion in taro proj ect 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
Number of  exporters 
6 
1964 4 
1965 0 
1966 7 
1967  1 3  
1968 0 
1969 13  
197 0 19 
1971 72  
1972 68 
1973 0 
Not e : Early numbers may be under-est imat es 
owing to incomplet e  reco rds . 
Source : Files of At iu Administ rat ion . 
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Proj ect VI : Coffee . Native coffee bu shes have grown 
wild for a long time on Atiu . They are said to be self­
sown from stock p lanted by early traders . Growers cul tiv­
ated them only by hacking back undergrowth to help harvest-
ing . The cof f ee berr ies were used f or a strong bitter local 
brew . In the 1950s several growers privately obtained seeds 
of some improved s trains from a neighbouring island and 
grew coffee commercially . Also , a range of import ed coffee 
varieties was planted in the local government nursery . 
In 1963 , the New Zealand Government direc ted the res ident 
agent on Atiu to improve commerc ial coffee growing . A New 
Zealand coffee expert selected a suitable arabica variety , 
and plant s were established in the Atiu nursery to provide 
8 0  
free seedl ings for growers .  Applicants had t o  have obtained 
the agreement of landowners to plant some land , then clear 
i t , dig hol es , cu t stakes , and plant shade and shel ter belts . 
The Agriculture Department supervised planting . Fer tilizer 
was free for the first  two years , and 3 -year Economic Dev­
elopment Fund loans were available for hiring machinery . 
The bushes had to be weeded , mulched and fer tili zed sev­
eral times and pruned once a year . Atiu was free of  mo s t  
cof fee diseases s o  n o  spraying was neces sary . The f irst 
berries appeared af ter two year s and full product ion was 
achieved at f ive , harvested from February to May . Picking 
by hand was a tedious and time-consuming task . 
Until 1 967 , the berrie s were pulped in a government 
machine and then sold to local traders . In 1967 a smal l  
fac tory wa s built o n  Atiu to husk the berries . The dried 
beans were then sold on contrac t to Greggs (New Zealand ) , 
the parent company o f  the Raro tonga orange proces s ing f irm .  
They paid a small frac tion of the price immediately , and 
the rest nearly a year later when they had worked out 
profits  on their cof f ee operations . Real prices have been 
falling in recent year s .  Table 2 8  records approximate 
returns to labour from an average-sized coffee plot of  225  
5-year-old trees planted on  0 . 15  ha  at  1 9 7 0  prices . 
Table 28 
E s timated returns to labour from coffee , 197 0  
Revenue : 3 09 lb at  2 0  cents 
Costs : Share o f  es tabl ishment costs 
Net annual return to lab our 
Approximate labour required 
$ 61 . 7 0 
$ 3 . 8 0  
$ 57 . 90 
11  days 
Average revenue produc t of labour on av . plot  $ 0 . 88 I hour 
No te : Average plot yields approximately 1 00 lb in 3rd year , 
200 lb in 4 th ,  3 00 lb in 5 th .  Es tablishment costs include 
clearing ( $ 1 8 ) , hol ing ( $ 5) , planting and manuring ( $ 3 ) , 
spread over 7 years . 
Source : Files of Atiu Adminis trat ion . 
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The scheme was introduced wi th grower mee tings . The whole 
collilllunity was keen : the administration planted a large area , 
and the school and the Catholic Church both planted plots ; so 
did 177  growers ,  wi th the largest private plo t containing 
1 , 300  trees . Many plots  were planted by contrac t work gang s 
or by communal work parties . 
I t  was the story of the C itrus  Replanting Scheme all over 
again . Initially enthusias tic growers grew reluc tant to 
cul tiva te and market crops . Most  pref erred to let them com­
pete with the bush , growing long and s traggl ing , as did the 
tougher native coffee ; they preferred to p ick them infre­
quently for home use , rather than sell them regularly . 
Fur thermore , a hurricane in 1 968 damaged mo s t  plantations 
wi th salt spray ; the res ident agent who had organi zed the 
coffee lef t the island the same year . As a result many 
neglec ted young bushes  died . Of a total of 40 , 000 plantings , 
10 , 000 had died by 1967 ; today less than 1 0 , 000 remain , 
mostly in poor condition ( see Tab le 2 9) . 
Table 29 
Grower EarticiEation in co ffee Eroj ect 
No . of maintained No . of private No . of 
private trees plots exporters 
1 963 1 , 58 5  15  
1964 14 , 743 84 
1 9 65 19 , 6 62 118 1 
1966  34 , 57 6  1 7 3  1 
1967 30 , 162  163 1 0  
1 968 1 8 ,  045 97 3 
1969  n . a .  7 2  1 0  
197 0 11 , 21oe 60e 23  
1971  n . a .  5 0e 9 
197 2 n . a .  35e 34 
1973  n . a .  25e 10 
1974 2 , 800e 15  15 
emeans estimate . 
Sources : Files of  Atiu Adminis trat ion , field no tes . 
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Pro j e c t  V I I : Citrus extension scheme . An ex tens ion to 
the earl ier Ci trus  replanting Scheme was implemented on Atiu 
in 1 965 . I t  was hoped i t  wou l d  s t imu l a t e  f la g g ing o r ange 
produc tion among growers who had had the chance to learn 
about modern tree cultivation from the f irst scheme . The 
government aimed to make the grower play a larger rol e .  The 
scheme offered new strains of orange tree on a sturdier 
roo t s tock ,  and also a new j af fa variety . They were to be 
bought , planted and maintained at the grower ' s  init iative . 
As the trees reached ma turity , the grower had the cho ice 
between maintaining a private plot , or buying fertili zer and 
spray through the adminis tration , then paying from crop 
proceeds . 
There was a slightly more cautious approach by growers : 
5 8  applied to j o in , bu t over the next six years only forty 
four ac tually planted plo t s , on average 0 . 5  ha ( twice the 
s i ze of earlier plots ) . Three thousand trees were planted , 
though a quarter had to be replaced because of  poor s tock 
and poor care . Most  of the participants were growing 
oranges for the firs t time - ei ther younger planters or a 
few older ones who had obj ec ted to the original scheme but 
since decided their fears were unj u s tified . 
Desp ite bet ter services and information , plot mainten­
ance did no t improve . The field survey showed only half 
the trees st ill survived by 1 9 7 5  and many of these were in 
poor condition . Plot debts  have risen fas ter than antici­
pated and yields are low : by 1974  for ty plots should have 
been bearing but only eight were p icked . A quarter of the 
plots have been abandoned by their emigrant owners . The 
res t  receive even less attention than the original c itrus 
trees did . 
I sland Foods Limited suggested an incorporation o f  lands 
might provide a larger more effic ient citrus plantation . In 
1 971 , a block of land owned mainly by two families was 
offered . Al though it  s till has no t been formally incor­
porated , men from these families are emp loyed by the Agr i­
cul ture Department to p lant orange trees on 4 0  ha . Unt il 
they mature , vege table crops are being interplanted to 
reduce cos t s . By 1974 only 2 00 of an eventual 8000 trees 
had been planted , but the incorporat ion was already encoun­
tering severe management problems . 
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Table 30 
Grower participat ion in c i trus ext ens ion scheme 
Maintained Maintained 
trees plo t s  
No . of  Value o f  
exporters input s  
Value of 
produc tion 
1 9 63 
1 9 64 
1965 
1966  
19 67 
1968 
1969  
197 0  
1971  
1 97 2  
1 973 
1 974 
73 
73 
686 
1 5 5 6  
2 2 1 1  
2 1 2 2  
n . a .  
n . a .  
n . a .  
n . a .  
n . a .  
1513 
1 
1 
7 
21 
35 
4 0  
41 
4 2  
4 5  
4le 
3 6e 
32  
1 
4 
6 
6 
($ } 
7 0  
110 
87  
2 00 
7 0  
( $ )  
2 0  
1 7 1  
334 
111 
Sources : Files of Atiu Administration ; f ield survey . 
Proj ect  VII I : Private pineapple proj ect . About 1969  
I sland Foods Limited indicated to the Cook I slands 
Government that they needed more fruit to keep their 
Raro tonga fac tory running economically . They suggested 
pineapples could be grown on the unused barren f ernland s 
there . 
Families were t o  apply for court occupation rights in 
small plo t s  of unused plateau fernland . The government 
off ered free technical advice and p ineapple shoo ts . Other 
materials could be bought from the local Agricul ture De­
partment , which also marketed the crop . All the work had 
to be done by the growers .  By Atiuan s tandards ,  thi s was 
considerable . Land had to be cleared , contoured , and 
drained . Pineapples were planted in rows , heavily fertil­
ized , weeded twice yearly , and sprayed . They fruited af ter 
the second year , then 6-monthly for another two years : 
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p i cking wa s by hand . After this , plants were uproo ted and 
the land left fallow . 
Well maintained , the p ineapples could bring good returns 
al though far less than those  advertised . Table 31 es timates 
the annual net returns to labour from the average 2-year­
o ld plot of 0 . 2 5  ha in 1 971 . 
By 1 9 7 0  twenty-seven famil ies had applied for occupation 
rights to plant up to one hec tare in p ineapples . However , 
in the meantime the government decided the crop might be 
bet ter produced using skilled management and hired labour 
in a land incorporat ion . 
Only eight private growers eventually tried growing 
p ineapples on their own . These were the mo st  active innov­
ative men on the island , and they used considerable skill 
and initiative with this diff icul t crop . Nevertheles s , they 
only obtained about a quarter the crop they had hoped for ; 
a mealy bug inf es tat ion was a maj or reason . Mos t  gave up 
their plo t s  and j oined the incorporation . By 1975  only 
two growers stubbornly continued on their own . 
Table 31 
Estimated returns to labour from p ineapples , 1971  
Revenue : 84 00 lb at 1 . 8  cents 
Cos t s : Share of establishment 
Weedicide 
Fert ilizer 
Total 
Net annual return to labour 
$ 19 . 00 
$ 6 . 00 
$13 . 00 
$ 151 . 10 
$ 38 . 00 
$ 113 . 10 
Approxima te labour required 14 days 
Average revenue product of labour on av . plot $ 1 . 35 /hour 
Note : Average plot yields approximately 8 000 lb in 2nd 
year , 4 000 in 3rd . Establ ishment costs inc lude tractor 
($ 38) , contouring ( $ 1 1 ) , planting ( $ 8 ) , spread over 3 years . 
Source : Files of Atiu Adminis trat ion . 
1 9 7 0  
1 9 7 1  
1 9 7 2  
1 9 7 3  
1974 
Table 32 
Grower participat ion in private pineapple scheme 
No . of 
plo t s  
7 
8 
8 
6 
2 
No . of 
exporters 
7 
7 
5 
1 
Sources : Files of Atiu Adminis tration ; field survey . 
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among At iuans . In 1 974 , twenty-f ive growers sold crop s worth 
over $ 3 , 000 , mostly in the local market or to the army . 
Shipments to Rarotonga occasionally proved very profitable 
bu t were risky . In addition , green vegetables  were a wel­
come supplement to some home diets . But the drought in 1974  
Pro j ect IX : Vegetables . The Cook I slands Government s  
dec ided the vis it  o f  New Zealand army engineers t o  Atiu in 
1 9 74 and the growing Rarotongan market for fresh vegetables 
presented opportunities for vegetable growing on Atiu . An 
agricultural officer was sent from Rarotonga to set up a 
small vegetable plot in the government nursery , growing 
selected seeds and selling these  to growers . (For polit­
ical reasons , the Atiu Adminis tration did no t continue this 
nursery work . ) 
Having seen the dismal record of past proj ects , the 
offi cer tried a new approach : instead of organizing public 
meet ing s  and exhorting the populace , he picked a dozen of  
the best growers and supplied them with free seeds , hoping 
o thers would copy them . 
These and other growers set up the Growers ' Association 
with representatives from each village to act as a pressure 
group . They arranged to ship bulk produce to Raro tonga 
and sell it there . They also built a tiny market place on 
At iu - the firs t formal ins titution to sell local produce 
8 6  
ru ined a lot o f  plant ing and dis suaded many grower s .  Half 
of them appeared to have given up planting by the following 
year . 
These vegetable growers were the entrepreneurial cream of 
Atiu . With hard work and careful planning a few of  them 
earned a lot of money this way : one man earned $ 800 from 
part-time growing in 1974 , and two others grossed over $ 4 00 .  
The average return per grower was $ 13 2 ; but wi th high costs  
of fertilizer , spray and equipment , and the heavy work 
required , the average revenue produc t of labour on a typical 
vegetable plot in 1 9 74 is e s t imated at  about $ 1 . 1 7 per hour . 
Several growers experimented with new varieties of vegetable . 
However ,  the real innovat ion was the break with tradition 
in selling crops to fellow Atiuans . 
Proj ec t X :  P ineapple Incorporation . I t  was suggested 
that one way to overcome At iuan p roblems of land fragmen­
tation , hesitant proj ec t response , and communal int erdepen­
denc e would be for owners to pool land into  an incorporat ion 
and j ointly grow a crop like pineapples , using economies of 
scale . This proj ec t required some communal consensus on 
the sensitive issue of land control , and it introduced a new 
form of labour organizat ion and control . 
A long series of meetings was held with Atiuan landowners :  
they were keen to participate but wary of  disadvantages . At 
last they agreed to set up a formal corporation under a 
managing committee of  five elected landowners who would 
appoint a farm manager responsible to them . They would plant 
pineapples using modern mechanical methods on the 2 00 to 
3 00 ha of fernland unused in the centre o f  the island . 
Several simple cos t-benefit analyses were carried out . 
The incorporat ion would plant 80 ha per year , covering costs 
af ter the third year . Then prof its would be dis tribu ted to 
landowners on the bas is of  their shares in the land s . Assum­
ing a regular annual yield of 7 000 tons , good profits  and a 
social rate of return of 30  per cent were anticipated . 
By 1 9 7 5  the Cook I slands Government had no t yet managed to 
incorporate the land , partly for political reasons . In the 
meantime the Agricul ture Department rents it from landowners 
who are then employed as wage labourer s to work on it . I t  
debits production co sts  t o  its current account - i n  effect 
an interes t-free loan . In 1 97 0  a pineapple nursery of 16  
ha wa s planted as a trial plot . The next year , work began 
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on the main plantat ion . This covered only 7 0  ha by 1974 , 
far below the planned p lanting rate . 
By then many cultivation problems had arisen .  The land 
had to be well-prepared , heavily fer tilized , hand-planted 
and weeded frequently . Af ter two year s the pineapples could 
be p icked 6-monthly . Labour was a maj or constraint on prod­
uc tion . It was intended to mechanize the breaking in of 
land , as well as spraying , fer tilizing , and possibly har­
ves t ing . The UNDP dona ted a boom sprayer (of the wrong 
type)  and a mechanic (used by the Cook I slands Government on 
other islands) . A long awaited experienced pineapple manager 
did not arrive until late in 1 975 . 
More problems arose  in shipping fruit to the processing 
factory in Rarotonga . Up to 1974 about a hal f of crop yield 
had been wasted owing to the poor scheduling of ships and 
the problems of  manhandling cases of  p ineapples over a 
treacherous reef . In 1 9 74 the New Zealand Government sent a 
contingent of army engineers to the island to build a harbour . 
This took one year and cost $ 52 6 , 000 by 197 6 ,  far greater 
than pineapple returns . In 1 9 7 6  two mo torized barges costing 
$ 8 0 , 000 were donated by New Z ealand to use the harbour . 
By the end of 1975  direc t development cos t s  totalled 
$ 1 68 , 000 or $ 1 , 5 00 per hectare (compared with an expected 
$ 3 5 0) , while to tal capital costs  were far greater . Antici­
pated yields in developed countries are over 2 , 4 00 cases per 
hec tare , and tho se achieved on the small holdings of neigh­
bouring Mangaia are around 1 , 600 . So far Atiu has produced 
only about 500 cases , and only half these have been shipped . 
These low yields are due to mismanagement ,  lack of  machinery , 
insect damage ,  and drainage problems . This unqual if ied 
financial disaster is  shown in Table 33 . 
Because  of the losses  and mismanagement ,  dividends have 
no t been paid to landowners as planned . In 1974  it was 
dec ided to pay out half the previous year ' s  proceeds as 
rent to the owners o f  the nursery . This showed the problem 
of fragmentat ion , unequal ownership and absenteeism that 
bug the s cheme . Of a to tal of $ 5 , 8 91 ,  $ 3 , 084 went to twenty­
four landowners still res ident on At iu ; one elderly woman 
received $ 1 , 43 0 .  Landowners are currently dissatisfied at  
hapha zard payouts , and their inability to influence p ine­
apple  growing decisions . 
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Table 3 3 
Performance of Pineapple Incorporation 
P lanned Actual 
Costs Revenue Area Costs  Revenue Area Emp loyees 
( $ )  ( $ )  (ha )  ( $ )  ($ ) (ha) 
1 97 0 2 0 , 000 16  1 0 , 900 16 15 
1 971  2 2 , 000 61 13 , OOO 36 20 
1 9 7 2  2 1 , 3 00 1 05 23 , 200 6 , 900 53  37  
1 97 3  4 5 , 6 00 153 , 200 150  33 , 5 00 7 , 000 7 0  5 5  
1 974 65 , 4 00 245 , 100  1 7 8  44 , oooe 1 6 , 30 0  7 0  7 5  
1 9 7 5  74 , 4 00 3 03 , 2 00 1 7 8  44 , 000e 8 , 8 00 7 1  n . a .  
S ourc e : Files of  At iu Administrat ion . 
The greatest impac t has been the opportunity for wage 
employment for every man who wants  it . Many have been keen 
to work in the scheme with i t s  at trac tions of a certain 
regular wage and communal work group s . Most wage earners and 
over a third o f  the labour force work regularly about 2 0  
hours a week : they are unwilling t o  work longer hours , 
for other activities  are being curtailed . Mo st  of  these 
wage workers have g iven up their proj e c t  cash crops , and 
find it hard even to maintain their subsis tence crop s . Cash 
cropp ing has become more of a special i s t  occupation for full­
time growers in recent years . 
In addition to the ten proj ects implemented on Atiu , 
another two crops were seriously proposed but did not even­
tuate . In 1962-63 the administration sugges ted growing 
pepper under the forestry trees ; fifty seven growers were 
interested . Eventually , it  was decided to grow the crop on 
a neighbouring island . In 1 967-68 a scheme was put forward 
to grow soya beans in an incorporation ; forty-six house­
holds wanted to j oin . The P ineapple Incorporat ion S cheme 
ended this . 
Chap ter 5 
Cultural attitudes to economic oppor tunity 
This chapter offers some general ized value j udgments 
about the cultural att itudes that colour the At iuan re­
sponse to economic opportuni ty . It contains material about 
the existence and magnitude of  th e cultural parameters 
used in the theoretical model . Each of the sect ions re­
lates specif ically to one of the following s ix chapters . 
Consump tion and work preferences 
Material items of consump t ion are impor tant to At iuans 
but their tastes for them seem easily satiated , as is 
common in relatively clo sed societies . Great emphasis is 
put on ' body needs ' :  food , drink , sex , and entertainment 
in the form of song and dance . The only important item of 
expenditure is food . The f ield survey showed that two­
thirds of spending on Atiu was on a very small range of 
basic foods - bread , sugar , tinned meat and fish . Alcohol 
ac counted for another 10 to 15  per cent and cloth was 
another maj or purchase . Most homes boa sted a few durables : 
a transistor radio , and perhaps a mo tor-scoo ter and a sewing 
machine . 
The starchy roo t and fruit crop s provide the bulk of the 
diet . No meal would be cons idered complete wi thou t taro, 
banana s and coconut . The scarcer fresh seafoods are specially 
desirable . I t  is no t easy to buy these subsistenc e items on 
At iu .  The western prac tice of imper sonal buying and sel ling 
among friends clashes with traditional customs . Al though a 
small vege table market has begun recently on the island , many 
are hes itant about us ing it . 1 
1 One grower told me that he planted 3 , 000 cabbage plants in 
1974 , and when they all grew he gave the surplus away 
ra ther than sell it . 
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D e sp i te level s of income that are very low by we s tern 
standards ( $ 188 per capita in 1 97 4 )  Atiuans do not like to 
sp end long hours earning money . Their tastes  for many wes ­
tern items are cons trained b y  socially imposed l imits and 
are ea s ily met . The unusual economic and soc ial c onformity 
on Atiu means there is l ittle variat ion between consumers '  
exper ienc es and tas tes . By 1974  the real value o f  expen­
diture was more than twice tha t of 1950 . Much of the in­
crease has been spent on durable good s . Innovat ion in 
such products takes p lace quickly through a powerful band­
wagon ef f ec t . For example , ten years ago there were no 
motor-cycles , bu t today more than half of households own 
them . Because such expenditure is lumpy , grower s who wi sh 
to buy mo to r-cycles and sewing machines work very hard for 
a short bur s t  to pay for them , then return t o  earlier 
leisure levels .  
At iuan concep ts o f  labour and leisure do no t follow the 
two extremes of wes tern economies . For this reason a t temp t s  
t o  separate and quantify them can b e  decep tive . Produc tive 
labour is o f ten enj oyable : men l ike to go f ishing ; less 
intensive work such a s  sewing or gathering berries of fers 
relaxation and company for women . Conversely , leisure 
occas ions are an opportunity for serious work - a picnic at 
the beach may end up wi th the men fishing and the women 
ga thering seafood s . 
Work is of ten unintensive and s low-paced , as is f i t t ing 
in the heat . A full-time p lanter may spend much of the t ime 
on his land res ting and talking to neighbours . Ind eed , he 
would be cons idered unsoc iable if he d id not . Consequentl
2
, 
even rout ine j obs l ike p ig-feeding may take s everal hours . 
The we s tern conc ep t o f  leisure has no exac t parallel . There 
are no ' hol idays ' from free labour , only sacred days on which 
work may no t be done . (On Saturdays mos t  men work on the ir 
lands or go f i shing . )  
At iuans are attuned to work by the task rather than by 
the t ime . Few people have watche s , and the day is orde
5
ed 
by the pas sage of the sun and by natural ' body clocks ' . 
21 went on a nett ing expedition where half a dozen men took 
three hours to net half a bucket of small fish;  this was 
not helped by the fact tha t mos t  o f  them were drunk . 
3Teachers comp lained that children would arrive la te for 
school on cloudy days . 
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Working by onesel f is not much fun , and , if done excess­
ively , will be considered antisoc ial . Mo s t  people on Atiu 
pref er to work in group s and probably work much harder 
tha t  way . The only cons istent loners in the society were 
one or two hardworking unpopular growers and several par t­
ly crippled or deformed men who sought the seclusion of the 
bus h .  All bush beer work and all fund-raising work is  
organized communally (as  wa s much private cul tivation in 
the pas t ) . There are good t echnical rea sons for this : heavy 
work requir ing a lo t of muscle power may be done with a gang 
mor e  effic iently . Al so p sychological reinforcement means a 
bu sh beer gang of ten men can dig ten taro patches in less 
t ime than one man takes to dig his own . 
The end resul t  of work is  mos t  important ; working for 
some impersonal organization ( such as the government) does 
no t inspire uncommit ted worker s . There is a world of 
dif f erenc e between the half-hear ted work of labourers on 
the p ineapple plantation , and the cheerful enthus iasm that 
goe s  into building a house for a relative or d igging a taro 
patch to raise funds for the church . Money is not always 
suff ic ient reward to overcome these prej udices . Private 
growers wishing to employ labourers for a small j ob some times 
of f er a b o t tle of whisky or several cooked fowls in return , 
without worrying about monetary equivalence . Such ' gifts ' 
seem to be more acc ep table than a money payment . 
An aspect o f  work e specially distas teful to Atiuans is a 
regu lar commitment to labour . When social obligations arise 
and require attention , work should no t be allowed to stand 
in the way .  The P ineapple Incorporat ion was for many the 
f ir s t  opportunity for regular wage labour ; record s show no­
body works a regular 4 0-hour 5-day week . Ins tead work is 
pref erred in short bur s t s  o f  high intensity . 
In summary , relat ively low levels o f  income are enj oyed by 
At iuans , but they consider they do not have much to gain 
from extra income (although occasionally people f ind they 
want to buy something that requires a lot more money) . Pri­
vat e  labour is no t enj oyed at all , and few people are int er­
ested in working harder simply to earn more money . Finally , 
it is  relatively easy to l ive c omfortably on Atiu , and 
some people do very lit tle work . But in the long run it is 
no t possible to l ive off the goodwill o f  o ther s . 
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A t t i tudes to risk 
Atiuans have shown enthu siasm for gambl ing in some ac t iv­
i t ies , and a t  the same time conserva t ive dislike for risk 
in other s . This may be rational ized : risky choices are 
j u stif ied only if the cost of  f ailure is relat ively small 
or if the reward from success is relat ively high; risk is 
avo ided in any way a person can insure himself when the 
cost  of failure is high . 
Instanc e s  of  the f ir s t  case are the small bet s  p laced on 
horse rac ing a t  the government be t ting agency in Raro tonga ; 
thi s i s  very popular among visiting Atiuans . An example of 
a high payof f induc ing a gamble is the c la s s ically risky 
occupat ion of f ishing - yields from a night ' s  f ishing in a 
t iny canoe in the open sea are to tally unpred ictable and 
the work is uncomfortable and dang erous . Bu t on a good 
night the reward s are considerable and this j us tifies the 
continu ing commitment s  to f ishing . 
When new opportunities ari s e ,  the true risks involved may 
not be known until growers have experimented with them . 
Economic losses soon bring correc t ive action .  For exampl e ,  
toma toes were grown for the New Zealand market . To get 
them there ripe bu t no t ro t t en ,  a ship had to  call at A t iu 
s everal weeks before they matured and then connec t  with 
another New Zealand boat a t  Raro tonga . C onsequently up to 
hal f  the toma to crops were lost withou t compensat ion ; af t er 
a few years g rower s gave up growing them . 4 
Risks are avo ided when the costs  of  failure are high . 
Typ ically this concerns the subsistence sec tor . At iuans are 
not will ing to experiment with risky new techniques on their 
tradit ional crops . They insure themselves with root crops 
like puraka, kape, and tii, low s ta tu s  foods that are 
allowed to grow semi-wild in the knowledge that they last 
f or years in the soil ; if a hurricane should des troy normal 
crops they would provide emergency food s  until fast maturing 
crop s l ike kwnara and banana could be ready in a f ew months . 
In the old days the other insurance against risk was the 
mag ic of crop pro tec t ion : rituals to fol lowing in p lant ing 
4 Ano ther exampl e : a grower told me that in 1 95 6  he grew 
peanuts and marketed them in Raro tonga ; bu t he never re­
ceived the money . This was too risky . In fu ture years he 
sold them himself at a lower price on A t iu . 
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according to the t radit ional calendar , in harvesting accord­
ing to f ir s t  fruit s  cus toms , and in obeying the prohibition 
of the tapu . Crop failures  were in terpre t ed as incorrec t  
application o f  this magic . Christianity and sc ience now 
challenge some o f  these procedures , though belief in and 
adherence to some of them continues . 5 
This f ear of the consequences of  crop failure is sl ightly 
less today because of the existence of a paternal admini­
s trat ion . Impressed by the weal th and benevolence of the 
government , At iuans realize that in the event of a d isas ter 
they would no longer be lef t to s tarve , and hence need not 
take such p recaut ions . The administration also provides 
o ther forms of  insurance . Their schemes to allow repayment 
of crop input s  in proportion to receip t s  guard against high 
fer tilizer or spray payments in a bad year . Without this 
the Ci trus Rep lanting S chemes would no t have survived the 
hurr icanes of  1 960  and 1968 . The mos t  recent p roj ect offer s  
absolutely certain returns to labour in the f orm of wage 
employment .  The popularity of working for the P ineapple 
Incorporation shows the Atiuan preference for cer tainty over 
the potentially higher bu t highly variable returns to be had 
from cash cropping . 
In summary , Atiuan a t t i tudes to r isk do not dif f er mark­
edly from those of  wes tern economies . Where costs of fail­
ure are high , p eople do their best to  insure thems elves .  
Where cos ts are low, they enj oy a gamble . 
At titudes to  the present and the future 
This s ec tion inve s t igates the relative pref erenc es that 
Atiuans have for using a fac tor now against investing it 
for later consump t ion . This dep end s on the sort of resourc e 
being allocated - whe ther it  is economic or cul tural , 
traded or inheri ted . For example , people do have a par t ic ­
ularly long ( though imprec ise) view of  the future where 
land r ight s are involved . Coconu t s  are commonly p lanted to 
consolidate long-term rights in a price of land . I t  is  f elt 
that thi s par t of the economic heritage should be preserved 
intac t for fu ture generations . 
S imilarly , the leng th of past time horizons - the limit 
of remembered time on which exper iences and knowledge are 
5 Of ten the magical conno tation of  such p rocedures is denied 
today . 
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based - may be very long , al though imprecise . Many At iuans 
can quo te genealogies for a dozen or more generations in the 
pas t ,  though they canno t  date them precisely . The coming of 
the gospel marks a wa tershed in Atiuan memory . More recent 
times are dated by the offic e  of  dif ferent resident agents . 
In everyday economic affair s , this regard for the future 
is  les s obvious .  The temp tation is to prefer immediate 
leisure over future higher yield s , that is , present consump­
tion over future consump tion . A classic illustra t ion o f  
this choice came at the end of 1 964 . Having grown peanut s ,  
apparently no one on the island saved any seeds for the 
nex t season : that was the las t time p eanut s  were grown . 
This is not to  suggest there is  no regard for the future . 
Many planning princ iples are inherent in trad i tional sub­
sistenc e produc t ion . S ome roo t  crop s  may be planted then 
left  in the ground for several years as a s tore against 
fu ture need . The princ iple of  the ra 'ui custom is to  put a 
tapu on a crop to preserve it for later use . The method 
can also be used to conserve fish or b ird supplies . The 
uninhabited off-shore atoll of Takutea has for a long t ime 
been used as a carefully managed reservo ir of birds and 
fishe s . 
P lanning over time has become an inc reasingly important 
issue with the introduc t ion of  new tree crop s that require 
several years of  cul t ivation before the tree yields fruit . 
Where this investment relationship is a sens i t ive one ( for 
example with coffee trees) Atiuans have a record of failure . 
Only where the trees can s till survive through a j ungle o f  
weeds ( f o r  example coconuts)  are crops grown successfully . 6 
The adminis tration has tried to  encourage successful pro­
duct ion of such crops by offering loans t ied to crop inves t­
ment : the Citrus Replanting S cheme allowed growers to  
borrow to t inance early inputs against expected future 
returns . E conomic Development Fund loans were established 
to encourage the peanut and coffee proj ect s  but were later 
used for any crops . 7 Legally these are unsecured , but a 
�echanical equipment like motor-bikes and trac tors are 
generally poorly maintained , further evidence o f  disregard 
for the future . 
7And now mainly used to pay bush beer gang s working on 
taro patches . 
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Table 34 
Loans on Atiu1 1950-74 
CRS loans Co-op . loans Housing EDF loans Total 
($ )  (No . )  ($ )  (No . )  ( $ )  (No . )  ($ )  (No . )  ($ )  
1950 200 ( 22) 200 
1951 2 , 000 ( 81) 2 , 000 
1952 4 , 500 (102) 4 , 500 
1953 5 , 500 (155)  5 , 500 
1954 6 , 000 (158) 6 , 000 
1955 10 , 000 (160) 10 , 000 
1956  9 , 500 (162) 9 , 500 
1957 8 , 500 (164) 68 ( 30) 8 ,  5 68 
1958 6 , 000 (164) 124 (27)  6 , 124 
1959 12 , 500 ( 164) 124 (27 )  12 , 624 
1960 20 , 000 (164)  142 ( 19) 20 , 142  
1961 4 , 5C'O (164)  162 (29)  4 , 662 
1962 500 (164)  36  ( 2) 3 5 , 200 (88) 3 5 , 736 
1963 300 (164)  38  ( 3 )  2 , 800 ( 7) 3 , 138 
1964 240 (10) 3 , 600 ( 9) 3 , 260  ( 1 7 9) 8 , 100 
1965 144 ( 2) 1 , 600 ( 3) 1 70  ( 3)  1 , 914 
1966 3 62 ( !+) 1 , 600 ( 4) 490 7)  2 , 432 
1967 20 { 1)  400 ( 1 )  160 2) 580 
1968 200 (160) 124 3) 400 ( 1)  3 , 025 39)  3 , 74 9  
1969 20 1)  560 ( 6) 580 
1970 300 (143) 2 ( 1) 1 , 200 ( 3 )  3 , 250 ( 27 )  4 , 752 
1971 3 , 640  ( 39) 3 , 640 
1972 200 (125)  1 , 200 (3 )  3 , 480 ( 25) 4 , 880  
1 973 250 (115) 1 , 200 (3) 1 , 230  ( 9) 2 , 680 
1974 650 (111) 1 , 800 ( 11) 2 , 450 
Note : CRS means Citrus Replanting Scheme : EDF means Economic Development 
Fund . 
Sources : Files of Atiu Administration and co-operatives .  
i .� 
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bad repayment record prohibits a grower from future loans . 
Interest is paid at 5 per cent though many Atiuan growers 
do no t understand this phenomenon . Demand for these loans 
is very high . 
Land is no t permit ted as security on a loan and mos t  
Atiuans can provide n o  o ther security . C onsequently negli­
gible commerc ial lending takes p lace . In the pas t some 
traders permitted shor t-term credit on purchases on condi­
t ion that exported produce be cons igned through them . Small 
family s tores may also allow credit but of ten only to kin 
and only over a short period . For ten years the co-operat ­
ives provided an erratic , small ,  untied source of  f inance . 
Documented loans are recorded in Table 34 . 
To summarize , Atiuans show a consistent preference for 
consuming the re turn on traded produce and for leisure in 
the present rather than for inves t ing labour in future 
consump tion . 
A t t i tudes to knowledge and learning 
Pre-European produc tion was based on a small range of 
c rop s ,  well known through generations of  experience . Prod ­
uc tion t echniques were s imple and eff ic ient given exis ting 
t echnology , consisting ma inly of cursory ground preparat ion 
of small plots of land , correc t t iming of plant ing , some­
times a little weed ing , and harves ting . 
Knowledge abou t crop hu sbandry wa s contained in f olklore 
accumulated over years of  experience and deeply roo ted in 
trad it ion . For example , bef ore the introduc tion of the 
Roman calendar , Atiuans knew what time of the year to plant 
crop s by the arrival of c ertain constella t ions in the sky , 
the f lowering of certain bushes , and the changes in behav­
iour o f  bird s and insec ts ; these last had the advantage of 
being sens itive to a clima tically unu sual sea son . Be st 
( 1 92 2 )  cites similar prac tices used by the New Zealand 
Maor i .  
In princ iple ,  knowledge was conf ined t o  the eas ily ob­
served correlations between plant yields and hor t icul tural 
practic e  or climatic var iation , withou t any sc ient ific 
unders tand ing of  the biolog ical rela t ionship s . For example , 
I wa s told of  ins tances from the past where grower s had 
carefully selec ted nut s  from tall heal thy coconu t trees as 
the best to  germina te and plant in new plantat ions . They 
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did this knowing heal thy trees yield heal thy offspring , but 
not under s tanding why . 
Where outcomes could not be accounted for , magical be­
lief took over . Bad weather , insect infestations , disease , 
enemy des truction were all dangerous forces . I t  took the 
sp ecial ized knowledge of a taunga (prie s t ) to wield the 
magic in suitable ritual form to control them . There was a 
narrow distinction between scientific knowledge and magical 
knowledge , bo th based on past observation . For example , 
the rising of  c er tain s tars was known to mark the seasons , 
but they were also believed to control them and foretell 
what they would be like . 
The :tv!aor i  lunar planting calendar 
The signif icance of the lunar calendar is that it provid­
ed a way of tell ing the time in the pre-contac t period : 
days all looked the same , bu t night s were d if ferent , each 
being charac terized by the phase of  the moon , its time of  
rising , and the quar ter it  rose from .  The Maori p lanting 
and f i shing calendar is based on this . Broadly it  s tates 
that there are naturally advantageous times to p lant 
cer tain crop s and catch different types of  f ish . I t  exists 
in various forms in many par t s  of Eastern Polynesia 
(e . g .  see Best 1 92 2 ) . 
On Atiu the basic calendar is known by all p lanter s , al­
though there are many individual interpretations . Best 
claims the New Zealand Maor i  no longer planted according to  
the calendar by the twentieth c entury , but the Atiuan cal� 
endar is  s till used by almo st all . I t s  form , reproduced in 
Table 35 with some loose translations , is  very similar to 
calendars recorded on the neighbour ing island s of  Raro tonga 
and Mangaia a century ago (Gill 187 6) . 
The t ime of day to plant crops is  determined by the s tate 
o f  the t ide . Crop s a r e  said t o  grow best if planted at low 
tide . Becau se Atiu is near the equator , low t ide occurs 
in the morning and evening during a full moon ( the mos t  
favoured p lanting time) , and at  noon and midnight dur ing a 
new moon . 
l s t  Quarter 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
3rd Quarter 
1 6  
17 
18 
1 9  
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
2 6  
27 
28 
29 
30 
Nights 
I t iroa 
I ro 
Oata 
Ami am a 
Akao ti Amiama 
Tamatea Tai 
Akao t i  Tama tea 
Korekore Tai 
Akao t i  Korekore 
Vari 
Una 
Maaru 
Una 
Maitu 
O tu 
Marangi 
Turu 
Rakau Tai 
Ro to te Rakau 
Akao ti te Rakau 
Korekore Tai 
Ro to te Korekore 
Akao t i  Korekore 
Tangaroa Tai 
Ro to te Tangaroa 
Akaoti Tangaroa 
Tane 
Rongonui 
Rongomauri 
Mo tu 
Source : A t iu Tumu Korero . 
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T h e  At iuan lunar month 
Loose translation 
' The beg inning ' 
' A  bad time ' 
' Moon is born ' 
' Time of Amiama ' 
' End of Amiama phase '  
' Tama tea phase ' 
' End of Tamatea phase ' 
' Korekore pha s e ' 
' End of Korekore ' 
' Mens trua t ion p eriod ' 
' Hidden phas e  of moon ' 
' Fain t , shadowy phase of moon ' 
' Frui t  and f l ower phase ' 
' Surpr ise phase ' 
' The ful l  moon ' 
' Time of full moon ' 
' Foundation cen tre ' 
' S tart of Rakau phase ' 
' Midd le of Rakau ' 
' End of Rakau ' 
' S tar t of Korekore phase '  
' Midd le o f  Korekore ' 
' End of Korekore '  
' S tart o f  Tangaroa phase ' 
' Middl e  of Tangaroa ' 
' End of Tangaroa ' 
' God of Forest 
' Period of greatness ' 
' Gho s t  time : d isappearing moon ' 
' Expiring of the moon ' 
Plant ing ins truct ions 
P lant root crop s 
· P lant root crop s 
P lant roo t crops 
P lan t roo t crop s and 1 banana 
S top plant ing 
Planting yield s onl y 1 f ruit 
Bad plant ing t imes 
Bad plant ing t imes 
Bad plan t ing times 
Bad days 
Fish are in hid ing 
P lant another banana type 
P lan t ing bring s good flowering 
P lan t roo t crops 
P lant all crops 
P lan t all crop s 
P lant all crops 
P lant all crops 
Crop s s tart to ripen inside 
Crop s are f ini shed 
No plan ting 
No P lanting 
No P lant ing 
P lan t ing yield s 1 big fruit 
Fruit i s  ripe 
Finish planting 
Good planting time 
A great planter gets good fruits 
Bad days 
Bad days 
\0 
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Generally accepted rules on plant ing crops seem to be : 
taPo , arrowroo t ,  introduced vege tables 
Kumar>a, yam , tarua 
Bananas and o ther f ruit and leaf crops 
any time 
full moon , low 
tide 
(selected days 
(depending on 
( calendar , low 
( tide 
There are many variations on this . For example , one man 
plants his root crops a t  a full moon , and his o ther veget­
ables at  a new moon , claiming this is  the t ime when it 
usual ly rains . These variations are supported by exper­
iences growers have had o r  heard about . One of the mos t  
progressive growers had once planted a very large area of  
kwnara forget ting about the s tate o f  the t ide . Mos t  of  it  
grew poorly , but the few rows planted by chance during the 
low t ide prospered . Ano ther reported growing kumara at the 
wrong phase o f  the moon : he grew a healthy leafy crop , bu t 
when he pulled it up there was hardly any roo t . 
Almo s t  everyone including the mos t  scientific growers 
appears t o  follow this calendar in some way . Only one 
grower questioned it - a young man recently returned from 
agricultural college in Samoa . He had planted out a trial 
plo t in yams in four sections specifically to  test the 
effec t of the moon and the tide . Unfortuna tely , p igs des­
troyed that crop , but a t  the time o f  my f ieldwork he was 
repeating the experimen t  with taro tarua, undaunted by 
this ominous crop failure . 
One agricultural off icer told me he b elieved in the 
calendar but d id not always follow i t  as his j ob lef t him 
little time to arrange plant ings this way . The agricul ture 
teacher at school said he did not plant his crops by the 
moon and he taught hi s pupils no t to . Thi s  was no t because 
that system did not work , but because it was inefficient 
to wai t  for the prop i tious t ime when one could have a sim­
ilar effec t by applying fertilizer and spray s . This inter­
pretation of  the planting calendar as ' nature ' s  fertilizer ' 
is common . 
Overall , the arrangement appears flexible and pragma tic , 
and p ar t s  are linked with sound horticultural prac t ice . 
Rules are convenient and changeable . For example , the best 
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tides for planting are in the early morning and evening , 
which is the only time wage earners have free ; it is  also 
the coolest part of the day , best f or workers and plants . 
Taro may be planted any t ime which allows the convenient 
prac tice of replanting shoots immediat ely as they are har­
ves ted . 
The f ishing calendar also remains in s trong u se , based on 
the same 3 0-day month . I t  probably rests on s tronger scien­
tific foundations , s tor ing the local knowledge essential in 
locating cer tain f ish at certain times . This calendar is 
cons tant ly revised wi th informat ion from recen t  exped itions . 
In general the f avoured f ishing time is during the new moon ; 
this is a slack agricul tural per iod , and furthermore the 
darkness hides fishermen from their quarry . 
Introduc t ion of new crops backed by new sc ientific 
technique s and advice ha s challenged much Atiuan indigeneous 
knowledge ,  espec ially since 1950 . How have Atiuans responded ? 
When likely new ou tcomes are completely unknown and where 
c o s t s  of learning are low, the current s tock of knowledge 
is f el t  to  be sub-op t imal . Then growers may agree to plant 
a crop they know lit tle o f  partly in order to learn abou t i t . 
This occurred with many of  the new proj ec t cash crop s . But 
where the co sts of  learning are high because they involve a 
r i sky inves tment of resources , and growers think the ir ex­
per ience is  adequate , change is  resis ted . Readily available 
fer tilizers and sprays are rarely used in the subsis tence 
sec tor because a crop failure induced by misinformed u se of  
these could br ing d isas ter . 
New techniques of ten contradict  engrained bel ief s . Then 
follows a period of adj u s tment when a grower has to dec ide 
whether to accep t or rej ect the new information . On Atiu this 
was a long and painful proces s : mo st grower s publicly d is ­
c la imed o l d  mag ics yet pr ivately followed them , sometimes com­
b ined with new sciences , sometimes as a subs titu te . 8 For 
example , questioned whe ther they believed in the eff icacy of 
c i tricul tural prac tices such as pruning , weeding and f ertil­
iz ing , mo s t  grower s a ssured me that they did , and ye t they 
d id no t use them on their own plo ts . Bel ief was s trongest 
8Faced with a sick child an Atiuan mo ther frequently tried 
to combine an old herbal remedy wi th a doc tor ' s  prescrip­
tion - a similar dil emma of belief . 
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in cases like slash weeding : growers had wi tnessed smothered 
orange trees being cleared and responding dramatically . This 
was t he old princip le of belief by os erved correla t ion . A 
new process such as preventative spraying agains t insec ts 
brought no such star tling results  and it was difficul t  to 
exp lain . 9 I gnoranc e of an explanat ion somet imes led to con­
fusion .  One grower was observed trying to cure a ta,ro 
bl ight by adding manure to the soil . But growers rarely 
rep eat such mi s takes , which is some evidence of a learning 
process . 
The speed of learning and the degree of belief dep end 
cruc ially on the role of the change agent , in this case the 
agr icul tural off icer who advises abou t new proj ect crops . 
Several men have f illed this role on Atiu and have been 
reasonably credible in translating scient ific change into 
Atiuan terms . 
I tu is a 4 0-year old Atiuan agricultural officer who 
lives with his wife and ten natural and adop ted children ; 
he also has a grown son in New Zealand . He was educated 
in Rarotonga and has worked on neighbouring is land s .  He 
has also travelled in Au stralia on a cour se . 
He has been fully involved as a grower in the proj ects he 
helps administer . He has p lant ed several orange plots  and a 
cof fee plantation that all yielded well . S ince 1950 he has 
par t ic ipated in all but one of the new crops introduced . In 
1 97 4  he was experiment ing with f er t ili zers and spray on his 
own new vegetable crop s .  
I tu has proved t o  b e  a good agricul tural off icer , working 
hard for himself and for the community . He shows high em­
pathy wi th his clients : being an Atiuan commoner himself , 
earning an average income and leading an ordinary life , he 
can p itch informat ion at  the r ight level for o ther growers .  
And o ther s f ind him credible . At the same t ime he is shy 
and quiet , and is clearly not lo oked up to as a leader . I tu 
himself faces a dilemma in bel ief . On one hand he has 
sc ientific knowledge of p lant growth : on the other , he has 
the background of an Atiuan grower . He reconciles the two 
views with typical At iuan pragmatism and sees no contradic­
tion in using modern fer tilizers on crop s  planted according 
to the traditional p lant ing calendar . 
9 The process could only be translated as  vai Pakau 
(med icine ) . 
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A t t i tudes to the connnunity 
In pre-contac t days At iuan soc iety was highly s tra t if ied , 
ba sed on the economic control of  land and the extrac tion of 
tribute . For the commoner c lasse s , conformity to this 
pattern was encouraged by grants of land , and deviance 
punished by its  conf i scat ion . From this conformis t  though 
dec idedly inequitable pas t  have arisen present-day pressures 
to conform in work habits (despite inheri ted d if f erences 
in fac tor availabil i ty) and consump tion pa t t erns (despite 
more recent differences in money earning abil ity) . 
Households on Atiu vary in s i ze from one to seventeen , 
bu t flexible rules of adop tion mean a large family may adop t 
out children to less well-endowed relat ives . Households are 
expec ted to help wi th community work schemes .  Land r ights 
are mos t  inequitable , being based on tribal rank ; but low 
popula tion dens ity and an informal sys tem of  land lend ing 
means everyone has a share in each type of land . 
The distribut ion o f  money incomes among households is  
skewed also ( see Fig . 7 ) . Bu t despite this , household s on 
Atiu l ive conspicuously s imilar lifes tyles . House designs 
and interiors are identical . Expenditure and nutri tion 
surveys show people eat the same food s . Generosity is 
admired . A man who is too cove tous in accumulating money 
acquires a repu tation for meannes s ;  ultimately he may f ind 
he can acquire no more land nor labourers to work i t . 
One impor tant means of  exer ting soc ial pressure to con­
form is the household inspec tion ( tu taka) held quarterly . 
With one such tutaka, the women ' s  heal th connnit tee announced 
the date and several weeks of intense activity f ollowed . 
Men s tayed home to cut lawns , weed gardens , and tidy around 
the hou ses : women c leaned houses and laid out hand icraf ts . 
Pigs illegally roo t ing round the houses mysteriously dis­
appea�ed into the bu sh . Houses were painted . The few men 
owning lawn mowers were kep t very busy . 
On the day of  the inspec tion , the women ' s  commit tee met 
in the village hall , together with the heal th inspector , 
nur se , resident agent , minis ter and o ther no tables . Af ter 
prayers and speeches they began a slow and thorough inspec­
tion of every hou se on the island , village by village . Each 
house was spot less , and the women looked through every room , 
complementing owners on par ticularly f ine pieces of  needle­
work , scolding them for untidiness , and making scornful 
103 
remarks about any home that boasted too many po sses sion . 
People critici zed a man trying to grow a high hedge around 
his hou se for pr ivacy . Over a feast afterward s , f ines were 
announced for subs tandard houses , and a trophy awarded to 
the best village . 
The aim of this tutaka is to ensure that a minimum stan­
dard of living is met , and al so to discourage privacy and 
check tha t  no household is too acquisitive . Finally it is 
an enj oyable and competitive social occasion . A s imilar 
inspection used to be held of household gardens ; a minimum 
plant ing quota was set  on all hous eholds and was enforceable 
by f ine . Consequent ly subsistence produc tion was quite 
uniform . 
Recen t  economic change s  associated with proj ec t aid have 
probably increased economic inequality in several ways . To 
some ext ent entrepreneurial talents appear concentrated 
within certain famil ies , even over generations . Faced with 
successive proj ec t s  the same growers have responded keenly 
and made mos t  money . For example , almost all of the men who 
are part icipating in the latest vege table proj ec t are 
proven grower s and they have above average incomes (a mean 
of $ 2 , 21 0  compared with $ 1 , 304 for all of Atiu ) . 
Recent migration has p robably wor sened this trend . Some 
household s  boa s t  a lot of wealth left as gif ts by migrant 
relat ives on holiday . And those who leave generally hand 
over proj ect plo ts to relatives who have r ights in the land 
and o f ten already own their own p lo t s . Some growers have 
been lef t caring for up to f ive orange plo t s . The Gini 
coef f icient measuring the dis tribu tion of orange p lots among 
household s dropped from 0 . 48 in 1955 to 0 . 39 in 197 5 . 
There are dif f erences in grower response s  to proj ec t s ,  
suff ic ien t  t o  allow categorization by economic roles . The 
s tandard method (Rogers and S hoemaker 1 97 1 )  is t o  d ivide 
the population into innovator , early adop ter , maj ority ,  and 
laggard group ing s by their timing of participation , using 
arbit rary cut-off points . I t  was shown in Chapter 4 that 
participation rates for Atiuan proj ects  f i t  this basically 
normal shape , although separate adop ter categories merge 
together . 
The f ir s t  p eople to participate in a proj ect are the inno­
vator s , who introduce an idea and adap t it to their own 
purpo se . Frequently they are set apar t from the community , 
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being r isk- takers , willing to exper iment with incomplete in­
formation , and having a high regard for the future ; they 
a l so d i sp lay ini t iative , ac ting independently o f  the rest  o f  
the popul at ion , and not relying o n  the government . There 
have been very few true innova tors in Atiu , and in the case 
of the Citrus Replant ing S cheme , none at  all ( see Fig . 12 ) . 
In almo st no cases did Atiuans introduce new crops them­
selves : the government did the innovator ' s  usual work of 
obtaining new crop variet ies , trial plant ing , and selec t ing 
be st stra ins . On Atiu the social penal ties for deviance 
and the ease of migra tion means that many fru strated poten­
tial innova tors have l ef t .  Consequently , there are many 
e a r l y  
innovato r _ - a d o p t e r  - - �u j l1ri ty - - lagga rd - - non-par t i c ipant 
;;ormal d i f f u s i on curve as predic ted for an innovation 
by Rogers ( 19 7 1 ) . 
194 7-8 50-1 5 3-4 58-9 
Histogram o f  actual grower 
partic ipat ion in Citrus 
Replanting Scheme. 1- - - - - - - 1  
34% 
Fig . 12 . Distribut ion of adopt er cat egories 
Source : Rogers ( 19 7 1  : Table 19 . ) 
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po tent ially profitable entrepreneur ial oppor tunities neg­
lec ted . l o  
The next growers t o  par tic ipate are the early adop ters , 
men who still display some ini tiative and foresight , and who 
will ac t under uncertainty and incomplete informat ion , but 
who are a little more conformis t  and rel iant on other s . I t  
i s  difficul t  meaningfully to separate them out from o ther 
conforming categories ; I arbi trarily class all those who 
par ticipated in the Ci trus Scheme in its  f ir s t  year as early 
adop ters ( 11 per cent of households) . Those adopt ing in the 
next three year s are c lassified as the early and late maj or­
ity ( 5 2  per cent ) , grower s  for whom a maj or concern is con­
formity , patterning their ac tions on tho se of o ther s . 11 
Finally come the laggard s who waited t ill the las t years of 
the S cheme (3 per cent) ; they will no t introduce a new 
technique until they are assured of i t s  certainty , full 
informa tion and early returns , as evidenced by the partic i­
pation o f  mos t  o ther s . Laggards are cul tural conservat ives .  
Reactionaries are people who will never accep t  the proj ect . 
Rogers and Shoemaker ( 1 9 7 1 )  takes no account of such a poss­
ibility . A third of Atiuans refused to j oin the C i trus 
S cheme , though the number decreased for later proj ec t s . Very 
few households did no t participate in any proj ec ts at all 
between 1 95 0  and 1 9 7 5 . 
Table 3 6  summarizes this progression of adop ter categories 
from preference for risk to avers ion to i t ; from long t ime 
horizons to near-s ightedness ; from willing experimentation 
and learning using incomplete information to dislike of 
ignorance ;  from low dependence on o ther members of the 
communi ty to high dep endence ,  and back to low again , in 
keep ing with their degree of social deviance .  
1 0c ompare this wi th o ther Polynesian economies where there 
has been little oppor tunity for migration . For example in 
Tonga people introduce new crops and techniques , set up 
s tores ,  bake bread , and drive taxis even on the isola ted 
is land (see Bollard 1 9 7 6 ) . 
11Typ ical of these was the man who told me he grew his 
crop s ' for as long as the o thers did ' . 
1--' 
0 
Table 3 6  °' 
General ized attributes of ado:Eter categories 
Participation Case 
At t itudes to : in CRS S tud ie s 
Inter- Pre-
depen- die-
Risk Time I gnorance dence Ac tual ted 
Innovator Risk- High regard I gnorance- Low 5 Tai 
taker for future acc ep ter Inter- ( 2�% ) 
depen-
dence 
Early l 2lhh 2 5  Rua Adop ter (11%)  (13�% ) 
Maj ority High 96hh 126  Toru 
r ( 52%) (68% )  Laggard 6hh 3 0  Rima w � \V (3%)  (16% )  
Reac tionary Risk- Low regard Ignorance- Low 63hh Ono 
Aver ter for future averter ( 34%)  
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Record s of At iu proj ects show that when an innovat ion is 
int roduced by government ,  the whole island i s  quickly aware 
of it ; there is no time lag in the dis semina t ion of inform­
ation . A few innova tors may try a crop , and , depending on 
their succ ess , some of the opinion-leaders may be induced to 
adop t it . This is the s ignal for the maj ority to j o in in . 
The time span required for all growers to make their decis­
ions is very short , compared with some s imilar documented 
innovat ions elsewhere (Table 3 7 ) . 
Table 37 
Time taken for connnunity to adopt innovations 
Atiuan proj ects 
Grain varieties in Ind ia 
Pes ticides in India 
Spray in Iowa 
New c rops in Kenya 
Hybrid corn in U . S . A .  
Average 
years 
4 
5 
8 
1 0  
1 6  
1 6  
Case studies of adopter ca tegories 
Source 
Fieldwork 
Lockwood and Moulik 
(1971)  
Bose ( 1 964 ) 
Rogers and Shoemaker 
( 1 9 7 1 )  
Garst ( 1974 ) 
Griliches ( 1 95 7 )  
In the f ive case studies that follow, not only does the 
speed of adop t ion of proj ects decrease from innovator to 
laggard , but so too does the number of proj ects entered and 
the rate of success in them ( see Table 38) . Furthermore , 
the income earned from agricul ture and other self -employment 
decreases from innovator to laggard , as  does the t ime spent 
on cropp ing . 
Tai , the innovator . Tai is a nervous , energetic and 
intense man of 4 0  who lives with his non-Atiuan wife - a 
teacher - their s ix young sons , and an elderly woman rel­
ative . He was raised by his grandmo ther and received only 
elementary schooling on Atiu . He planted his f irst proj ect 
crop , forest trees , at an early age , though he later dug 
them up to grow o ther c rop s . 
I-' 
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Table 38 
Proj ect record of d ifferent growers 
Early 
Innovator adopter Maj ority Laggard Reac t ionary 
(Tai) (Rua) (Toru)  (Rima) (Ono ) 
C it rus ( 1950) 1 951 
Forestry ( 1951 ) 1 95 6 
Tomatoes (1955) 1 955 
Peanu ts ( 1964)  1 964 1 964 1 964 
Coffee ( 1963)  1 964 1 965 1 96 6  1 964 
C itrus Extension ( 1 96 5 )  1 9 6 6  1 967 1 97 2  
Taro ( 1966) 1 97 1  1 9 7 2  
Pineapples ( 1970)  1 97 0  1 97 0  
Vegetable s  (1974)  1 974 1974 
Number a t tempted 7 5 4 1 2 
Number c ontinuing 3 2 1 0 0 
Sources : Files of At iu Adminis tration , f ield no tes . 
In 1 961 , at his grandmo ther ' s  suggestion , Tai went to 
Auckland , New Zealand , for a year . He worked long hour s 
at two j obs and earned enough money to buy mat er ia l s  to 
s tart building his large house on Atiu . 
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On his return he worked on the family coffee plo t . In­
s tead of selling the berr ies to the government like mo st 
o ther growers ,  he went to the trouble of  drying them , 
roas t ing them , and selling them locally ; this was at  a time 
when sale o f  produce on Atiu was not a socially approved 
habit . Then Tai tried growing peanuts ; he hired school 
children to harves t  them and paid them in nut s . He roas ted 
the nut s  and sold them at  local dances and picture shows ; 
bu t he could no t make a p ro f i t  and gave up af ter a year . 
In 1971  Tai went away again , worked hard , and in a year 
saved $ 2 , 000 . With this he bought a light truck in Auckland 
and freighted it back to Atiu . He says he realized this 
would no t be a particularly profitable inves tment , bu t the 
connnunity needed ano ther t ruck . In 19 74 he was having 
dif f icul ty running it , with legally f ixed hireage rates and 
high p etrol cost s , and he could no t afford to pay himself a 
wage . He conf ided that he gets very annoyed with relatives 
who expect to borrow it  for nothing (he told them they must 
pay) ,  and by people was ting his time while they collect 
firewood or have a p icnic . He is now trying to form a union 
wi th the two o ther private truck drivers to nego tiate a fare 
inc rease . 
Al so on his return from New Zealand Tai entered a con­
trac t with two Rarotongans to open a small shop equ ipped 
with a refr igerator in the front of his hou se . He and his 
wif e  own half the shares and serve in i t . The o ther two 
s end the goods from Raro tonga . Tai i s  getting d issatisf ied 
with them too as he doe s  not think he is getting a fair 
return ; he intends to buy all the shares himself . Turnover 
is $ 3 00 to $ 4 00 per week and prof its are f ixed by government 
at 15 per c ent on landed cos t . Tai al lows customers to buy 
on cred i t  but they mus t  set tle up their accounts each week­
end . His relatives know they mus t  pay there . 
In 1966 , before leaving Atiu , Tai planted half a hectare 
in orange trees . They were poor s tock and only about half 
survived the transplanting . On his return he extended the 
plant ings with some new experimental l ime ,  lemon and mandarin 
tree s . He maintains his oranges very well , weeding the whole 
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p l o t  by hand ; though young , the trees are now bearing heav­
ily , the heal thiest on the island . 
Tai was the f ir s t  Atiuan to grow pineapples commercially ; 
his brother-in-law sent him some s tock from Mangaia . A 
number of  o ther private g rowers have followed hi s example 
since then . Before he went to New Zealand he obtained a 
legal order on his p ineapple plot giving him secure tenure 
and sole right to the proceed s . He lent the plot to  his 
bro ther , bu t the lat ter neglec t ed i t  in his absence . On 
hi s return Tai replanted the p ineapples , and enlarged his 
plot and employed his cousin to  weed it . He resisted the 
a t temp ts of the newly formed P ineapple Incorporation to in­
clude his land . Today his small plo t s tands , completely 
surrounded by 1 00 hec tares o f  Incorporat ion land s ,  a symbol 
of hi s independence and mistrust of authori ty .  
He i s  an inve terate experimenter . H e  persuaded a Euro­
pean friend in Rarotonga to  send him seeds of  new varieties 
of vegetab les to try .  He grew the f irs t onions on At iu as 
an experiment and sold them all at the local market .  He is  
now planting the f ir s t  beetroot  and eggplant and using new 
tomato roo ts tocks . When the New Zealand Army contingent 
provided a temporary outlet in 1974 , he took full advantage 
of it and grew pumpkin , cabbage , cucumber , p eas and melon . 
Tai po ints out vege tables require a lo t of  work but they are 
a profitable crop that grow all year round . He has inves t ed 
in a wheelbarrow and a knapsack sprayer ; currently he i s  
spraying vege tables with several different sprays to test 
them . He uses small quantitites of  blood and bone which he 
prefer s  as a ' natural ' fertili zer . When the government 
set up a growers '  associat ion to introduce vegetable growing 
in 1974 Tai was already an experienced grower . 
Tai keeps forty to f if ty pigs , and considers them a good 
inves tment , because they clear the land f or planting , even 
though they take a long time to f eed every day . S ome t imes 
he sell s a p ig through his shop . He grows taro, build ing 
the patche s  himself and selling the surplus ;  when a blight 
infec ted plants in 1 97 3  he obtained some disease-resis tant 
s trains to plant . He also plants taro tarua, hiring labour­
ers and machinery to clear the land , and bananas . He en­
courage s  his young sons to help him , proud of their abil ity . 
His latest venture has been to order a billiard table from 
New Zealand , and hire this out on Atiu . 
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Tai makes some effort to conform to At iuan soc iety , work­
ing on communal labour gangs , deacon in the church , cha irman 
of his village commi t tee , and par t icipant in a community 
drive to record local traditions . For this he receives a 
certain amount of  respec t from the community , but he stands 
somewhat aloof and is no t regarded as a leader . Basically 
Ta i is an individualist scornful and mistrus tful of o ther 
people . He refuses to drink in bush beer schools , employs 
workers , enj oys earning money , and sells crop s to relatives ; 
this is  all cons idered anti-social behaviour . 
Rua , the early adop ter . Rua is a very intell igent man of  
40.  He lives wi th his non-Atiuan wife and seven young chil ­
dren . He comes f rom a family of  high rank with large land 
ho lding s , and his father was well known as a good grower . 
Rua received secondary education on Rarotonga , trained as a 
teacher , and travelled widely through the outer Cook 
I slands . 
Returned to Atiu to teach , he took up his father ' s  peanu t 
plo t for a while . In 1965 he planted a coffee plo t ,  but he 
found it  too troublesome to p ic k  the berries , and let the 
plo t run to weed . His father dis trus ted government mo tives 
and had refused to j oin in the C itrus Replant ing S cheme . 
But in 1 967 Rua planted his own orange trees on a half­
hec tare plo t .  Today they are beginning to bear . 
In 1 9 7 0  Rua followed Tai ' s  example and planted a very 
small trial plo t of pineapples . But he encountered trouble 
with d isease and did no t rep ea t  the experiment ; he handed 
over his lands to the Incorporation . In 1 97 4 , as chairman 
of the Growers ' Assoc iation , he helped organize the 
vegetable proj e c t . He himself plant ed tomatoes , melon , 
cabbage , beans and let tuce on a p iece of  land j ointly with 
his bro ther . The brother was a full-time grower and sold 
some of the crop , but Rua mainly wanted heal thy green veget­
able s  for his family . 
Today Rua and his oldest son also grow large quantit ites 
of taro and taro tarua, and arrowroo t ,  kwnara, yam and 
bananas .  They keep a f ew p ig s ,  goa t s  and fowls . Rua is  also 
a keen f isherman and is  toying with techniques that might 
increase his ca tch . One problem is f inding the time for all 
these activities , for he has a great love of alcohol and 
spends much of his time drinking . 
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Rua is something of an enigma . He is very proud of old 
traditions and is  careful to share his harves t s  and ca tches 
wi th the ari ki and the minis ter ; he boas ts about his hered­
i tary land rights . And yet he has a very searching sc ienti­
fic mind , with a good working knowledge of pr inc iples like 
crop selec tion . I f  Tai seeks money , Rua seeks knowledge for 
its own sake , trying to unders tand , and taking pleasure in 
teaching his son . 
Toru , the maj ori ty adopter . Toru is  a 4 5-year-old man 
who lives with his wife , six children , and an older relative . 
Ano ther son is marr ied and lives in ano ther village , occas­
ionally helping hi s father . Three more children l ive in 
Raro tonga and New Zealand , and they send a lot of money back 
to their parents ( $ 7 2 5  in 1 97 4 ) . Toru inher ited hi s tribe ' s  
senior mataiapo title from hi s father . 
Toru planted a c itrus plo t  in 1951 and later induced hi s 
father to j oin the scheme too . Today he maintains both with 
ano ther plot left by a migrating friend , and the effort is 
too much ;  even though the whole family help s , the t rees are 
det eriorating and yields dropping . Toru considered growing 
tomatoes in the 1 95 0s but was put off  by the lo sses o thers 
suf fered . But he did try growing p eanu t s  for one year . 
Af ter the coffee proj ec t had been introduced and mo st 
growers had expres sed interes t ,  Toru decided to plant a plo t . 
However , he underes t imated the work required to maintain i t  
and he never marketed any berries . A few tree s are s t ill 
there and these yield j us t  enough coffee for the famil y .  
Toru had always grown a l o t  o f  taro and i n  1 9 7 2  was induced 
by the success of o thers to s end the surplus to the market 
in Raro tonga . Today he hires the bush beer gangs to help 
when necessary . He hires a trac tor to c lear land for arrow­
roo t , but o therwise plants his taro tarua, yarns , taro and 
bananas in completely tradit ional fashion according to the 
plan ting ca lendar , and without f er tili zer or spray . He 
will no t buy or sell produce locally . He al so keeps a few 
p igs , goat s  and chickens . 
In many ways Toru reflec ts typical Atiuan a t titudes and 
hab i t s . He was ini tially keen to j oin in mos t  community 
proj ects though he of ten preferred to use the produce for 
home consump t ion rather than sell i t . For the last f ew 
years he has worked as a labourer on the P ineapple Incorpora­
a t ion . Today he p refers this work wi th its lower but s teady 
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income , and he works there regularly , tend ing his plantat ion 
in the late af ternoon . 
His economic knowledge is typical of  many growers : he 
shows some unders tanding of  c itricul ture and claims to 
apprec iate the difference pruning and weed ing make to orange 
tree s , ye t like mo st o ther s he does not apply these to his 
own plo t s . He canno t say what price he receives for his 
orang e s , and he does no t know wha t the ou t s tand ing debt on 
his p lo t  is . He prefer s to talk of  the good o ld days when 
money was easier to earn and the old native orange trees 
yielded more fruit . 
Above all , Toru is a conformist who accep t s  community 
patterns and f its  in well with them . He spends a lot of  
time working in community groups and work par ties . He is 
the chairman of  one of the bu sh beer schools and organizes 
the ir work ; much of  the t ime he is  to be found down at the 
school , drinking and talking . L ike so many o thers he has 
many relations overseas , but he seems satisf ied with his 
life on Atiu . 
Rima , the laggard . Rima is a 30-year-old who lives with 
his wif e , s even children (ano ther is  adopt ed by relatives ) , 
and a middle-aged male relative . Rima is the youngest son 
of one of the outstanding famil ies on the island , and some­
thing of a black sheep . He was educated on Raro tonga , but 
wa s expelled from college . Apart from a trip to  Tahiti , 
he has spent the rest o f  his life on Atiu . Although highly 
talented he has achieved lit tle . Af ter he was dismissed 
from a j ob wi th the co-operative , hi s father managed to get 
him a part-time j ob as a shopkeeper ; occasionally he works 
there , but much of his t ime is spent asleep on the front 
verandah of his house , ostensibly babys itting . 
He keeps a f ew p ig s  and fowls , and plants a little taro 
and arrowroot with the relative who s tays with him ,  on the 
latter ' s  land . This relative does most of the work , provid­
ing the family with foods and fish ;  withou t his help Rima 
would certainly have to work harder himself . 
Money is  earned by Rima ' s  wif e , the New Zealand-educated 
daughter of  a rich half-Chinese trader . She has a highly 
paid clerical j ob and is a hard worker . She is  also well 
endowed with land ; they live in her old family hou se . She 
even bought Rima the motor-cycle he rides . Recently , Rima , 
helped by relat ives , built a second , smaller , house . 
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Rima used to work on his father ' s  coffee plot and his 
uncle ' s  o ranges , but he was soon disillusioned when he re­
ceived none o f  the harvest . He ha s only j oined in one pro­
j ec t : in 1 972  his wif e ' s  sister planted a new orange plo t  
o n  some j o intly-owned land . Rima and his wif e  dec ided they 
should re-assert their own rights in the land block , so they 
hired some friends to plant s ixty young trees nearby . The 
plo t was no t looked af ter and an accidental f ire killed the 
tree s . Refu sing to do it himself , Rima hired more people to 
replant the trees . Today hal f  are dead and the rest sickly 
through neglec t .  
Rima i s  inherently lazy ;  his wife considered s ending him 
to New Zealand to earn some money but she f eared he could 
never save any . He has an inferiori ty complex and gives up 
eas ily . O ther more hard-working Atiuans look down on him .  
Yet Rima embodies many traditional traits . He particuarly 
likes working with o ther s , spending some time on voluntary 
conununal proj ects and bush beer gangs . He is not avariciou s , 
and is generous and hospitable . He loves drinking and spends 
a lot o f  time at the bush beer schools . He does not have to 
work hard for a living and sees no rea son why he should . 
Ono , the reac tionary. Ono i s  a 4 0-year old who lives with 
his wif e  and six children on Atiu . He al so has several chil­
dren in Raro tonga and New Z ealand . He was brought up by 
fo s ter parents , received a good education on Rarotonga , and 
returned to Atiu . 
For a while he tried to make a l iving a s  a p lanter . He 
grew tomatoes for four years until returns became too un­
certa in . He grew peanuts but rats dug them up . He planted 
a large grove of coconuts  but they died . His las t effort 
was to plant coffee in 1 964 ; he d id no t look after the bushes 
p roperly and they were soon smo thered by weeds . S ince then 
he has g iven up all interest in p lanting . New proj ect crops 
do not enthuse him .  He can afford this a t titude because he 
has a highly paid j ob as an administrative c lerk . 
Today he keeps a f ew p igs , fowls and a flock of goats . 
He does a minimum o f  planting : a f ew bananas ,  f our taro 
patches (all made by bush beer gangs ) ,  and some arrowroot on 
a plot cleared by tractor . He actually has to buy taro and 
other vegetables , mos t  unusual for an Atiuan household . He 
possesses little agricultural equipment , an old bike and a 
dilap idated home . He is also dissatisfied with his j ob :  he 
can rise no further , and claims he is  the vic tim o f  political 
Table 3 9  
Money incom e  of d if f er en t  growe r s , 1 974 
Tai Rua Toru Rima 
Agr icul tural income 7 65 81  32 
Wage income 2 , 346a 1 , 8 04 1 , 034 1 , 24 2  
Remittances and 
transfer s  3 0 8 0  7 25 4 0  
Total income $ 3 , 14 1  $ 1 , 965 $ 1 , 7 91 $ 1 , 28 2  
a Includes Tai ' s  shop activities . 
Sources : Files of Atiu Administration ; field no tes . 
Table 4 0  
Labour hours worked oy d if f erent grower s in 
sample week , 1 97 4  
Tai Rua Toru Rima 
S elf-employed labour 28 14� 11� 4� 
Wage labour 1 5a 6�
b 
37� 12 
Communal work 1 2� 2� 12� 
Drinking time 2 20� 14 14 
a
lncludes Tai ' s shop ac tivities . 
bA teacher during school holidays . 
Sources : Files of Atiu Adminis tration ; field notes . 
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Ono 
1 , 295 
200 
$ 1 , 4 95 
Ono 
3� 
30 
1 
28 
1 1 6  
manoeuvr ing . Consequently h e  is planning to  leave f o r  New 
Zealand soon . He pores over the newspaper s his children 
send h im ,  looking at adver t isements for j obs , huuses and 
car s . 
There are two types o f  reac tionaries : one is so t ied by 
cul tural conservatism that he wil l  tolerate no change ; the 
o ther sees no thing to gain from par ticipating in his soc iety 
and has opted out of  it  - this is Ono . He does no t expec t 
to remain long on Atiu , so there i s  no point in plant ing 
long-term crops . Anyway he knows he is a poor p lanter . He 
dislikes agricul tural work and make s the children do mo s t  
of  i t . H e  even dislikes working for the community o r  the 
bush beer gang s . In his own way he is as much a deviant as  
Tai the innovator . Ono finds his solace in alcoho l , and in 
the week I ques tioned him about his daily work had spent 
28 hours dr inking . 
Attitude to au thority 
Atiuan growers have for a long time responded with sub­
servience to paternal adminis trat ions . In pre-contac t t imes 
the akaere planned and d irec ted planting s , and there was 
l it tle room for ind ividual init iative . They could force 
growers to p lant a m inimum quant i ty ;  they could forb id 
them to harves t crops in times o f  scarc ity . Successive 
au thorities have continued this paternal ism through the 
church , the resident agent , the village commit tees and 
the island counc il . They can command a volunteer work 
force , lay down plant ing requ irements , and declare hea l th 
s tandards . 
The cruc ial l inks in this ch�in of  authority have been a 
small group of opinion leaders , men who , by virtue of their 
p ersonality and ac tions , f ill a number of Atiuan soc ial 
ideal s ,  and are consequently looked to for communi ty leader­
sh ip . Today the resident agent , is land councillors and 
ariki do no t mould Atiuan public op inion as much as a few 
ind ividual s  - one a member of the Leg islative Assemb ly ,  one 
an agricul tural off icer , and several teachers and deacons . 
Prof ile of an op inion leader : Varu . Varu is a 65-year­
o ld At iuan who l ives with his wif e  and grandchild in 
Raro tonga , because he is  the Atiuan member of the Leg islative 
Assembly which s i t s  there . He also has a house on Atiu 
maintained by an elderly r elat ive . 
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Varu received little early education , but went to sea on 
a trading schooner and travelled widely around the Pacif ic 
for many years . In 1 952 he returned to Atiu and became the 
local teacher and later , headmaster . He was a competent 
grower while there , planting forest trees , tomatoes , peanuts 
and coffee bushes . He also planted a special coconut plot 
for government fertilizer trials . 
While teaching he found time to organize the youth of 
his village to rebuild the local meeting house , against the 
opposit ion of elders . He eventually redesigned and super­
vised redecoration- of all the o ther villages ' meeting 
houses too . Nex t ,  at a time when most  people still lived 
in thatch huts , Varu dec ided to build himself a house of 
wood and blocks . He designed one by trial and error , and 
built it helped by his three bro thers . It was a great 
success and they ended up building eight more . Then Varu 
decided he wanted running water , so he designed and buil t 
the f irst  water tank . I t  was square ,  made of  lime , and 
leaked badly ,  but he perf ec ted it  with later designs . 
About 1 9 60 the government offered Housing Authority loans 
of $ 4 00 to rebuild houses . Varu was appointed housing 
officer . He experimented with the mixture for making blocks , 
and cut costs by ordering bulk cement who lesale , and by 
get t ing Boys ' Brigade and Boy S cout group s to haul sand and 
mix the blocks in his own mould . He redesigned the gov­
ernment plans to enable the loan to f inance a larger house . 
He organized men into groups of six to eight each working on 
several houses . In this way almost  all Atiuans built new 
houses in ten year s .  
Meanwhile Varu had helped organize the co-operative 
movement ac ting as a go-between for government and grower s .  
He became the head of the Marketing C o-operative and the 
Taku tea I sland Commit tee . He al so organized Atiuans into 
preserving his torical traditions , and introduced the teach­
ing of ind igeneous cra f t-making into schools . 
In 1 965 the first  Cook I slands Legislative Assembly con­
vened . Varu was elec ted one of Atiu ' s  two representatives ,  
and he had to spend mos t  of his time on Raro tonga . In 
1 968 he found himself no t re-elec ted , much to his surprise . 
He interpreted this as a s ign from God that there was work 
to be done , and set about redesigning and rebuilding the 
Cook I slands Christ ian Church building ; this is the large st 
church in the Cook I slands , and it was a massive j ob .  Varu 
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drew up the plans , then supervised the rebuild ing . He em­
ployed twelve full-time tradesmen and organi zed each village 
to provide for ty men to work on it in rota tion one day each 
week . I t  was finished in 14 weeks . The resul t is impress­
ive . Varu was re-elec ted to the Assembly in 1968 ; he has 
been there ever s ince , a senior statesman in the oppo sit ion 
party . However , these absences have weakened his ties with 
At iuans . 
How could Varu achieve all this ?  Partly through his high 
community office and status : he i s  spokesman for the three 
ariki, the chief akaere on the island , and he derives pres­
tige from his abil ity as an orator and holder of cultural 
knowledge . He is a senior church deacon and the cho ir 
leader . He is currently head of the Boys ' Brigade for the 
whole of the Cook I slands , a very powerful posi tion . He 
has an easy rapport with Europeans . Despite little formal 
educat ion he has cons iderable writing , drawing and engin­
eering skills . Varu has developed a wider outlook on the 
world than most  Atiuans pos sess , from travell ing widely 
through the Pacific and New Zealand , to Tahiti with a choir , 
to Korea on a church mission , and to Bri tain with the Boys ' 
Brigade . 
Varu is an energetic innovator . He possesses considerable 
charisma and is an expert organizer . His main role is as 
the man who interprets change in terms At iuans can unders tand , 
and puts the stamp of respectab il ity on them . He is success­
ful as an opinion leader only be cause At iuans respect and 
trus t him.  
The response of Atiuans to control has been subservient . 
They plant as directed , and when instruc tions are no t given , 
appear at a loss . 12  As a result they have been unable to 
display ini tiative when required . Marke t signals have been 
frequently ignored as indicator of  economic intelligence . 
For example , in 1 974 copra prices reached record levels : 
Atiuans had the facil ities and experience to make copra , but 
did no t re spond . 
1 2one informant ,  quest ioned why he planted an orange plo t , 
replied ' because the government wanted it ' .  Ano ther told 
me the reason why planters stopped pruning their orange 
plo ts in the 1 96 0s was that they realized the government 
would no t prosecute them for not doing it ! 
Port 2 
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Chap ter 6 
The pre-proj ect economy 
Typically in the Pacific a pre-contact indigenous 
economic system consisted of peop le using very simple tech­
niques to get food from the land , for individual or conununal 
consump t ion , in keeping with a long-s tanding set o f  soc ial 
rules on how to behave . This chapter descr ibes how such a 
system produced good s , how it  organized it self , and what 
limited dec isions were lef t to the individual .  Early 
European contac t brought monetization which in turn led to 
changes in produc tion and consump tion opportunities and 
increased scope for individuals to make economic decisions . 
Attempts  by outsiders to change techniques in the economy 
through aid proj ec ts have been mor.e recent . Thi s  chapter 
builds the foundations on which later chapters wil l  analyse 
the effec ts  of these proj ec ts . The theoretical discussion 
is illus trated with a case study of Atiu using material 
drawn from Part I .  
The pre-contac t economy 
Charac teristics of  production . A maj or charac teristic of  
pre-contact agricul ture was the short time span between the 
planning of a catch or a crop and its fruition . For the 
hunter and gatherer , the production process consisted of  
combining the labour under his  control in  a ski lled manner 
with a straightforward (and usually easily obtainable) 
technology such as bows and arrows , nets , digg ing sticks . 
The dec ision that some food or housing or clo thing material 
was wanted meant that the person must go and search for i t , 
whether fruit , nut s ,  wild vege tables , animals , birds or 
fish . Thi s search could be dangerous , uncomfortable or 
unsuccessful ; i t  frequently took a lot of  time , espec ially in 
les s  aff luent areas . 
In its  more developed forms the planning period spanned a 
seasonal cycle . Crops not found growing wild had to be 
planted and sometimes roughly cultivated . Planning could 
mean s imply that shoots were roughly replanted when root 
crops were harvested . On the o ther hand grain crops demanded 
more preci se management .  Yet cul tivation generally implied 
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no more than planting at the start of  the season and har­
vesting at the end , with a lit tle maintenance in between . 
Even long-term tree crop s management was reduced to 
sing le period decisions . Frequently self -sown and hardy , 
trees were rarely cul tivated for the future . A harvester 
simply decided how much fruit to collec t off them . In a 
hunting and gathering economy , cul tivation prac tices re­
duced to searching and catching or collec ting . This did no t 
preclude a long-term view of economic resources - it was 
necessary for survival tha t land fertility be managed , f lora 
and fauna conserved , and sometimes population regulated . 
Almo st all communit ies had some way of impo s ing social taboos 
on particular resource use in times of need . Such problems 
were social ly regulated , and the ordinary person was no t 
involved in day to day mul ti-period decision making . 
The character of  this s imple one-period one-input pro­
duction process may be specified further . The funct ion was 
cont inuous and non-increas ing for a range of d ivis ib le in­
puts and outputs . In hunting and gathering activities , 
returns to scale could be nearly constant , especially in 
conditions of  primitive affluence . I f  berries were relative­
ly abundant and it took an hour to collect one kit , the 
second kit should take only ano ther hour . l Emp irical con­
f irmation of this comes from Sahlins ( 1 97 2 ) . 
Produc tion of  native oranges in Atiu in the late nine­
teenth century provides an example of such a production 
func tion . Native oranges ,  though a tree fruit , were regarded 
as a single period crop which required no maintenance to 
help raise future yields . Young trees were allowed to sprout 
from seeds wherever oranges had fallen and the bush had no t 
smo thered them . 
When oranges were needed a family would go into the bush 
to one of their groves ,  roughly clear the undergrowth , shake 
down some oranges , and carry them home . Unwanted oranges 
were left to rot . There were many trees relative to the 
needs of the popula tion ,  so  oranges were not highly valued . 
In season plenty could always be found . 
1we assume that land was relatively abundant , and hence 
labour was the only scarce input . 
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A second characteris tic of pre-contac t agricul ture was 
the low realized variance in crop yields , and hence the rel­
ative unimportance of  risk avoidance as a criterion of 
decision making . On an isolated island , ind igeneous crops 
became biologically adapted to the physical environment , 
gradually developing resis tance to the extremes of  clima te 
and immuni ty to native pes ts and diseases . This natural 
breeding was at the expense of high yields . The outcome 
was a hardy plant tha t could be relied upon to give consis­
tent bu t low quality returns . In a similar way , hunted 
animal s developed high survival abilities bu t not the meat 
or skin qual ity of domesticated ones . 
Some production var iation did inevitably occur in extreme 
year s .  In affluent communities many wild growing crops were 
no t fully explo ited in ordinary year s ,  so in a poor year 
needs might still be met . Furthermore , in a non-specialist 
economy with little exchange ,  uncertainty from prices and 
marke ts was no t a problem .  
Where exogenous fluctuations were unavoidable and pot­
entially harmful a community attempted to counterac t the 
disturbances wi th appropriate mag ic and ritual . This ex­
planation wa s first  g iven by Malinowski (1922 : 4 2 1 ) : 
In garden mag ic , soil , rain , proper work are given 
their full due . None the les s , no one would dream 
of  making a garden without the full magical per­
formance being done over it . Garden magic is 
thought to make j ust this difference , which a man 
hopes for from ' chance ' or ' good luck ' , when he 
sees everybody around him working as hard as he 
can , and in all o ther respec ts under s imilar 
conditions to himself .  So  we see that in all 
the se cases , magical influence runs parallel to -
and independently of  the effec ts of human work and 
natural condit ions . I t  produces these differences 
and those unexpected result s ,  which canno t be ex­
p lained by any of the o ther factors . 2 
2The algebraic consequence of  this explanation is that in a 
produc tion func tion any yield variance is  caused not by a 
dis turbance term , but by inputs  that vary in (magical) 
quality . 
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T o  illus trate for Atiu , it appears tha t the na tive orange 
trees there off ered far more consis tent crop yields than do 
mod ern c i t rus plants . The trees tha t survived to ma turity 
did so because they had survived the smo ther ing of surround ­
ing bush and had adap ted themselves to the Atiu environment . 
For example there was l it tle evidenc e of biennial bearing -
the al terna te good and poor yields common wi th modern c itrus . 
Atiu was essentially a closed ecological system ;  there are 
no stories of bad pest or d isease infestations oc curring in 
the past as they do today . The trees grew very large , 1 0  
metres o r  more high , and heavily trunked . They yielded more 
(low qual ity ) fruit per tree than do modern c i trus ( though 
c onsiderably less per hec tare ) and conserva tive estima tes put 
this at 6 ca ses per mature tree . Thi s impli·es a po tent ial 
produc tion of 45 , 000 cases in the 1 930s . Since expor ts never 
exceeded 2 0 , 000 cases and household consump tion was a frac t ion 
of this , it is clear that  even in poor years there must have 
been cons iderable was tage of oranges :  supply variability was 
minor . At a rough estimate native orange exports for 1 930-4 9 
had a supply varianc e of 0 . 09 whereas modern orange expor ts 
over the last  2 0 years had a variance of 0 . 35 (see next 
chap ter for derivation ) . 
A third charac teristic of  indigeneous produc tion was in­
formational : established techniques were wel l  known . Af ter 
a crop had been grown repeatedly in the same area for a long 
time , a body of knowledge was buil t up , containing the most  
efficient techniques of produc tion given the community tastes 
and technical ability .  This evolved from genera tions of 
experiment ing , both conscious and subconsc ious .  It wa s the 
subs tance of folklore . I t  might no t have repre sented the 
full information set in the light of outside experience and 
modern knowl edge . Sometimes it contained a strange mixture 
of  scient ific logic and ad hoe (e . g .  magical ) explanation . 
Nevertheless , given the indigenous experience and outlook , it 
repre sented the bes t  information available . Anthropological 
stud ies are fu ll of accounts of ind igeneous technical know­
ledge in closed communities . 
For their survival all communities developed formal or 
informal arrangements for the passing on of  this accumulated 
body of knowledge between generations . Whether the knowledge 
wa s available to all or only to clo sed spec ialist  group s de­
pended on the na ture of the work and the s tratification of 
the society . General agricultural technique was common 
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knowledge ; specialist mag ical ritual wa s usually the pres­
erve o f  the init iated . 
Again to illustra te with Atiuan native oranges , by the 
1930s (when ownership record s are f irst available) it is 
clear that every household had picking rights over a few 
groves totalling about thir ty trees . Everyone knew where 
to find these trees and to whom they belonged . They knew 
the easiest ways to pick them . They knew that the only 
maj or influence on production was adverse weather - long 
droughts  and hurricanes especially . The trees had been 
planted since the mid-ninet eenth century , so the oldest 
growers had a lifetime experience of  them , and the youngest 
had genera tions of knowledge to fall back on . All that 
needed to be known about cu stomary management of na tive 
orange trees wa s common knowledge . 
A more detailed study of  a pre-European contact produc ­
tion process is g iven by Firth ' s  (l965}  descript ion of taro 
growing on a remote Polyne sian island . 3 
3In their agricul tural system the Tikopia have formula ted 
the s imple thesis that rain is necessary for taro to grow,  
and they plainly see  that at  times the crop suffers from 
drought . I did not hear them discuss  plant growth in terms 
of water or moisture in general ,  though doubtless they could 
have formulated their generalizat ion in such wider terms . 
But in any case , though taro is  a p lant that needs cons id­
erable mo isture , they have made no attemp ts to improve their 
cul t ivation of it by irrigat ion , nor did I ever hear the 
poss ibility of such a process ment ioned • . • •  But the posi­
tion is comp lica ted by the relig ious factor . Invention and 
technical control can only take maximum effect where they 
do no t run counter to other established formulations . In 
Tikopia , rain is  bel ieved to be controlled by the spirit 
being s ,  who are appealed to in verbal formulae and by of fer­
ings . On the who le the tendency is for the Tikopia when 
faced by a drought to intens ify their efforts  to placate and 
caj o le their god s rather than to seek method s of water con­
servat ion or diversion • . • •  
A theory of magic sponsored by Malinowski , and generally 
accepted , is that  appeals to supernatural agenc ies such as 
those  ment ioned above act as a supplement to t echnical 
knowledge , f illing the gaps in it , so to speak , and do no t 
displace this knowledge . 
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Social organizat ion . Dec isions about economic produc t ion 
and consump tion depended on the systems of soc ial organiza­
tion and control . In a closed economy these were usually 
es tablished and stable , though by no means s tatic . Very of­
ten they limited individual economic choice to tight bound s 
of convent ion . The case discussed here is  typical of  island 
Po lynesia . 
Communities developed s tratified hierarchical s truc tures 
where different levels of authority controlled diff erent 
3 (Continued) 
The prac ticality of  the Tikop ia observation of  natural pro­
cesses and the type of l imited abstrac tion which they form­
ulate is well illus trated by their generalizations concern­
ing the growth of taro . I t  is held tha t the quality of the 
crop stands in direc t relation to the height of the brush­
wood on the plot before it is cleared • . .  I was told : ' If 
when the brushwood is tarutaru maru [innnature ] it is cleared 
away , and taro is  planted , it is  bad . If the brushwood goes 
up above then the taro goes up above . '  Here then , the 
T ikopia have formula ted a correlation empirically observed . 
How far have they integrated it into a sc ientific agricul­
tural explana tion? That they use this princ iple as a basis 
for ac tion is shown by the fact that they adop t d iff erent 
styles o f  planting for ground which has s tood in innnature and 
and in mature brushwood • • •  This shows that the Tikop ia 
are no t considering so il nourishment but an over t growth­
parallelism .  I questioned people to find if the j udgment 
of fu ture crop quality by height of brushwood embod ied any 
idea of any magical contagion between them . But I could not 
get the formulation beyond the equation of  the s tates of  
brushwood and taro . The T ikop ia have clear ideas on the im­
portance of rain to the taro crop , and the value of using the 
cut brushwood and o ther vegetable material as a shel ter round 
the root of the taro to conserve moisture . But the equation 
is no t in terms of  the material as a mulch but of the stand­
ing brushwood . They real ize also that the taro derives its  
growth from the soil . When they mould up the earth • • .  at  a 
later stage they speak of heaping it  together to ' feed ' • . •  
the plant s ,  using the same term as is  used for the f eeding of  
a child by  its  mother . But they have not l inked up these 
separate propo sitions ; they have · · no t  attempted to translate 
the value of  a mature brushwood into terms of soil recovery , 
nor have they any theory of  how rain and soil properties com­
bine to make taro grow {Fir th 1 965 : 90-4 ) . 
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aspec ts of  economic ac tivity . For the commoner , survival 
meant accep tance of this system and deference to the auth­
orities . The chiefs  filled many economic roles as regulat­
ors , co-ordinators , exper ts , holders of proper ty and capit­
al . They extrac ted tribute in goods and labour . They laid 
down norms and puni shed defiance . Commoners learnt to rely 
on chiefly paternal ism and they lacked initiative when they 
were absent . In some soc ieties chiefs went so far as to lay 
down planting standards and times to plant . Grower s were 
not allowed to plant less than an imposed minimum amount . 
The other soc ial influence on individual economic per­
formance was the degree of interdependence with fellow 
workers . Clo sed hierarchical societies tended to stress 
conformity , and frequently commoner s modelled their actions 
by copying their peer s . This led to a soc iety stressing 
rel iance on other s . Capital and consump t ion good s were di s­
tribu ted reasonably equitably and were very mobile . Many 
societies prac tised customs of exchange on reques t .  I f  a 
relative or friend grew a successful crop it  was rea sonable 
to reques t some , and diff icult for him to refuse . The ou t­
come was that there was little point in planning to produce 
more than family requirements . This in effec t imposed a 
maximum limit on produc tion . 
The monetized economy 
The effects  of  European contac t . European contact with 
indigeneous economies followed d ifferent forms . Bu t common­
ly in the Pac ific and elsewhere , co lonial political influence 
as well as private traders and missionaries induced monet­
iza tion without al tering basic production pat terns . Only 
much later were attemp ts  made to introduce more eff icient 
production techniques through aid proj ects . 
The first  changes induced by monetizat ion were the oppor­
tunities for trade in good s . Traders brought new consump tion 
good s to off er indigenes as an inducement to sell their own 
produce , and set up trading posts . This ins t ituted an ex­
plicit price sys tem .  Neale ( 1 97 1 )  shows that monetization 
did not imply a to tal dep endence on markets  and was compat­
ible with a non-commercial sec tor . But it  d id make it 
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possib le to compare otherwise unlike events , opening up new 
opportunities  and temptat ions . 4 
The o ther changes were to the soc ial system .  Sources of 
non- ind igenous authority destroyed the principle of  rank 
and privilege that underlay many socie ties . Ins t itutions 
such as land courts freed factor con trol from tradit ional 
chiefs and priests . Old cus toms of tribute oavment were re­
placed by monetary taxes and church titles . The se changes 
were j ustified by the concepts  of  Christianity and democracy . 
Naturally such social change was a gradual and painful pro­
cess , lagging behind trading opportunit ies . For a case s tudy 
of  monetizat ion in Tonga and a sugges ted t ime sequence , see 
Bollard ( 19 7 7a) . 
Ind ividual de cision-making . Previous ly mos t  economic 
de cis ions had been made by collective agreement or author­
itarian directive . Now ,  social emancipation freed commoners 
from the social cons traints on the ir product ion . Individual 
optimizat ion of individually- controlled resources for indiv­
idually- consumed rewards became a poss ib ility . 5 Product ion 
techniques were lit tle changed , but growers were now offered 
a price for the ir produce . This money was useful for it  
could be  exchanged for  new consump tion goods . How much of 
these newly monetized crops should a grower produce?  This 
was the new allocation decis ion that had to be  faced at an 
individual level . 6 Following the standard neoclassical model 
4Because of tighter social prohib itions fac tor markets were 
not es tablished so quickly . The model we develop as sumes 
no markets  for labour or land , and only an infant market 
for capital . 
5The individual unit envisaged here depends on the social 
organization of the par ticular community , usually some form 
of extended or nuc lear household . Sen ( 19 66)  touches on 
the allocat ion of production and consump tion within such 
a househo ld . 
6In the following model we represent the no-risk , s ingle­
period , full-information product ion process des cribed in 
the firs t se ction of the chapter as : 
q = f ( i ) , where q 
i 
is crop ou tpu t 
is labour input 
defined so tha t f i > o , f ii  � o • We also assume tha t preferences about consump tion and work 
may be represented by a cont inuous u til ity func tion 
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o'f allo cation , to maximize his utility a grower should keep 
working un til the (non- increas ing)  marginal revenue product 
of another unit equals the ( increas ing) marginal real cost 
of labour in terms of utility . This re sult (equation ( 1) ) 
is wel l  es tab lished in various forms . So  are the l ikely 
equilibrium pos itions . Above certain conventional levels 
extra income was lit tle use and the extra lab our (or ab ­
sence of leisure) required to earn it  became very undesir­
ab le ; this was particularly so in the case of primi tive 
affluences where a b ackward bending labour supply curve could 
be ob served ( see Ro t tenberg , 19 5 2 ; Berg 1961) . In this case 
price increases made it easier to earn income , but growers 
were no t always interes ted in working harder to earn more 
(or they did so only in irregul ar bursts  - see Fisk 1964) . 
This situation may be illustrated from Atiuan history . 
Decisions of  growers there can b e  formalized in terms of the 
produc tion funct ion - utility analysis us ing the ob serva­
tions at the beginning o f  Chap ter 5 .  From 1900 to 19 50 
traders offered to buy nat ive oranges . In response Atiuans 
gathered s ome for sale , but they thought  it unpleasant and 
unsociab le to spend too much t ime working to earn money . 
This implied a very high and increasing marginal disutil ity 
of lab our . A few s tore-bought items were becoming ne cessary 
for a family : however , beyond these there was no great need 
for more earnings . Consequently money incomes remained low 
in this period ( $5 1  per capita in 19 30) . 
Produce prices f luctuated during this period , caus ing 
growers to review their work allocation . But such movements 
were all al.ong known product ion functions . Provided price 
changes were not too abrup t , the information set was no t 
disturbed and the grower could eas ily adj ust his work patt­
ern . But the introduction of new proj ect crops after 1950 
6 ( Continued)  
u = u {y ,  2)  
def ined so  that u > o , q 
where y = pq i s  grower income 
p is unit  market pr ice 
uqq , ui , u ii  < o • 
Then contrained op timization occurs where 
ui 
= p f (1)  u i y 
Note that this formulation assumes that deci sions abou t 
the subsistence and cash sectors are made independent ly . 
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caused st ruc tural changes of a more fundamental type in the 
At iuan economy , as was the case throughout the Third World . 
Introduction of proj ects 
More deliberate attemp ts to induce improvement s in prod­
uc tive techniques have now been made in developing countries , 
frequently in agr iculture . 
E conomic treatment of technical change . Blaug ( 19 6 3 )  
defines technical improvement o r  process innovat ion a s  an 
addit ion to technical knowl edge that may or may not involve 
new equipmen t ,  but that can reduce the average cost  per unit 
of output despi te cons tant input prices . Technical improve­
ment does no t imply anything about its  adop tion by a f irm 
or the firm' s resulting changed prof itab ility . 
Mos t  of the dis cuss ion on technical change c oncentrates 
on its  neutrali ty or b ias , and its  effect on factor sub­
stitut ion and reward ( for example Heady 1960) . Though 
usually applied t o  commercialized economies ,  technical 
change may also affect  the sub s is tence sector (Fisk and 
Shand 1969 ) . For example , Salesbury ( 1962)  relates  the 
effects of the introduction of s teel axes on a subsis tence 
community of New Guinea highlanders . 
Early theore tical dis cussion concentrated on the effects 
of  disembodied technical change : technical improvement was 
assumed to originate from outs ide and affect  production by 
increasing the output from current inputs .  Early proposals 
assumed that it would fall on exis t ing factor input comb in­
at ions equally , that is , ' Hicks-neutrality ' .  Later varia­
tions suggested that technical change more of ten affected 
capital produc tivi ty in which case it was capital augmen­
ting or ' Solow-neutral ' .  This as sumes that the availab le 
labour is capab le of us ing imp roved cap ital , whereas it 
might require extra training or education ; this in its elf 
could be a form of labour-augmenting technical change . Many 
improved methods of  husbandry - drainage , irrigat ion , fert­
ilizers , sprays , when used to improve existing crop yields -
are examples of  such disembodied technical change . 
But frequent ly change is emb odied in new inputs .  An im­
proved tree variety cannot b e  added to the existing produc­
tion process , but requires that old trees b e  uproo ted and 
new ones planted . S imilarly a new strain of  lives tock re­
quires extens ive breeding . This technical p rogress is em­
bodied in a vintage of  cap ital , and means that the new 
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product ion func tion applies to that vintage only . This is 
Rut tan ' s  ( 1959 ) definit ion of an innovation as the set ting 
up o f  a n ew p rodu c t i on fun c t i on r a t h e r  t h an a sh i f t  in the 
u L a  one . A path of technical progress is described by a 
series of dated produc tion func t ions ( S alter 1960) . The 
vintages model also provides an explanation why current 
techniques may lag behind best practice ones : depending on 
capital cos ts , it may be  more profitable to use outdated 
equipment for a while rather than uproot it for new .  
The transfer of  new technology from the circums tances for 
which it  was des igned , and in particular its misapplication 
in under-developed countries , remains a problem .  Atkinson 
and S tiglitz ( 19 69 ) point out that the effect of technolog­
ical change is usually to improve one particular product ion 
technique , but no t other techniques or inpu t comb ina tions . 
The production funct ion shifts at one point only . Al though 
this may have been optimal previously , it is no longer nec­
essarily the best comb inat ion . In part icular , th is explains 
why research on a part icular range of the funct ion carried 
out in developed countries is no t necessarily relevant to 
developing ones where a different cost s tructure implies a 
different neighbourhood of best performance . If technology 
is imported from a country characterized by relative cap ital 
abundance then it will be  labour saving (E ckaus 19 66) . The 
current debate on ' appropriat e technolgoy ' sparked off by 
Schumacher ( 19 7 4)  res ts on this . 
Even when only one input is involved , there is  no reason 
why a produc tion func tion should increase mono tonically . In 
fact evidence on the Green Revolution from Mellor ( 19 69 )  and 
elsewhere sugges ts that so called ' improved ' crops frequently 
offer much higher capacity yields ( at leas t under controlled 
conditions )  in re turn for a much higher init ial labour re­
quiremen t ;  productivity may or may no t be higher . 7 Figure 
13 illustrates such s imple differences in a new crop . Whe ther 
growers themselves will regard the crop as improved or not is 
7we may illustrate this algebraically by a suitab ly shaped 
product ion funct ion ( the Mitscherlich funct ion) , which is 
used later : 
_ [ l  -k ( 2-2m) ] q = q - e 
Here ' improvement ' would imply that q increases , 2m in­
creases and k remains constant . 
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O r i g inal s t a t i onary crop t e chnology 
1 m  l ab ou r  
Fig . 1 3 . Example of improved crop 
less obvious . This was the pattern of many new proj ects on 
Atiu . An At iuan grower sums up the changes 
The [ old ] Maori orange you j us t  pick . No weeding , 
manure , spray and taking away the dry branches . 
You j us t  pick the orange and get the money . But 
the [new] plot orange you pick and get more money . 
But hard work . You spray , manure ,  weed 
Weeding ! Weeding ! Weeding ! Hard work ( quo ted 
in Menzies 1970 : 102 ) . 
In pract ice technical change is usually embodied in new 
vintages of human capit al too ; here exis ting e conomic theory 
underes timates the extent of change required . What is 
intended as a simple innovat ion requiring a change in factor 
comb inations in fact requires and induces far more b asic  
changes in  farming sys tems , family life and communal activ­
it ies . Technical change cannot occur independently of these 
other changes to the soc ial structure , cultural and psychol­
ogical outlook of a community , especially in many under­
developed countries which are characterized by the very 
interdependence of this s tructure . 
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Economi c anthropologists  have been more sens itive to this 
int erdependence . Whar ton ( 19 69 )  and Smelser (19 63)  b o th 
show the linkages between economic change and structural 
change in society . Mead ( 1955)  provides an example : she 
sees the change from sub s istence agriculture to cash cropp­
ing in the corn growing communities of the North American 
Indian and the potato growing communities in Peru as entail­
ing a radical change from making a living from a value crop , 
to earning a living from a merely utilitarian crop . 
More generalized theories of change . There are very 
strong asp ects of a community ' s  cul ture , society and psy­
chology that may no t b e  sympathetic to some aspec t of 
economic change . This means e conomic change mus t either be 
embodied in these charac ter is tics , or else it  mus t  expect 
some resis tance from them. Foster (1962)  outlines cul tural 
barriers to change that reflect the b asic values and atti­
tudes of a community - things like their feeling for trad­
it ion , the ir fatalism,  cultural ethnocentrism , pr ide ; social 
b arriers reflect group connections in the community - the 
nature of mutual obligat ions , pub lic opinion , factionalism , 
ves ted interests , att itude to authority , castes and class ; 
and p sychological b arriers reflec t individual and group 
motivation , ways of perceiving , communicating , learning . 
Induced change that is des igned in accord with these indig­
enous traits is more likely to  find easy accep tance than 
if i t  requires them all to change f irst . 
Parsons ( 1950 : 70)  tries to generalize the phenomenon of 
structural change beyond the b oundaries of economy or cul ture : 
8 
9 
There are two types of  integrative mechanism in the 
social system - tho se allocative mechanisms , oper­
ating through media like money and power , tha t affect 
the b alance of  advantages and d isadvantages in the 
s ituation of an acting unit ; 8 and those which , like 
integrative communicat ion , operate through af fec ting 
the mo tivational state of the unit , concerning the 
definition of what he wants not how he can ge t it9 . 
• • •  Only when strain impinges on and involves this 
level of the sys tem of behavioural control can 
s tructural change in the pr esent sense become 
e . g . through the product ion possib ilities relat ionship . 
e . g . through the ut ility function . 
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possib le . Once it has occurred , the ques tion is 
whe ther the impe tus to change goes ' over the 
watershed ' ,  or under the countervail ing impac t 
of the mechanisms of  soc ial control , falls  back 
again . 
The impac t of  the dis turbance , which may be  exogenous 
( induced change) or endogenous ( ' strain '  in relationships)  
depends on its magni tude , direct ion , frequency , the 
s trategic nature of  the units affec ted , and the degree of 
resistance by the sys tem to  change . 
Treatment of  proj ect  effects . E s tabl ished theories of 
technical change and the ir inadequacy where more basic 
changes to noneconomic ac tivi ties are involved have been 
outl ined . How can this be treated ? The procedure followed 
in this theoret ical part is to isolate economically import­
an t cul tural , psychological and social charac teris tics of  a 
community , and show the effects they have on the decisions 
made by an ' average ind ividual ' facing an agricultural aid 
proj ect , such as a new crop , with certain technical char­
acteris tics . 
The following five chap ters inve s t igate the effects of 
such struc tural change , as each of the five pre-contac t 
production conditions outlined in Chapter 6 is in turn up­
set . 1 0  Chap ter 7 cons iders how the increasing riskiness of  
new crops affects their popularity ; next the dynamic nature 
of their te chnologies which requires mul ti-period planning 
is stud ied ; these new techniques also place growers in a 
s tate of ignorance ( Chapters 8 and 9) . The following chapt er 
outl ines the interdependence of different individuals '  decis­
ions . The las t theoretical chapter considers lessons for 
proj ect administration by modell ing the effects of various 
government services - it s role as banker , as insurer , as 
teacher , as co-ord inator . 
The overall aim is to fac t the issues raised above and 
summed up by Nelson (1973 : 221) : 
lOEach of these chap ters builds a model based on a variant 
of the neoclas s ical resul t ( 1 )  in Footnot e 6 .  We cont inue 
to assume that sub s is tence income is roughly constant from 
year to year and that a grower regards each aid proj ect  
as an independent decis ion . 
What is involved in technology transfer ? . . .  
The development process involves to a considerab le 
extent introduc ing and learning to  use effic ien tly 
techniques that have been employed for some time 
in a developed country . Once we have freed our­
selves from the concep t of a s imp le-minded cross­
country produc tion function , it is apparent that 
what is taking place transcends less developed 
countries s imply moving up the produc tion func tion 
as their physi cal and human capital resources are 
augmented . The technology trans fer process in­
vo lves trans fer of information in an explicit 
sense . It  seems important to unders tand and 
develop a model to handle the kinds of  information 
and processes at work . 
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Chap ter 7 
Decisions wi th obj ective risk 
This chap ter invest igates how obj ective risk in a proj ec t 
affects decis ions to participa te . The analys is is limited 
here to the simple case where a grower canno t predict the 
outcome of his work due to outs ide disturbances , but where 
he knows perfec tly well the probability d is tribut ion of 
outcomes . This is obj ective risk ( in the terminology of 
Knight)  as oppo sed to uncertainty , where an individual lacks 
perfec t  knowl edge about the l ikelihood of  out comes but forms 
some subj ective dis tribut ion on the basis of par t ial know­
l edge . This subj ec tive risk is frequently cons idered along 
wi th pure risk . Indeed the two are often confused in case 
s tudies of technical change which imply imperfec t knowledge 
by defini tion (e . g .  Cancian 19 7 2 ) . 1 
Can a producer make rational decisions under known r isk? 
Mars chak ( 19 74)  defines rational ity under uncertainty as 
requiring a comple te ordering of preferences by a utility 
func tion , which in turn requires an ordering of pro spec ts 
based on a complete and known probab ility dis tribution of 
the environment . 
Types of risk 
Whar ton ( 19 71 )  document s  three main source s o f  prof i t  risk 
that face all farmers : variab ility in crop yield affec t ing 
produc tion , variability in produc t price affecting revenue , 
and variab ility in factor cost s . The last of  these is less 
important in communities where social customs have inhibi ted 
1subj ective uncertainty is treated in a separate chapter , 
because ignorance involves two add i tional issues : a grower 
may wish to mod ify his behaviour in case his gues ses prove 
wrong ; and repeated trials mean he improves with sub sequent  
guesses and adj us ts his  labour accordingly . The distinc­
t ion between obj ective risk and subj ective uncertainty is 
not well defined , for it  is the dis t inct ion between nearly 
perfect and par tial knowledge . 
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the growth of fac tor marke ts . 2 But the introduct ion of a 
proj ect crop usually requires new factor inputs  ( fer tiliz­
ers , sprays , etc . )  that are subj ec t to fluctuat ions in 
supply . Chap ter 11 touches on this . 
Another type of risk associated wit h new proj ects is 
ins t i tutional : for example , bet ter crops can lead to un­
certainty about the land r ights of producers .  Lockwood and 
Moul ik ( 19 7 2 )  document the introduct ion of a high-yielding 
wheat var iety in an Ind ian village . Af ter its profitable 
acceptance 70  per cent of tenants and sharecroppers were 
turned off their land by landlords attrac ted by h igh rates 
of re turn , and rents rose 5 5  per cent for the remainder . 
The model of pp . 142-5 includes the f irs t two risks : in 
yield and prices . New crops of the type introduced into less 
deve loped countries as aid proj ects in general g ive high 
yields compared with pre-proj ec t crop s , but suffer from much 
grea ter variance in yield . S trains of livesto ck and plants 
bred specifically for their high bear ing charac teris tics 
tend genetically to be  very sens it ive to the conditions under 
which they grow . Any devia tion from the op t imum cl imate , 
maintenance or inputs can produce f luctuations in output . 
This is exacerbated b ecause plants bred under experimental 
condi tions suf fer greater variance in the field because of 
the uncontrolled environment and ab sence of innnunity to the 
pes t s  and d iseases found there . This relationship between 
experimental and farm crop performances is ob served by 
Davidson ( 19 68) . 
In addition , plants  bred for developed countries charac­
terized by temperate climates , few pes ts , skilled scientific 
management ,  controlled water supply , heavy use of fer tilizers , 
machinery and sprays , are frequently those recommended for 
aid proj ects in less developed countries where they will en­
counter a tropical climate , extremes of mois ture , pests and 
diseases to which they have no resistance , and machinery and 
raw material shortages . 
This was the pattern of the Green Revolution in As ia . 
Myrdal ( 19 68)  c ites examples of such increased r iskiness and 
the cons equent reluctance of growers to participate . 
2For example , in much of Polynes ia land may not b e  formally 
traded , labour is rarely hired , and capital is d iff icult 
to ob tain . 
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The se crop risks may be illus trated by record s of orange 
growing on Atiu . The yield var iance of proj ec t c i trus trees 
on Atiu from 1 95 5  to 1 974  wa s 0 . 3 5 . 3 S imilar tree varieties 
grown under controlled cond itions in experimental trials in 
Au stral ia (West and Howard 1938 ) /yielded a variance of only 
0 . 21 .  No data are available for trees grown under controlled 
condit ions wi thin the Cook I sland s bu t we would expect a 
variance somewhere between these two . (From available re­
cord s of 1 93 0-4 9 the effec tive yield variance for native 
oranges  grown on Atiu was only 0 . 09 ,  sugges ting that trees 
had adap ted themselves to their Atiuan environment . )  When 
market fluc tuations are inc luded , the proj ect orange trees 
suffer less revenue variability than the native ones , for 
they earned constant prices , whereas 1 9 3 0-4 9 was a period of 
violent pr ic e  changes . Table 4 1  record s  estimates of  the 
riskines s  of d ifferent crop s . 
The type and extent of risk met by grower s may be illus­
trated by  the typ ical orange plot  owned by Toru , the ' maj or­
ity grower ' of Chap ter 5 .  F igure 14 shows the f luctuations 
in the weight of oranges he produced and the net revenue he 
rec eived for them over eighteen years . (This inc ludes the 
var iat ion in Toru ' s  work effor t that obviously took place 
from year to year . )  A maj or source of variation was the 
c limate : two hurricanes ravaged the trees , and a drought 
stunted production . C i trus fruit is charac terized by bienn­
ial bearing : having been stripped of oranges by a hurricane 
a tree will flower well and consequently fruits  heavily the 
next year . Then having exhaus ted itself it may fruit poorly 
the year af ter . Other uncontrollable variability came from 
shipp ing shortages and a white mo th infestation at  a time 
when no spray was available . In comparison , prices have been 
relatively stable . 
The signif icanc e of this risk to Toru is  clear when we see 
from the f ew record s available that the returns on the native 
oranges marketed by his fa ther in the late 1 93 0s varied ann­
ually by no more than a few pound s .  
3The measure of risk used is  the variance of returns from a 
crop over a period , normalized about an es timated labour 
trend in order to compensate for planned variations in in­
puts . Clearly this measure is  only an approximate one . 
Table 4 1  
Es timates of crop variance 
Proj ec t 
Native c i trus 
Experimental c i trus 
Proj ects : 
I Citrus Scheme 
II Fores try 
III  Tomatoes 
IV Peanut s  
V Taro 
VI Cof f ee 
VII Citrus Extension 
VIII Private pineapples 
IX Vegetables 
X P ineapple incorporation 
Var iance in 
yield revenue 
. 09 
. 21 
. 35 
. 11 
. 54 
. 50 
. 4 7 
. 35 
. 22 
. 3 6 
. 2 6 
. 2 0 
. 48 
. 5 9 
. 4 5 
. 55 
. 2 6 
. 25 
. 3 0 
. 00 
Data source 
Atiu record s 1930-49 
Wes t  and Howard (1938) 
At iu records 1955-74 
Estimate only 
Atiu records 1955-62 
1957 -64 
1959-73 (exaggerated as 
it concerns surplus over 
local consumption only) 
1965-74 
19 55-74 Citrus Scheme 
data 
197 1-74 
Estima te only 
Certain returns for wage 
labour 
Note : Nat ive c itrus variance measured from marketed produc tion not to tal yield . 
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($)  
I 
200 
100 
Note : 
S ource : 
1960 
Re t u rns received by grower 
a t  1 9 74 prices 
65 
'� I .,  
' ' 
Marketed production in lb 
70 
Fig.  14 . Fluctuations in orange returns 
hurricanes 1960 , 1968  
infe s tations 19 6 1 , 1962  
shipp ing delays 1964 
floods 1967  
b iennial bearing 1969 , 19 70  
drought 19 74 
Files of Atiu Administration . 
Attitudes to risk 
outpu t  
(OOOlb) 
10 
I t  is generally accep ted that farmers in less developed 
coun tries dislike risk . The usual explanat ion is that they 
have low incomes and cannot afford bad luck. Wharton ( 19 7 1) 
builds a plaus ib le model where there is a preoccupation with 
risk avo idance rather than with maximum income . Faced wi th 
a new crop a grower considers its variance rather than its 
average yield .  Johnson ( 19 7 1) documents such a case : he 
des cribes a connnunity of poor Brazilian peasants who spread 
their risks and maximize security by planting a d iverse range 
of  crops on several typ es of land , using low variance crops , 
maintaining kin tradit ions involving land and food recip­
rocity , keeping on goods t erms with shopkeepers and patrons , 
and avo iding entrepreneurial opportunit ies . 
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But to claim that the main aim of all peasant s is risk 
aversion (as does Brookf ield 1 97 1 )  is to overs tate the case . 
Awad ( 1971)  argues plau sibly tha t each community does have 
its potential r isk-takers but because of problems of inf or­
mation about investments and ins t itutional d i scrimination 
against  low-income borrowers they do no t always get the 
chanc e  to take risks . I t  has also been suggested that these 
risk-takers are more likely to be the innovators and early 
acceptors of new prac tices in a community . 4 
An individual ' s  preference for or avers ion to risk in in­
come depends on the level of this income and on economic -
cul tural attitudes to it reflected in the shape of his util­
i ty func tion . Friedman and Savage ( 1 948)  suggest that a 
common attitude to risk is to insure against a po ssibil ity of 
losing heavily but at the same time enj oy a gamb le with a 
small cos t . The per son who behaves like this has a marginal 
utility of  income that decreases for a c ertain income range , 
then incr eases af ter a point . 
Two intu itive measures  of aversion to r isk have been dev­
eloped by Arrow ( 1 97 1 ) . Assuming labour levels have no 
effect on risk preferences , then the curvature of the utility 
func tion provides a measure of absolu te r isk aversion , and 
the elasticity of the marginal utility of income is  a meas­
ure of relative r isk aversion . Both measures are positive 
for a convex (risk averter ' s) u til ity func t ion . Arrow sugg­
ests  that absolute risk aver sion is likely to decrease with 
income (a richer man is more likely to engage in bets of a 
f ixed s ize) , and relative risk aversion is likely to in­
crease ( if the size of the bet increases at the same rate 
as income , a man is less willing to accep t  it) . 
Jus t  how s trongly does a r isk aver ter dislike risk? Pratt 
( 1 9 64 )  def ines a premium for risk as that amount of money re­
quired such that the expec ted u tility of income should equal 
the u tility of the expec ted income d iscounted by the premium . 
This risk premium then turns out to be roughly propor tional 
to the income var iance multiplied by Arrow ' s measure of 
absolute risk avers ion . 
4This is no t as obvious as it sound s .  Innovators clearly 
have to work with little information with the chanc e that 
their c oncep t ion of a proj ect may prove wrong . Accept ing 
crop s known to be r isky is  a d ifferent proposition : it is 
the distinct ion between obj ec tive risk and subj ec tive 
uncertainty . 
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To illustrate : the observations of pp . 9 3-6 suggest tha t 
typ ical Atiuan growers might have a similar attitude to risk 
to wes tern farmer s ,  given a similar income . Bu t because of 
their lower incomes and the likely magnitude of crop varia­
tions , they may be expected to exhib it a positive and mod­
erately large risk premium . 
Model of choice under risk 
Us ing the Pratt-Arrow formulat ions of risk aversion , 
standard models of risky choice can now be adap ted to an 
ind ividual faced wi th a risky crop to grow .  Assume initially 
that there is a static decision involving a s ingle p eriod 
produc tion process , where risk affec ts the process indepen­
dently of the level of inputs , as a var iat ion in the ' s tate 
of nature ' (cf . Diamond 1967 ; S t iglitz 1974) . 5 Further , 
a ssume that the probability func tion describing the risk is 
additively separable . 6 
Then it is  possible by optimization and simplification to 
derive an established risk result : if a grower maximizes 
his expec ted utility , he will work until the marginal real 
cost of his labour ( in terms of utility)  equals the expec­
ted marg inal revenue produc t di scounted by the varianc e in 
likely revenue times his risk avers ion at  that income 17vel . 
Thus he modifies his old work rule by his risk premium . 
An hypo thesis is set up to test from this resul t . 8 As 
the riskiness of the crop increases so will the (risk-
5so for example rainfall affects a crop in the same way re­
gardless of how much is produced and by what technique . 
6That is , y = ( 1  + s)  p f { 2) , where risk s is d istributed 
N ( o , a2 ) .  
7Equilibrium result is - :; = y� [l + ye .  cr2 • :�YJ• 
where ye is expected income . 
8
This is the pattern of hypothes is tes t ing tha t  is  followed 
through the models of the next four chapters : tes ting both 
statistically by linear regress ions , and descrip tively by 
observat ions , that the relative responses of  growers to a 
series of  proj ect charac terist ics , are as predicted by the 
model . We should Jbe cautious about accep ting the :s tatis­
tical evidence alone because o f  the theoretical assumptions 
of the models and th e poor quality of the data . 
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aver se) growers '  premium , and he wil l work less and produce 
les s . 
The hypo thesis i s  tes ted for the Atiuan case . The aim is 
to estimate the differing re�ponse of one collllllunity to a 
range of different proj ec ts . Then , from the equilibrium 
result of Footno te  7 ,  the dec ision of a grower to participate 
in a proj ec t at  any t ime depends only on the riskines s  and 
the profitabili ty of that proj ec t ( independent of the level 
of involvement) . Assuming it is possible to approximate 
this relationship by a linear func t ion , least  squares re­
gression may be used to test whether the risk variable is 
signif icant in explaining participa tion , and whether its 
coeffic ient is  negat ive as predicted . 
The dependent variable that bes t  reflects partic ipation 
is the labour time spent on a proj ect ( i ) . This is avail­
able for 1 974 only (from a grower survey). Consequently 
the revenue received from a crop (y) (available from pro­
j ec ts record s )  is also used as a proxy for partic ipat ion . 
The measure of proj ect r isk (a 2 ) is the variance of norm­
al ized returns as calculated in Table 41 . The measure of 
profitabil ity (P) ,  the second explana tory variable , is 
explained in the next chap ter . Each regression uses data 
grouped from one or several years from 1 955 to 1 974 , long 
enough to provide suff ic ient observat ions but no t so long 
a s  to allow intertemporal d is tortions . 1 0  
The result s  of the s imple regression are presented in 
Table 4 2 .  This simplis tic equation provides only a mod­
erate f i t . However , in every period the coeff ic ient of 
the risk variable is highly negative , sugges t ing that 
growers disl ike risk j u s t  as  we predicted . In all but one 
period the coef f icient is s ignif icantly greater than zero , 
at  a 95 per cent conf idence level . I t  is  also worth no ting 
tha t  the c oef f icients  of the profitabil i ty variable are 
s trongly positive and highly significant : thi s suggests 
that growers are a ttrac ted to commerc ially pro f i table crop s . 
On this s tatis tical evidence the hypothesis that Atiuan 
growers d islike risky proj ect s  is not rej ec ted . 
-
9 
We assume here that growers have ident ical utility func-
10 
t ions . 
The years 1 9 6 0  and 1 968 are omit ted from the data base 
because two hurricanes cau sed maj or disturbances in crop 
produc tion then . 
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Y55_5 9 
(n = 1 9 )  
y60-64 
(n = 2 0) 
y65-69 
(n = 24 ) 
y7 0-71  
(n = 1 6) 
Y7 2_73 
(n = 18 ) 
Y74 
(n = 10) 
�4 
�n .:z 10) 
Table 42  
Effec t  of variance on_participation 
(y* , t* = 8 + 8 1 02 + 82 p ) 0 
557 . 1  
1 7 7 1 . 9 
3 68 9 . 9  
2 959 . 0 
4 997 . 1  
6863 . 4  
1 92 . 0  
-13 06 . 0 
( 0 . 54 )  
-587 6 . 7** 
(2 . 02)  
-1 0972 . 7** 
(2 . 3 2 )  
-674 6 . 2*** 
(3 . 94 )  
-11699 . 9*** 
(3 . 28 )  
-1 6637 . 7** 
( 1 . 98 )  
4 61 . 5** 
( 2 . 06 )  
7 . 8*** 
( 2 . 7 1) 
9 . 1*** 
(4 . 2 6) 
18 . 1*** 
( 5 . 00)  
5 . 7** 
( 2 . 3 2 )  
13 . 4** 
( 2 . 09) 
12 . 2  
( 0 . 51 )  
0 . 2 
( 0 . 2 8) 
Note : t s tatis tic is g iven in brackets . 
. 3 6 
. 60 
. 64 
. 58 
. 51 
. 4 6 
• 67 
y* , i* are op t ional allocat ions of income and labour . 
* s ignificantly > 0 at 90% level of conf idence .  
** signif icantly > 0 at  95% level of confidence . 
*** s ignificantly > 0 at  9 9% level of conf idence .  
Ob servation lead s to a similar conclus ion . For example , 
tomatoes were considered an attrac tive crop in the 1 950s . 
Then several harvests were lost because there was no avail­
able ship to the New Z ealand market .  As these huge risks 
were reali zed , growers quickly withdrew. 
In a similar way ,  coffee producers began to realize the 
variability of yields a few year s after p lanting . Most  then 
gave up their crop . A few decided it wa s worth maintaining 
their inves tment : this small group of growers marketed 
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their crop . They were keen growers who had been quick to 
j oin thi s  and o ther proj ects - the innovators and early 
adop ters wi th relatively low risk premiums . 
Chap ter 8 
Production dec isions over t ime 
In indigeneous economic systems , produc ers frequently 
faced choic e s  between a var iety of techniques and produc t s . 
Typically,  these processes combined labour with int imate 
local knowl edge . Where capital equipment was needed it  was 
simple and generally built by the producer himself (for 
examp le digging s ticks , fishing equipment) . Production was 
usually a s ingle period process , whether po int-input  point­
output ( fi shing) or requiring a seasonal gestation period 
(roo t-crop g rowing) . People al so p icked frui t , nut s  and 
berries off slow-growing trees . But these were generally 
self-sown and growing wild - an endowed resource l ike land 
rather than an accumulated s tock of cap i tal . 
This did no t mean there was no planning for the future . 
For their survival , all conununi ties had to be prepared for 
unexpec ted crop failure or other d isaster . Communal chiefs 
of ten held power to place a taboo on the use of certain crop s 
dur ing bad times .  The reverence in which many growers held 
their family lands ensured they were managed in a far-s ighted 
way .  
The introduction o f  proj ec t crops changed this es tablish­
ed sys tem .  Not only were these new crop s risky as noted in 
the last chap ter , but they also required planning over time . 
New tree crops po sed particular problems in the management 
of inves tment cap i tal fot future returns . This chapter in­
vestigates this new dynamic decision-making . I t  formulates 
a suitable dynamic production func tion and shows how it  use­
fully describes the different charac teristics of proj ects . 
It  can be recast in a form suitable for estimation giving 
some idea of parameter values . Then a theoret ically opt imal 
level of participa t ion is derived , and i t  is shown how a 
grower will adj ust his work pattern to at tain i t . Next a 
predic t ion i s  made as to how a grower will respond to dif fer­
ing types  of proj ects ; and finally these predictions are 
tes ted on Atiuan evidence .  
146 
147 
Formulat ion of a non-stationary produc tion process 
When a new ' improved ' crop i s  introduced , espec ially if 
it is a tree crop , a grower mu st evaluate its comp lex new 
technology . In general it will be more productive , but will 
also require more cultivation . This could include land pre­
para tion , planting , weeding , fertili zing , wa tering and har­
ves t ing , most  of  which is  done by hand in the Pacif ic . Con­
sequently the maj or input is labour in its  various roles . l 
The growth of a tree crop d iffer s  from sho rt-term production 
in several ways . 
1 .  Labour input affec ts not j ust  immediate yields , but 
more basically the potential yield of  the tree when it is 
mature . 
2 .  These yield s take some time to respond to changes in 
the labour input .  
3 .  As the tree grows older its  yields will grow too . 
1 .  S t eady s tatic capacity yield s . The bearing capac ity 
that a tree grows up to have depends on how much work is  pu t 
into looking af ter it . I f  the same labour is applied for 
some time , the tree will reach some steady s tate capacity 
when it matures . More labour increases this capacity bu t at 
a decreasing rate . This is  postulated as an exponent ial re­
lat ionship (because of  its easy estimation) . 2 Some level of 
maintenanc e labour is necessary before the tree will produce 
at all . The effec tive labour input is the extra work above 
thi s minimum maintenance that a grower does . So , for exam­
ple , weeding orange trees more than is  necessary for their 
bare survival in ear ly life will increase their yields later , 
but at an exponentially declining rate . 
1I . . f n writing o a certain lab our input , we mean that comb in-
2 
ation of tasks that yields the greates t ouput for that 
effort . In Chap ter 11 th is assumption of a s ingle input is 
relaxed . 
Lab our relation is : 
* 
s - [ l  -k( i-i ) ]  q = q - e m ( 1 ) 
with q , k ,  i > o 
m 
* 
where qs is the capacity of the crop at mat ur ity , given 
indefinite applications of  labour input . 
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The ma int enanc e labour parameter ( £m) is botanically det­
ermined : hardy trees that  grow in the wild do not need any 
care at all . In troduced high-yielding sensi tive trees typ­
ically do need a lot of care j us t  to survive . If a grower 
continues to give a tree less than its maintenance require­
ments , then the st eady state capacity of  the tree will 
decline and the tree deteriorates . 
If  effec tive labour input s  are very high , then the mature 
tree ' s  yield will asympto tically approach some best-prac tice 
fixed capacity level (q ) .  This capacity parameter is  never 
exac tly observed , but it is a statistic connnonly quo ted by 
crop experts and useful for proj ec t descrip tion . 
The third parame ter (k) can al so be interpreted ; the ex­
ponential cons tant is the produc tivity of net effec tive lab­
our in raising the steady s tate mature tree capaci ty .  This 
is  also an important crop charac terist ic . 
2 .  Rate of adj ustment . If a grower decides t o  change 
his labour input , the potent ial bearing capac ity of the t ree 
will t ake some t ime to respon d .  So  the new input must  cont inue 
for some t ime for the adj ustment process to be complet ed . 
A logarithmic-linear adj ust�ent proc�ss is assumed . 3 
Interpret the coefficient of adj u s tment (A ) as  a measure of  
how quickly asymp to tic capacity responds to an input , and 
hence how long labour change mus t  continue . 
Knowledge of this fourth parameter is par ticularly import­
ant for growers learning about a new crop : the effect of  
experimental inpu ts  may not be visible for  several periods .  
I t  i s  al so one indication o f  what Hirschman (1 96 7 )  call s  the 
latitude of a proj ec t . 4 A crop with slow adj u s tment is  
diff icul t to change actively by working harder ; conversely , 
neg lec t i s  slow to cause deterioration . 
3Adj us tment relat ion is : 
-:. * s* log qt = A log qt-l 
+ ( 1- A )  log q ( £ t) 
o � >. < 1 
* 
( 2 )  
where q i s  capacity at maturity given current labour input . 
4 ' this characteristic of  a proj ect ( or task) that permits 
the proj ect planner and operator to mold it , or to let it 
slip , in one direct ion or another , regardless of outs ide 
disturb ances ' (Hirs chman 1967 : 86) . 
149  
3 .  Natural growth . As a tree grows older its  produc tion 
will increa se quite independently of these managed inputs . 
So the product ion relat ionship (1)  and ( 2 )  as formulated so 
far has a non-stat ionary aspec t .  Growth is postula ted to be 
log is tic or S-shaped : actual yields grow at an increasing 
rate in the early s tages , and then at a declining rate until 
they asymptotically approach a par ticular (not necessarily 
maximum and no t observable) ma ture level . 5 This logistic 
form implies tha t the percentage growth rate in a per iod is 
proportional to percentage deviation from mature capac ity 
in the previous period . 6 
The logarithmic rate of  growth of  output to capacity (a ) 
provides the fifth parameter . I f  it is  large , then maturity 
yields are reached relatively soon and the crop is  a ' short ' 
one ; if it is  small , there is a long wai t  for maturity . This 
provides a measure of the length of a proj ec t ,  and gives some 
indication of its  gestation period . Even short-term ephemer­
al s ( several crops per year ) , annuals and biennial s may be 
dis tinguished from one ano ther in this way . 
These relationships ( 1 ) , ( 2 ) , ( 3 )  constitute a suitable 
non- s tationary dynamic product ion function in which suc cess­
ive labour inputs  determine successive (unobservable) asymp­
totic capacity yields ,  to which real output gradually grows . 
The system is  usefully charac terized by its  f ive parameter s : 
the steady s tate labour productivity , the bes t  prac tice 
capacity yield , the growth rate , the rate of adjustment to 
change , and the maintenance labour level . 
Cons ider a brief -illus trat ion taken from Atiuan life . A 
grower planted a plot o f  orange trees . He was an old man 
and spen t  only a little t ime looking af ter them ; consequent­
ly the oranges he picked ( growing along ql in Fig . 15) fell 
short of what he could have grown . After a time he died . 
5 
6 
There is plenty of b io logical evidence for a logis tic growth 
funct ion : for example see Bliss ( 19 70 ) . Mathematically it 
is attractive because of its easy transformat ion in to 
es t imating form .  
qt - qt-1 = a qt-1 (q*t-1 - qt-1) ' < 3) 
q*t-1 a > o 
where qt is actual product ion at t .  
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Not e : Increased labour input t2 and zero labour input t3 
cause new growth paths q2 and q3 . 
The plo t was divided , and inherited by his two sons . The 
older one was an indus trious grower and he looked after his 
trees well . They responded to the improved treatment , and 
j umped on to growth path q2 , reaching q*2 a t  maturi ty . The 
younger son was no t interested in cash crop s . He did no t 
even carry out basic maintenance .  His trees continued to 
grow naturally along q3 for a short  while ; gradually weed 
competition strangled them and produc t ion dropped away . 
I t  can be shown that in a steady s tate where input s  are 
cons tant and there are no disturbances  to the system (1) , 
( 2 ) , ( 3 ) , it  reduces to  exac tly that single period production 
func tion used in footno te 7 ,  Chapter 6 .  Thu s  that s tatic 
func tion turns out to be a spec ial case of the more  general 
dynamic func tion , wi th s tationary produc t ivity and estab­
lishment labour equivalent to the steady s tate parameters . 
This non-stationary pro duc tion func tion is  s imilar to the 
usual treatment of produc t ion using a s tock of capi tal equip­
ment which mus t  be accumulated and which can deprec iate . 
However , there is a logical difference : the func t ion des­
cribes a relationship between two underlying processes -
151 
produc tive labour and natural growth . It may be adap ted to 
describe any managed performance of  a growing organism . 7 
S everal limitat ions of the formulat ion should b e  no ted : 
the productivi ty of inputs is assumed to depend on the ir 
level of applicat ion and the maintenance labour is as sumed 
cons tant irrespective of the age of the tree . 8 Furthermore ,  
i t  i s  assumed that nothing is permanent - that early mis� 
management can always be compensated for by later inputs . 
Finally , the decline of  crops from old age at the end of a 
proj e c t  is not covered . 
Empiri cal es t imation of the process 
Lave ( 19 66) points out that little work has been done on 
the specificat ion of  agricultural microe conomi c produc tion 
funct ion , part icularly because of data prob l ems : frequently 
data cover a small range , they are autocorrelated and collin­
ear ; they are ob served rather than con trolled , and hence 
ce teris paribus res tric tions on other inputs do not hold ; 
estimation in less developed areas is even more hazardous 
because of high dis turb ances and unreliab le records . 
These data prob lems apart , one of  the at tractions of this 
product ion specification is the way it may be transformed 
into estimating form . The unob servab le asympto tic capacity 
yie lds are sub s tituted for , and the sys tem simplified by 
expanding suitable logarithmic express ions into an approx­
imate truncated series . The out come is estimating form 
(4) . 9 This is attractive b ecause it bears a sens ib le theor-
7 Some examples are : explaining eight gains of  matur ing 
lives tock on different diets ; predicting efficiency of 
workers in a ' learning by doing ' process where informa­
tion can decay ; predicting athle tic performance where 
f i tness mus t be built up . 
8Th " . is is an advantage of the vintage cap i tal mode l wh ich 
assumes labour inputs  are mos t  effic ient only on the lates t 
vintages of  capital , i . e .  the young trees . 
9E • • f s t1mat 1ng orm is : 
r:t - 1 )  '<I t-1 J. (
q t-1 - 1) + qt-2 
(4)  
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e t i cal explanat ion , it reduces to the familiar form of the 
original sys tem under s teady s tate condi tions , and it per­
forms in a suitab le way given likely parameter values . The 
equat ion says that the rate of deviat ion of current ouput 
from the natural logistic growth rate partly depends on what 
i t  was in the las t  period , and partly adj us t s  to  the last 
per iod ' s  labour input .  
I t  is intended to es t imate the f ive parameters o f  equa­
t ion ( 4 ) . This may b e  done in several ways : 
( i) Equat ion ( 4 )  is a non-linear funct ion in f ive variab les 
with five parameters . By wr iting it  in maximum likelihood 
form , the values that minimize the estimating error may be  
found . This can be done by one o f  the  computerbased itera­
t ive gradient or quasi-Newton methods ( see Goldfield and 
Quandt 1 9 7 2 ) . These estimates are the asymptotic approxima­
tions to the true parameter values . 
( ii)  As a second bes t  method of estimation , equation (4 ) may 
be roughly l inear ized then estimated by multiple linear re­
gression . One parameter will be over-identif ied and a priori 
knowledge of ano ther is required to complete estimation . 
( iii) A third approach is to  use extra knowledge from 
o ther sources , to allow partial estimation of particular 
parameters by s imple techniques . I f  a crop is perfectly 
maintained then e s t imat ing form ( 4 )  reduces to  the or iginal 
growth funct ion ( 3 ) : the crop grows along the fast e s t  
logis tic curve . I t  is then usually possible to  guess the 
capacity produc tion parameter (q) , and the growth parameter 
(a) can be es t imated by ordinary leas t squares regression on 
the logarithmic-linear trans form. The response rate ( A ) may 
be  seen as roughly l inked to the growth rate and therefore 
no t independent ly e s t imab le ( see footnote 15 ) . Then equa t ion 
( 4 )  rewritten in logarithmic-linear form allows easy es t ima­
t ion of the remaining parameters , productivity (k) and main­
tenance labour ( tm) ,  by ordinary leas t squares . This is 
particularly useful as these are probab ly the two crop char­
acteristics mos t  liab le to change during the introduct ion 
of the crop to the field , whereas the others may be reasonab ly 
es timated from known experimental resul ts . 
9 ( Cont inued)  
Because the aim here is s imply a logical overview , mathemat­
ical details of  this and sub sequent derivat ions are no t 
given . They may be found in Bollard ( 19 7 7b ) . 
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In order to explain the effects of different crop charac­
teris tics on proj ect par ticipation in Atiu , rought estimates 
of these parame ters are now needed for each proj ect . Ob tain­
ing suitab le field and experimental data presents a prob lem . 
Table 43  lists the bes t  estimates . The productivity and 
capacity parame ters are recons tructed from technical records 
of crops , and together they const itute the marginal produc­
tivity of the firs t unit of labour , an indicator of crop 
prof itability . The growth parameter is based on the statis­
tical estimation above . The lab our maintenance figures are 
es timates given by agricultural off icials . 
Intertemporal decision making 
A grower seeking the best work pattern for him to apply 
to this dynamic production process has some implicit concep­
tion of the relat ive value of income and leisure in differ­
ent per iods . This weighting is represented here by the rate 
of t ime preference . It is generally assumed that consump tion 
and labour in future periods are respect ively less des irable 
and les s dis tas teful than in the present . A dis count fac tor 
weights  the corresponding future ut ility with respect to 
current utility . 
This characterizat ion of att itudes to t ime in terms of a 
s ingle parameter is s implis t ic , but it does allow some crude 
generalizations about the temporal responses of different 
growers to proj ects . For example , Rogers ( 19 69 )  claims that 
' lack of deferred gratification ' ( that is a low rate of t ime 
preference) is a general characteris tic of peasantry . 
The evidence of  pp . 9 3-6 allows comment on the likely 
form of Atiuan time preferences . Clearly growers '  views of 
the future depend on the activity they are consider ing . 
Most people have a very long-term concern for their family 
lands . But in the management of recently introduced cash 
crop s they show a marked preference for consump tion and 
leisure in the present rather than the future . 
A grower ' s  response to a proj ect over t ime can be  analysed 
in a s imilar way to the analys is of var iance ,  given grower 
risk premiums , of the previous chapter . In fact Malinvaud 
(19 7 2)  draws parallels between the two concep ts : one a sys­
temat ic preference for certainty , the other a systematic 
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Table 43 
E s t ima tes of t echno log ical Earame ters 
Capacity Productivity Growth Maint enance 
q k ex £ m 
Ci trus 12 , 320  . 0234 L O  1 5  
Fores try 0 0 0 . 4  0 
Toma toes 800 . 02 7  44 . 0  0 
P eanuts 230 . 0073 37 . 0  0 
Taro 1 , 000 . 056 3 1 . 0  0 
Cof fee 1 , 12 5  . 0084 1 . 1  14 
C i t ru s  Ex tens ion 1 2 , 320  . 0234 1 . 0  15 
Private p ines 3 5 , 500 . 0006 2 . 0  34 
Vegetables 1 , 200 . 0084 55 . 0  0 
P ineapple Incorpn 1 , 700 . 0016 244 . 0  0 
Sources : ( i )  q in lb , from proj ect record s . mp i (ii)  k in uni t s  per day . Derived from formula k = -=-- where mp £ ' t he 
marg inal produc tivity of labour in an average year , c8iii�s from tables in 
Chap ter 4 .  Then P = pkq in $ per d ay is marginal revenue produ c t  of the 
f ir s t  uni t  of  labour , the rough measure of proj ect pro f i tab ility used in 
each chap ter . Pr ices are der ived from Table 13 . 
(iii)  ex ,  a cons tan t , comes from logis tic estimat ion of best  growth rates , 
from experimental and adm inistrat ion records . 
( iv )  £m ' in days , comes from material in Chap ter 4 .  
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preference for the present . lo Blit zer ( 19 7 3) considers th is 
time weighting should include such things as a risk premium 
for f uture savings . 1 1  
Stein ( 19 71 )  challenges the concep t of a fixed culturally 
determined inter temporal discount rate . He quo tes work of 
psychologis ts who explained the different preferences of 
different rac ial groups for rewards over time by whether they 
thought they would ever ac tually receive these rewards or 
no t - in effec t their time preference reflected their con­
cep t of risk . 
In this chap ter it is explicitly as sumed choice is made 
over t ime under riskless cond it ions and with perfect inform­
at ion . I t  is also as sumed that utility from the to tal plann­
ing period is additionally separable into a series of stat ion­
ary single period utility func t ions . 12 The planning period 
is less than the lifespan of the crop . The rate of time pre­
ference is specified by the connnon discount factor that Heal 
( 19 7 3 )  shows is the only consis tent one ( in the sense that 
the marginal rate of  substitut ion between any successive 
periods is constant) . 
Then the problem faced by the grower trying to maximize 
his utility over the ent ire planning period subj ec t to  the 
mult i-period production func t ion may be  repr esented . (by opt im­
ization of  the Lagrangean funct ion) as a 3-equation differ­
ence sys tem in three variab les : labour input , product ion , 
and a mult iplier . 
Dynamic adj us tment and s teady s ta te solution 
How does a grower adj ust his labour to reach an equil­
ibrium over t ime ? How does output respond ? And how will 
he correct his lab our in response ? The sys tem of d ifference 
equations implies that at the end of  any period , output 
for the following per iod and the mult iplier for two periods 
lOBut he warns that whereas t ime preferences are related to 
interest rates in competitive .equilibrium ,  risk premiums 
are independent of the price sys t em . 
llF h . f . d . k h b or a case w ere premiums or time an ris ave een 
confused see Moulik ( 19 7 3 : 10) . 
12 We assume no learning and hence no new items in the 
functions . 
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hence are already predetermined . The grower will decide on 
his next period ' s  labour , and the produc tion funct ion will 
then determine th e following year ' s  ou tput . 
The outcome of  thi s  2-period lagged sys tem is that ad­
j us tment to the true equil ib rium b ecomes a complex procedure . 
One reason is the yield lag in response to lab our decis ions . 
Here is ano ther example from At iu : a grower decided how 
much t ime to spend weeding his orange trees in 19 7 3 ; unfort­
unately he overe s t imated , and spent too long . He was re­
warded by an unusually large crop o f  o ranges the next year 
and suspected something was ami s s . But it was not until  the 
end of  19 7 5  that he knew how much extra utility that move­
ment on the produc t ion function was worth . Only then was he 
quite sure of his mis take . In the meant ime he probably over­
worked in 1 9 7 4  and 19 7 5  too , and this would b ias output for 
s everal year s .  
Conversely , production out comes dep end on the inputs over 
several year s . S o  the high produc tion of  19 7 4 could have · J  
been caused by excess ive input not only in 1 9 7 3 , but in 
previous years too . The grower needs another year to f ind 
out . As a result l abour adj us tment to a disturbance is 
lagged . This explains the s low ( and wrong) reactions o f t en 
obs erved to changes in the market for tree pro duct s , and 
the difficulty the grower faces in learning about them . 
If the planning period is as sumed long lenough to permit 
close approximat ion to the asymptotic capacity l evel , and 
there are no more dis turbances to the sys t em ,  then input s  
and outputs wil l eventually set tle down to a t imeless equil­
ibrium :  the ' s teady s ta te ' . 
Under thes e  cond itions the adj ustment syst em reduces to 
a s ingle equilib rium condition ( 5 ) .13 This has a f amil iar 
form.  It s ays that in s teady s t ate a grower will keep on 
13  UQ, 
K . MRP 0 ( 5 )  u y 
-k ( R-0 -Q, ) 
where MRP O  - m pqke marginal revenue product 
and K 
in s te ady s tate 
o ( l- A ) a discount factor 
( 1- o A )  [1-o ( l-a) ] , ( o  < K < 1) 
Again , the reader mus t refer to Bollard ( 19 7 7 )  for 
explanat ion . 
15 7  
working until the marg inal cos t of extra labour i n  terms o f  
utility equals the discounted marginal revenue product of 
s teady s tate labour on the proj ect . The discoun t fact or 
depends on the grower ' s  rate of t ime preference , and on the 
proj e ct rate of growth and speed of adj ustment . It  is 
positive but less than unity , implying that the grower 
will work les s than in the equivalent s ingle period equil­
ibrium .  
S ens itivity analys is . and p roj ect design 
Now the sort of  response to b e  expected from smal l changes 
in proj ect des ign may be invest igated . In par t icular the 
following quest ions are asked : will growers work harder and 
produce more of a crop with greater or less labour productiv­
ity , higher or lower capacity , s lower or fas ter mat urity and 
response , and more or less  maintenance lab our ? Secondly , 
what sort of grower would one expect to b e  most enthusias t ic 
over such changes ? 
This involves s en s it ivity analysis on each proj ect and 
grower parameter , to f ind out the effect of  a change in each 
on the level of grower participation , assuming all o th ers are 
held constant . Implicit part ial differentiation of  the 
s teady state equilib rium condition (5 ) with respect to each 
parameter in turn , yields the resul ts presented in Table 44 . 
A grower works on a tree crop . This is then replaced by a 
new variety that boas ts a higher s teady s tate lab our produc­
t ivi ty , and is s imilar in all o ther respects .  The effect of  
this can be cast in terms of  the likely ut ility gain from 
extra income , the disutility from extra labour , and the wind­
fall gain in utili ty from the increase in productivi ty . 
Overall , the grower will work harder and he will produce more 
of the crop . 14 Thi� increase will be especially marked among 
growers with high rates o f  t ime preference involved in fast 
maturing crops with high capacity levels , speedy adj ustment , 
and low current produc tivity levels . 
What is  the react ion if  the new crop offers increased 
capacity yields instead ? Again the grower will work harder 
and produce more . He will be especially interes ted if he 
is f ar-s igh ted and the crop is a short-term relatively 
14 We assume here and for the rest of the chapter that the 
marginal ut ility of income is never negative . 
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( i)  
( ii)  
( i ii)  
( iv) 
( v) 
( vi) 
Note : 
Tab le 44 
Sens i t ivity an alys is on sys t em parame ters 
E f fe ct of p arame t r i c  change 
29. {l} K . MRP 0  . MP 0 . u � > O ;  3k k D+K . MRP 0 . k . u ,,  
-� {-=1---} K . M:RP 0 . MP 0 . u � > n :  aq q-q D+K . MRP 0 • k.  u �  
ag_ { ( 1 - 6 )  K . MRP 0  . MP 0 • u ., > O ;  j a: a: ( 1-6 . ( 1-a:) ]  D+K . MRP 0 . k . u �  
29. { ( 1- 6 )  K . MRP 0  . MP 0 . u , < O ;  a A  ( 1- :X. )  ( 1 - 6  :X. )  D+K . MR.P 0 . k . u � 
i_q 1 { u u-�;u y £ } MP O O ·  < 3 £ D , 
29. [ 1- 6 :x. ( 1-a:) J K . MR.P 0 . MP 0  . u O ·  { 6 ( 1- :X. 6 )  ( 1 - 6  ( 1-a:) ] 
> 3 6 D+k . MR.P 0 . k . u � , 
a £ Assuming pos i t ive MP 0  , ap has some s i gn as 
29. 
ap 
n 
K 
{ - [MRP 0 . u t � 
+ u H ] + 
u £ [MRP 0 u �� + u :I £ ) }  
u �  
( 1-6 :X. ]  ( 1- 6  (1-a) ] , d i s coun t factor . 
Condi t i on s  for 
s t rong e ffe c t  
6 , a: , q h i gh 
:X. , k low 
6 , a: , k high 
;x. , q  l ow 
q h i gh 
;x. , a: , low 
q , :X. , a: h igh 
k , q h igh 
k , q high 
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product ive one with speedy adj us tment and low current capac ity 
yields . 
S imilar ly , the e ffects of p art ial changes in the other 
proj ect parameters may be analysed . A fas ter maturing crop 
wil l  induce more effort and yield more output . A fas ter 
responding crop will be more popular . 15 A crop requiring 
greater minimum maintenance labour will mean withdrawal of 
in teres t .  
What happens i f  the same non-s tat ionary crop is offered 
to a grower with a h igher rate of t ime preference? I t  can 
be shown that he will work harder on it than would a grower 
less concerned with the future , especially if the crop is 
highly product ive and high capacity . 
E ach of  these changes is  assumed to t ake place in isola­
tion from the o thers . I f  this is relaxed and other s imul­
taneous changes are cons ide red , each perturbation might s t ill 
be expected to have the same general ef fect on part icipation . 
Fur th ermore , a dis turb ance term may now b e  recalled to the 
production proces s , incorpora t ing variance of  output as 
ano ther p arameter of proj ect des ign , without expec ting the se 
results to change . 
Hypothes is t e s t ing 
On the basis of these resul t s  the hypothes is is tested 
that the differen t  characteris t ic s  o f  proj ect design ( prod­
uct ivity , capacity , growth and adj us tment rate , maintenance 
lab our , and riskine s s )  af fect partic ipat ion as pr ediced by 
Tab le 44 . 
Ob servation of the At iuan e conomy sugges t s  that in the 
early years growers were par t ly at tracted to a proj ect for 
non-e conomic reasons such as the prestige or social change 
it of fered . However , in later years growers took more 
not ice o f  the diff erent technical characteristics of diff­
erent proj ects ( or what they perceived them t o  be) . For 
15 The response rate ( A ) seems to be related to the growth 
rate (a ) : the more s lowly a tr�e grows the more s lowly 
it is l ikely to respond to inputs .  Confirming thi s , the 
two parame ters have a comple tely symmetrical e ffect on 
participation in Tab le 44 . 
j-1 
Tabl e 4 5  °' 
0 
Effect of  tec hological Earame ters on Ear t iciEa t i on 
(y* , l* = 8 + 8 1 P + 82a: + 8 3 £  + �, , , i 2 ) 0 m 
so 8 1 82 8 3  84 
2 
R 
Y55-59 1425 . 9 4 . 5  77  . o  87 . O* -7755 . 9  . 45 
(n = 1 9 )  (1 . 06) ( 1 . 14 )  (1 . 4 5 )  (1 . 13)  
y60-64 -660 . 4  4 . 2** -28 . 8  2 91 . O*** 2 1 53 . 3  . 84 
(n = 20) (2 . 1 9) ( 0 . 62) (3 . 74 )  ( 0 .  4 0) 
y65-69 4 941 . 2 7 . 2** 182 . 2*** 646 . 0*** -2511 6 .  7*** . 80 
(n = 24 ) ( 1 .  81)  ( 2 . 81)  (3 . 86) (4 . 07 ) 
Y7 0-7l 7 25 . 8  4 . 7** 15 . 5*** 46 . 4* -28 24 . 2* . 80 
(n = 16)  (2 . 5 0) (3 . 50) (1 . 63) (1 . 66)  
Y7 2_73 211 . 9  1 0 . 7*** 3 9 . 4*** 49 . 2* -284 3 . 0  . 89 
(n = 18) (3 . 25)  (6 . 21)  (1 . 38)  ( 1 . 1 9) 
Y7 4  130 . 2  4 . 5  61 . 5*** 53 . 3  -404 0 .  7 . 96 
(n = 1 0) ( 0 . 58) ( 7 . 20) (1 . 14)  (1 . 21)  
9.,74  2 5 . 2  0 . 0 1 . 6*** 0 . 8 - 1 3 6 .  6 • 97 
(n = 1 0) ( 0 . 13)  ( 6 . 03 )  ( 0 . 52)  (1 . 26)  
Sources : p '  a. '  R,m from Table 4 3 ;  a
2 from Table 41 . 
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example , in 19 74 most growers specialized either in growing 
oranges or lab ouring on the P ineapple Incorporat ion . These 
were s imilarly profitab le pursuits ,  but the l at ter offered 
fas t payment ,  certain returns , and required no maintenance 
labour : i t  became increasingly popular as predicted . More 
evidence comes from the cof fee proj ect . Thi s  crop was 
structurally very s imilar to orange growing , but less prof­
itab l e ; by 197� there were only about fif teen connnercial 
growers l ef t . 1 
A more sys tema t ic test o f  the hypo thes i s  is  attempt ed by 
treat ing the relation between grower participa tion and the 
proj e c t  parame ters as roughly l inear , and then es t ima ting 
the correlat ion . Tab le 45 pres ents the result s . In the 
1950s  these parameters provided a poor explanat ion of grower 
ac tivity . S ince then i t  appears that growers have been 
attrac t ed by pro fitab le crop s , that they do l ike fas t mat­
uring ( and fast responding) proj ects , and that they have been 
put off  by risky ones as pred i c ted . Mos t  o f  these parameter 
coe f f icient s are s ignificant , and do not contradict the 
hypo the s is . 
However ,  it  is surprising to note that the coef f icient of 
the maintenance labour parame t er is  pos it ive . Agains t all 
expec tat ions , growers seem to have p lant ed crops that re­
qui te hard work j us t  to maintain them .  Thi s  cannot be ex­
plained satisfactorily . I t  may b e  that growers ' percep­
t ions of a crop ' s  maint enance needs are very far from real­
i ty :  this should b ecome clear in the next chap ter . 
16
Ep s tein ( 19 70 )  obs erved New Guinea highlanders using sim­
ilar crop characteristic s  as a b as is for choos ing new 
cash crops . 
Chapt er 9 
Learning ab out new technology 
One reason why producers in developing countries res i s t  
apparently profitab le new technology is because they are 
s cared they cannot be sure j us t  how th is technolgoy will 
perform .  A produc tion proces s  depends on the accumulated 
s tock of  knowledge j us t  as it depend s  on the exis t ing s tock 
of  capi tal . 
There is  no e s tab lished theoret ical approach to the 
treatment of  knowledge in technological change . ( For this 
reason the approach and conclus ions of  this chap ter are 
tentat ive . )  The mos t  b as i c  work inves t igate s  the role of 
knowledge in production . Shell ( 19 66 )  shows how Kaldor ' s  
technical progres s  function formulates production as depend­
ing on the changing s to ck of te chnical knowledge , as wel l  as 
the levels of human and physical inputs . Nelson and Phelps 
( 19 6 6 )  argue new knowledge is  b as ically labour-augment ing 
(Harrod-neutral technological change ) . Sheshinski ( 19 6 7 )  
sees new knowledge as both allowing people t o  learn about 
their work and let t ing machines b e  more efficient ly designed 
(Hicks-neutral) ; he cons iders cumulative gross  inves tment or 
gro s s  output to b e  a suitable measur e  o f  the stock o f  inform­
ation . 
The extens ive literature b as ed on this deals with meas­
urement of the rate of learning and the conditions for op­
t imal invent ion and accumulation of  private knowledge in a 
competitive e conomy . The p roblems here are diff erent : the 
things growers have to learn ab out in new proj ects and how 
they do it ; their attitudes to ignorance , learning and 
knowledge ; the way these attitude s  affect their decisions 
whether to grow a new crop or not ; and the implicat ions this 
has for the trans fer of proj ects . This has received l it t le 
at tention from economis t s  beyond the glib conclus ions of 
1 62 
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Solo ( 19 6 6 , 1 9 7 2 ) that i t  is a very difficult thing to trans­
fer a body of  knowledge between countries . l 
Knowledge about a crop is treated here as a public good : 
it  is  non-tradeab le and ob served by all in the community . 
The b road approach o f  Arrow ( 1969 , 19 7 1 )  to learning is 
app lied : a grower ' s  knowledge o f  a crop enables h im to 
make an e s t imate of  the likely outcome of  some planting 
policy with some degree of confidence . Learning from trials 
or ob s erva t ion allows him to revise his ear lier e s timate if 
new evidence sugges t s  it is  wrong , and also to increase his  
confidence about i t . In the t erminology of Chapter 7 ,  learn­
ing progre s s ively changes decisions under subj ect ive uncer­
tainty to decis ions under obj ective r isk . 
Type s  of  knowledge and ways of  l earning 
Wha t  does a grower need to know for efficient management 
of  a new crop ? He mus t know how much maintenance it  needs , 
what i t  is  capab le o f  bear ing , how quickly i t  grows , how it 
responds to different inputs , how r isky i t  is , and o ther 
produc tion characteris t ics . He needs to know how easy and 
how cos tly it is t o  get the necessary inputs ; also the value 
of the crop and what the l ikely demand for it is . 
When they int roduce a new crop , the administrators of a 
proj ect possess  s ome informat ion about i t . But if the crop 
has b e en developed in a nurs ery in a temp erat e developed 
country , then tran s ferred without change to the f ield in a 
tropical develop ing country , much o f  this information will 
be irrelevant , b e ing based on d i fferent phys ical environment , 
fac tor cos ts , and management .  Grower s  soon come to dis trust 
an administ rat ion that passes on such knowledge . 
How can a grower facing a new act ivity learn about it  for 
himself?  I f  it has a f ixed ( though unknown) outcome , learn­
ing is easy . One trial with the new technique e s tab lishes 
the exact effect under these circums tances .  For example , 
Sansom ( 19 70)  writes about Vietnames e  peasant s ' reactions to 
1The many studies by anthropologis t s  and o thers of  technolog­
ical change in a commun ity rarely recognize the b as ic theor­
e tical d i s t inc t ion b e tween making decisions where an out come 
is r isky but of known probab i lity ( ob j ective r isk) and mak­
ing decisions where even thes e  probab il ities are no t known 
for sure ( sub j e c t ive r isk) . 
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a new s imple mo torized wat er pump . A farmer needed only t o  
try the pump once to estab lish exact ly how superior i t  was 
over foot power in rais ing water a particular height . Con­
sequently , disseminat ion was rapid . 
But most agricultural processes involve highly variab le 
returns because of changing inputs and out s id e  dis turb ances 
such as the weather . Now learning is  more difficult and 
more costly . The grower mus t gather all the o f f i c ial pub ­
licity and local hearsay that h e  f eels i s  relevant into an 
ini t ial informat ion s e t ; then he can update this by ac t ively 
experimenting with different p lanting comb inat ions h ims e l f , 
o r  by pass ively watching the t r ials of  others . Thi s  is  
cos tly , for it  may take many seasons o f  observation . I t  is 
difficult too , because the grower mus t s omehow isolate the 
effect of  the new technique from the effect of exogenous 
disturbances . 2 A s implif ied problem is  analysed f ir s t . 
Learning about a p arame t er . I f  the grower can isolate 
one particular cons�ant characterist ic of  product ion that 
he wishes to learn about , then it  is conceptually easy to 
represen t  the way he learns . 
I f  the p aramet er may b e  d irectly derived from eas ily 
observed variab les , then the grower can build up succ­
e s s ive es t ima tes f rom these variables . For example , it 
is  easy to learn about the exp ected product price or the 
var iance of  returns b y  recording succe s s ive crop proceeds 
for a t ime . 
But how can a grower learn about a par ame t er that he never 
ob serve s ?  I n  the specif ic case of  the non-s tationary produc­
t ion func tion of  the previous chap ter , how c an he ever gues s  
a t  the value o f  the labour product ivity parame t er , or the 
capacity output , or the maintenance requirement s ,  or the � 
crop ' s  growth rate , or i t s  speed o f  response to cult ivat ion ? 
The product ion rel at ion is s implified to analyse the learn­
ing p roces s . A grower hears of an improved variety of a 
well-es tab l ished crop . He knows the f orm o f  the one-period 
produc tion relat ionship , and only wants to learn the value 
2 For example , he trie s  pre-fertilizing a crop , then i t  rains 
heavily all season . The crop b ears wel l :  somehow he has 
to s eparate the effects of  fer t ilizer and rainfall . 
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of a s ingle constan t  parameter in the proces s . He plants 
this same crop each year and maintains it in the same way . 3 
Af ter he has harves ted the crop at  the end o f  the year , 
he f inds that the yield is  not quit e  what he expected . Be­
cause of this he changes his percep t ion of  the unob s ervable 
parameter . In fact thi s  means that he approximately modif ies 
his idea of the mys tery parame ter by some proport ion of  how 
wrong the Rrevious year ' s  exp ec ta tion of output has turned 
out to be . This is the f amil iar adap t ive expectations rule , 
first derived by Nerlove ( 1958)  to explain farmers learning 
about an equilibrium price by a cobweb mechanism .  It is 
also shown by Turnovsky (1969)  to resul t wher e people make 
rat ional predic tions of ob servable variab le s  using Bayes ian 
samp l ing under certain condit ions . 
In learning thi s  way , the grower ' s  e s t imate of the para­
met er is  never conf irmed dir ectly , only ind ir ec t ly through 
being abl e  to make mor e  accurate production for ecas t s . De­
pending on his init ial informa t ion , he will prob ab ly make 
poor predictions a t  f ir s t  and have to r evise his ideas radic­
ally . Then as predict ions get bet ter he can adj ust his 
e s t imate more and more f inely . 5 
The coeff ic ient of  adj us tment depends partly on the sort 
of  random disturbances inherent in the product ion pro ces s . 
I f  the grower knows that outcomes are r i sky , he will b e  less 
inc lined to revise his e s t imate . The coefficient is  also 
cultural ly determined . A f armer with engrained beliefs ;w:Hl 
require a lot more evidence to change his views than one less 
roo t ed in trad it ion .  
I s  i t  possible to der ive an approximation to the grower ' s  
adap tive expectations rule that will allow an empir ical 
3 
4 
This assump tion of one trial p er per iod is not essent ial to 
the argument : it  merely s imp l ifies the indexing . 
,... 
� 
P t-l + Dt [ qt - qt-l ] , where 
P
t and qt are
 e s t imates 
made of parameter P and output q immediately after per iod 
t .  
5In pract ice he may never put an ab solute value on the 
parameter , but s imply decide each period whether he is 
currently over- or under-es t imating by a large or small 
margin . 
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illustration of his pattern o f  learning? B y  l inear iz ing the 
product ion function it is possible roughly to rewrite this 
rul e  as an est imab le relat ion : that the annual adj us tment 
to the parame ter es t imate is proportional t o  the real error 
in the old estimate . 
As a f irst approxima t ion , assume that the coefficient of  
adj us tment is  cons tant . Then this learning pattern is  ex­
ponent ial : 6 a grower starts from his ini t ial es t imat e and 
approaches the true value asymp to t ically . Th is corresponds 
to the exponential learning curves fitted by p sychologists 
to subj ects gue s s ing the prob ab ility of an even t (Hilgard 
1956) , and by economi s t s  to the rising productivity of wor­
kers in a new proces s (David 1 9 7 5 ) . 
However ,  the assumpt ion is quite unreal . The adj us tment 
coefficient is  related to the variance o f  the parameter es­
timat e  and this is decreasin7 . I t  is l ikely tha t the co­
eff icient will decrease too . This means that an exponen­
t ial curve under-estimates the rate of learning in the 
middle s tages . In addit ion , the coefficient contains the 
exogenous disturbances o f  the production funct ion . So real 
learning oscillates ab out th is adj usted exponential curve as 
an abnormally good harves t  b iases a parameter es t imate one 
way and an abnormal ly b ad one b iases it the o ther way . 
These o s c illations will decrease over t ime as  the numb er of  
trials increases . 
Parame tric learning is  a s implif icat ion , but a use ful one . 
I t  allows the d is t inc t ion between d if ferent typ es of  ignor­
ance . For example , growers involved in the At iu coffee prod­
uct ion d id not realize how variab le returns would b e ,  nor 
how hard they would have to work to increase them . Comp are 
this wi th the p ineapple proj ect : here growers d id not real­
ize the work they would have to do j us t  t o  maintain their 
crops , and they had inflated views of the ir maturity yields . 
6 
p
t = 0
tp + (l-0t) p , where p is ini t ial estimate of p .  
0 0 
7Turnovsky ( 1969 ) shows in his s imilar model that the ad­
j us tment coefficient will be constant only i f  the l earner 
organizes his trials so that the knowledge contained in 
the s ample is proportional to that in the prior es timate . 
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Learning about a produc tion relat ionship . Faced with a 
new crop rather than j us t  an improved variety , it is more 
l ikely a grower wi l l  ne ed to learn the nature of the whole 
produc t ion relat ionship . Now the grower controls the input 
and observes the resul t , but the mechan ism involved is un­
known . 
The process is  s imp l if ied by assuming the same s tat ionary 
s ingle input product ion function with one trial peS period , and a normally dis tributed known dis turbance term . The 
learning p rob lem reduces to the l ikely dis tribut ion of out­
put from some input . Becaus e this is normal , it is charac­
terized by i t s  mean ( the expected output level) and i ts 
variance ( the pre c is ion of  the e s t imate ) . 9 
The grower learns ab out these by gathering informat ion on 
the out come of  pas t trial s  where the inputs were in any way 
comparab l e .  The way h e  sorts and weights thes e  pas t results 
depends on his skill in weeding out abnormalities and com­
pensating for input variation . Jus t as in s imp le parametric 
learning , his ini t ial e s t imates will b e  poor ones , but they 
wil l  improve until  the mean of  expec t ed output approaches 
true ouput and its  variance app roaches zero ( ind icat ing a 
precise e s t imate) . 
Consider a spec ial case : the grower wants to f ind the 
expected output from working a par ticular f ixed amount . He 
has some idea of the d is tribut ion of this expected output . 
He puts in ano ther period ' s  labour and records another out­
come . Now he can revise his est imate of the distribut ion 
in accord with Baye s ' rule ; his learning rule may be spec­
ified . Following the approach o f  Turnovsky ( 1 9 6 9 )  it i s  
als o  possib le to show precisely how this new e s t imate depends 
on the old e s t imate and the latest out come . In fact the 
grower learns about both the s ample mean and sample variance 
by revised expectations , learning rules as for the parametric 
8i . e .  q t is distributed N (qt , cr2 ) ; cr2 is known , q is unknown . 
Mos t  o f  thes e  assumpt ions may b e  relaxed and the r esul t s  
will s till follow in princ iple . If the disturb ance term is 
unknown too ( as is l ikely) then results  are mor e  complex . 
9i . e .  q is distribut ed N ( q , w ) ;  the grower is  learning t " t t about qt and wt . 
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case , the first in a roughly exponential way and the second 
in a roughly logis tic  way . 10 
But the grower cannot make a rational decis ion on how 
hard to work , knowing only one point on the production func­
t ion .  He mus t es tab l ish reasonab le e s timates o f  outcomes 
for a whole range of  inputs . Then he has a prob lem of  guess­
ing a continuous relationship from a set  o f  discrete point s . 
He may s tart t o  observe s ome input-output relationship that 
holds generally true over an int erval . In this ad hoe way 
he can formulate what he suspects  to b e  the b e s t  approxima­
t ion o f  th is relat ionship . I f  it has a s imple monotonic 
form l ike some o ther crop he i s  used to , thi s  will be easy . 
But i f  the proce s s  is  comp le tely new1 then the grower may mis interpret i t s  purpose altogether . 1 
In learning , a grower build s  up a confidence region for 
the funct ion . Because s amp l ing will be concentra ted in cer­
tain lab our ranges , this confidence region will b e  uneven . 
The mos t  popular work hab it s  yield the most ob s ervations , 
hence the lowest  variance s  for the es t imated outc omes and the 
smallest conf idence interval . Growers will b e  more vague 
about the outcome of  unconnnon work hab it s . This point is 
made by Fellner ( 1966) . Figure 16 sugges t s  what the growers ' 
impres s ion of  the true relat ion migh t b e .  
I n  this s imple case the vector o f  variances of  exp ec ted 
ouputs from different inputs provides an indication of  the 
A IW t t-1 
W t (qt - qt-l) , exponential learning ; 
i a 
W t (W - w ·  ) , logistic learning . t t-1  
a 2  
Th is means tha t  the es t imat e  of th e expected value will 
qui ckly approach its  true value , but the confidence the 
grower has in this es t imat e  increases only s lowly at 
firs t , then fas ter , then slowly again . 
11A loose illus trat ion of  a b ad mis int erpretat ion is  prov­
ided by Moerman (1968) . He des cribes the introduction of  
tractor technology in a remo te Thai village . Ins tead o f  
using the trac tor to replace the plough , farmers used i t  
t o  replace the axe clearing land . I t  was no t effic ien t a t  
doing this , and they gave up us ing it  after a few years . 
output 
� 1 
Production function 
q = f U )  
Confidence r e g i o n  f o r  fun c t ion given normal 
d i s tribution of observations on range 
( �I • ;r ) 
' r  labour 
Fig . 1 6 . Growers '  concept ion of product ion funct ion 
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extent of  a grower ' s  knowledge about the production funct ion . 
Low variances imply a high s tock o f  informa t ion . 
Luckily , in pract ice , learning is made eas ier in several 
ways : f irstly informa tion gained from a trial with a cer­
tain lab our input also yield s  ( le s s  relevant) information 
about surrounding input-output comb inations . 
S econdly , a grower in a tight community will undoubtedly 
learn f rom others as wel l  as from hims elf . He mus t  j udge how 
relevant someone else ' s  experiences are - whether they used 
the s ame factor inputs as he would in the same way , and 
whe ther he trus ts the ir conclus ions . 
I f  he regularly ob serves the experiments of a group of  
growers he will form a mean of  the ir outcomes , sub j ectively 
weighted by the rel iab ility and relevance he ass igns them . 
He will have more confidence in this grouped out come and 
will b e  able to revi s e  his expectat ions more closely each 
time . With the ext ra informat ion , his  es t imates of the dis­
trib ution will converge to the true outcome fas ter . 
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Th irdly , in introduc ing a new crop an adminis tration 
generally helps a grower to learn by provid ing good ini tial 
informat ion or suggesting relevan t areas to resear ch . Th e 
section covered by pp . 194-8 inve s t igates this . But as 
Hirs chman ( 19 67 )  p o ints out , no government can p rovide com­
plete informa tion to each grower , nor do es any grower plant 
a crop without learning something ab out it in the proces s . 
Myrdal ( 19 6 8) claims tha t mos t  high-yielding crops of  the 
Green Revolut ion are characterized by their complementary 
inputs .  It is necess ary to relax the assump t ion of s ingle 
input product ion . How does a grower learn ab out a crop that 
needs b o th labour and fert ilizer? Each experiment can only 
yield inf orma t ion about one variable input at a t ime . The 
number of  tr ials necessary to gather a certain knowledge 
about the effects of a range of  inputs increases by the 
power of the number of inputs . I t  i s  more cos t ly to learn 
and more difficult to pick out the underlying relationship . 
Communal co-operat ion in j oint learning becomes cruc ial here . 
Many new proj ects are tree crop s . Now the assump t ion o f  
s tat ionary produc tion is  relaxed : learning b ecomes harder . 
I f  current output depends on input s over s everal previous 
p eriods , then the effect of each period ' s  input mus t  b e  
learned about separately . Thi s  will b e  diff icult for the 
crop will prob ably respond to new input s only gradual ly . 
Furthermore this has to b e  dist inguished from the effect o f  
natural growth o n  yield s . The prob l em is more comp licated 
than mult i-input learning and more expens ive too , b ecause 
each trial takes s everal periods t o  complete . Thi s  poses 
the danger o f  get t ing ' locked in ' to a sub op t imal crop . A 
farmer plant s some trees to see how well they grow on h is 
soil . It  is  s everal years before he f inds tha t , alas , they 
fruit poorly ; but af ter that inve s tment of t ime he feels he 
mus t  persevere with them rather than plant ano ther variety . 
The Atiu exp erience illus trates patterns o f  learning . 
For example , growers had not known peanuts b efore they were 
introduced in the 1950s . The resident agent grew them in 
the government nursery for s everal years b efore releasing 
s eed . I f  was not difficult to learn how to grow this s imple 
crop , and many households exper imented for a few s easons . 
By Lhen they had learned that product ivity was lower than 
init ially expec ted , and returns more variable . Within f ive 
years mos t  had realized the crop was unprof itab le .  By this 
time they had a good idea of  peanut r esponse to small input s 
o f  family labour . They had no knowledge o f  the poss ib ili ties 
of large organized labour inputs , nor of  the res ponse to 
fertilizer and machinery . 
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It was more diff icult to l earn about new tree crops . When 
the Citrus Replanting S cheme was in troduced , grower s knew 
only about their o ld native orange trees . The adminis tration 
as sured them that capac ity yields would be higher ( though 
they exaggerated how much ) , but they failed to stress how 
hard the growers would have to work to maintain the trees and 
how highly variable yields would b e .  So grower s had to learn 
about each of these charac ter i s t ic s  by exper ienc ing them . 
The administration advised on the requirement s  for f ert il­
izer , spray and pruning , but o ften mis trust ful growers had to 
ob s erve the effec ts o f  these for themselves b efore they would 
follow recommendat ions . The growth of the crop complicated 
learning too . For examp le , the effects of p runing might not 
be visible for s everal seasons and even then only gradual ly 
so . By thi s t ime yields could b e  changing for o ther reasons 
too . 
With all these unknowns , and with s t rongly ingrained trad­
itional beliefs , growers required cons iderable evidence b e­
fore they were willing to accep t that their preconcept ions 
of orange product ion were wrong . For s ome , this took a de­
cade o f  exper ience and observat ion . By thi s  t ime they were 
' lo cked in ' to a crop that was not ideal . Evidence that 
growers did eventually learn came when a c itrus ext ension 
s cheme was introduced in 1965 . Few growers were interested 
thi s  t ime . Mos t  o f  those who d id j oin the new s cheme had 
proved themselves e ff ic ient specialist orange growers and 
wanted to increase the ir holdings . 
Att itude s  to ignorance and l earning 
Grower s  regard decision-making where there is a chance of  
the unexpected happening differ ently from decis ions with 
assured outcome s . A l imit ing case was the obj ective r isk 
analys ed in Chap ter 7 .  However , when the grower knows there 
is r isk but is not sure j us t  how s evere it is  then his 
act ions will differ from when he knows the odds h e  face s . 
In other words , ignorance adds a new d imens ion to the old 
risk prob lem - how to cope with subj ective uncertainty . 
This subj e c t ive uncertainty will lessen with experience . 
Thi s  introduces an imp l ic it investment prob l em - whether to 
trade t ime for exper ience . Whar t on ( 1 9 7 1 )  points out that 
a sub s istence farmer dis tinguishes future even t s  of  which 
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he has had past exper ienc e f rom tho se which are new to him .  
This correspond s to the d is t inc t ion between ' exploration 
r isks ' and ' commerc ial r isks ' d iscu ssed by Awad ( 1 97 1 ) . 12 
In Chap ter 7 growers '  attitudes were r epresented by a 
sp ecialized risk premium in a case of  complete knowledg e . 
Now this may be g eneralized to a r isk-ignorance premium : 
it d ep ends on the tru e  d is tr ibution of  ou tcomes o f  an event 
and on the knowledg e the g rower has of  the d i s tr ibu tion . 
Assuming any dis turbance to produc t ion i s  normal as befor e , 
the premium may b e  writ ten as a func tion of the expected out­
come , its  variance and the informat ion s e t . Following the 
def inition of the r isk premium thi s general ized r isk-ignor­
ance premium is def ined to sat isfy the certainty-equivalence 
cond i t ion that the expected u t il ity f rom income in a per iod 
should equal the cer tain u tility to be had f rom the l ikely 
income minus that period ' s  premium : in o ther word s ,  what a 
grower would g ive up to be a s sured of a known r eturn . 
This premium will d ecrease a s  informat ion increases over 
time . This is the princ iple of  Marschak ( 1 9 7 4 ) , that a de­
c i s ion maker begins mo s t  ta sks with subj ective probabili t ie s  
tha t  become more obj ective with exper ienc e . Then t h e  prem­
ium reduc es to the spec ial r i sk premium . 
Will a g rower enj oy making decisions where there i s  an 
el ement of the unknown or will he pref er well-established 
ac t iv it ies?  It seems l ikely that if he was averse to obj ec­
tive risk he wi ll be avers e  to deci sions under ignorance too , 
and for the same reasons : he canno t afford the chance of  a 
miscalcula tion j u s t  as he could no t afford the chance o f  a 
misf ortune . I f  his income is small , his premium will be 
larg e . I f  he has little information , the premium will be 
large too . 
Grower s in i so lated communities with s trong trad itional 
bel iefs are particularly unwilling to experiment wi th new 
crops , or to inves t in a crop wi thout full informat ion about 
it . Wi thin a cotmnunity we might expec t that the keenes t  
12 ' Exploration risks face innovators and arise  from the inab­
il ity of  the p ioneers to pred ic t precisely the ou tcome of 
their own ac tions . Commercial risks are present in all ec­
onomic operat ions whether they are familiar or no t ,  and 
stem from the well-known unp redic tabil ity of economic ac t iv­
ity in general ' (Fellner quoted in Awad 1971) . 
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innovator s will be the one s most prepared to ac t o n  little 
informat ion and learn f or themselves ; these may also be the 
grower s wi th highest incomes bes t able to bear the costs  of 
failure .  Laggards may be least will ing to get involved in 
experimental crop s . 
Dec ision making with ignorance and learning 
Mos t  producer s do not like working without full informa­
tion , but it may be the only way for them to learn more . 
Thi s sec tion derives an orig inal formulat ion , built on the 
ideas of two established f ield s : the learning by doing 
approach of Arrow ( 1 9 62a) , Nel son and Phelps (1 966) , Fellner 
( 1 9 6 9 )  and Ros en ( 1 97 2 ) , where eff iciency in a task d epends 
on the op erator ' s  exper ience ;  and the pure learning princi­
ple of S t ig ler ( 1 9 61 )  where op timal learning implies a s earch 
for informat ion unt il the extra savings earned equal the 
marginal cost  of  another tr ial . 
A grower has the opportunity of a new crop . He knows a 
little about it , bu t lacks full information . How does this 
ignorance af fect  his decis ion on how much to p lant? Assume 
a s imp lif ied model where a grower maximizes his expec ted 
( add itive) utility over two p eriod s subj ect to a simple 
single-per iod product func tion . 
Under thes e  cond i t ions it can be shown to be best for him 
to keep on working in the f ir s t  p eriod unt il the marg inal 
real c ertainty-equivalent cost  of his labour equals the dis­
count ed expec t ed marginal rev enue produc t .  This discount 
factor ref lec ts not j us t  a relative change in the d is l ike 
of obj ective risk , but a change in the whole r isk-ignorance 
premium taking into account the relative present value of 
extra income in the next period resulting from an extra trial . 
This change in the premium comes from an adj ustment to the 
estimat e  of next per iod ' s  income , and an improvement in the 
conf idence g iven to thi s  pred ic tion owing to the extra in­
format ion . 
Thus at  any t ime a grower will want to work relatively 
less  on a new proj ec t than on an es tablished one . This is 
the disincentive of  r isk . However , he knows he may reduce 
the subj ec tive part of this disincentive by investing in 
trials to improve his scarce inf ormation . He is mo st likely 
to do this if he car e s  abou t the future , and he is now in the 
ear ly s tages of a proj ec t where information is scarce and 
there are hig h  returns to learning . As his knowledge grows , 
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this  inc en t ive to  invest weakens : bu t by then his premium 
will be smaller . 13 
The same pr inc iple hold s for multi-period planning . If 
produc tion responds to input s  over a period then the grower 
has ano ther i s sue to consider : working now is an inves tment 
in capital for the future as  well a s  an investment in know­
ledge .  
The hypothesis  i s  formulated , tha t  ignoranc e-averse grow­
ers will be relat ively keener to partic ipate in proj ec ts with 
more inf ormation . However , to tes t this requires a measure 
of the informat ion about a c rop . Ins tead the hypo thesis  i s  
mod ified t o  a more g eneral statement : growers act o n  the 
bas i s  of learned rather than perfec t informat ion about the 
character istics of a produc t ion func tion , and t heir learning 
may be roughly viewed as revising expec tations . 
Produc tion i s  represented by the non-stat ionary func t ion 
of the previous chap ter . Can grower par ticipation be ex­
plained better by reformulating the full information tech­
nical parameter s used there a s  par tial informat ion ones?  
The parameters used to explain grower par ticipat ion were 
crop varianc e ,  produc t ivity , capacity yield s , growth rate , 
and maintenance requirements of  a crop . 
Table 4 6  sets  out a conception of  the grower ' s  s ta te of  
knowl edg e  about these crop paramet er s . It  app ears that grow­
ers probably r eal i zed the likely growth rates o f  differ ent 
crop s and the product price s , but were sad ly a stray with the 
other c harac ter i s t ic s . I t  i s  a ssumed they ini t ially expec ted 
proj ec t s  to have the same variance as  pre-proj ect crop s , then 
succ essively updated them . I t  is also assumed that footno te 
6 approximates their learning abou t unobservable parameter s . 
They formed e s t imates  of  c apac ity production f rom what a id 
admini strator s told them . They gues s ed at  the productivity 
parameter (correc tly it  is  crudely assumed, excep t for peanu t  
and coffee p roj ec ts ) . As f or maintenance labour l evels , they 
13I f  the premium is too hig h ,  a g rower may never be able to 
afford to experiment to improve his information , even 
though it would be in his long-term interest  • Bal dwin 
( 1 9 63 )  s ees this investment problem , rather than the pure 
r i sk ,  as  the maj or reason subsis tence producers are reluc­
tant to adopt new c rop s . 
C i trus 
Forestry 
Toma toes 
Peanu t s  
Taro 
Cof fee 
C i trus Ext . 
P rivate p ines . 
Vegetables 
P ine . Incorp ' n .  
Table 4 6  
Estima tes o f  learned parame ters 
Variance 
( o2 in $ )  
True Ini t ial 
. 2 6 
. 2 0 
. 4 8 
. 59 
. 4 5 
. 5 5 
. 2 6 
. 2 5 
. 3 0 
. 00 
(a) 
. 3 6 
. 2 0 
. 1 0 
. 1 0 
. 1 0 
. 1 0 
. 2 9 
. 1 0 
. 1 0 
. oo 
( b )  
Productivity 
( k  /day) 
True Initial 
. 02 3  
. 01 0  
• 027 
. 007 
. 05 6  
. 008 
. 02 3  
. 001 
. 008 
. 002 
( c )  
same 
same 
same 
twice 
same 
twice 
same 
same 
same 
same 
(d)  
Capacity 
(q  in lb)  
True 
1 2 , 3 20 
. o  
8 00 
2 3 0  
1 , 000 
4 00 
1 2 , 3 20 
3 5 , 500 
1 , 2 00 
1 , 7 00 
(e)  
Ini t ial 
1 5 , 4 00 
1 , 056 
800 
230 
1 , 000 
600 
1 5 , 4 00 
3 5 , 500 
1 , 200 
1 , 700 
( f )  
1 75 
Maint enance 
( £  in day) 
True Initial 
1 5  
0 
0 
0 
0 
14 
1 5  
3 4  
0 
0 
( g )  
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 0  
1 2  
1 2  
0 
0 
(h) 
Note : Parameter estima te at any t ime grows from initial to true value , using learning 
rule in footno te 6. Arbitrarily set � = 0 . 9 constant , so that grower takes 20 years 
to revise his estima te by 90 per cent ( on assump t ion that produ c tion i s  highly v a r ia b l e  
and growers a r e  very set i n  their bel ief s ) . 
Source s :  
( a )  From Chapter 7 .  
( b )  Method o f  Chapter 7 ,  assuming C i trus Replanting Sc heme estimate based on na tive 
c i trus ; c i trus extension estimate ba sed on C itrus Replant ing S cheme ; fores t ry 
and Pineapple Incorporat ion e s t ima tes as sumed true ; all o ther proj ects set 
arbitrarily low . 
(c ) From Chapter 8 .  
( d }  All arbitrarily assumed the same a s  true values for want of better estimate s ,  
except f o r  peanu t s  and coffee whic h were cl early overe stimated . 
(e)  From Chap ter 8 .  
( f )  
( g )  
( h )  
C i t rus , f ores try , coffee , c i tru s ex tension , private pineapple estima tes based 
on claims of adminis trat ion during introduc t ion , from Atiu files . 
From Chapter 8 .  
For annual crop s ,  known t o  be zero . For capi tal crops assumed zero ( l ike native 
c i trus ) . Later capi tal crops as sume £m = current estimate of £ for Ci trus Replanting Scheme . 
m 
Assume grower knows c rop growth rates , i . e . a = a .  
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thought tha t  new capital crops were l ike na t ive citru s  and 
na t ive coffee and could look a f ter themselves .  
Then the regression of  Chapter 8 is  repeated , replacing 
true proj ect charac teristics  by thes e  e s t imates of learned 
p roj ec t charac teristics . The resul ts are shown in Table 
4 7 . Thes e  l earned variables do p rovide a reasonable f i t  
i n  a number of cases . However , i n  general they are not 
much improvement on the full information var iables . This i s  
not surpri sing in view of  the emp irical assump tions we had 
to make . 
Yet there is  plenty o f  evidence from Atiu on the import­
ance o f  informat ion in decision making . Hence rather than 
rej ect the hypothesis al together , this may be seen ra ther as  
a failure to r epresent the extent of inf orma tion meaning­
fully . Therefore these data are not used in fu ture analysis . 
L earning abou t oneself 
Analysi s  s o  far has been l imited to growers l earning 
about the produc tion proce s s . They must also learn abou t  
the ir own r eac tions when they are placed in totally new 
s i tuat ions . How much enj oyment will come from a lot  mor e  
money than they have ever had bef ore? How unpleasant will 
mor e  regular work prove?  These ar e the problems typically 
po s ed to grower s by new proj ec t crop s . 
Mos t  economic work on s elf-learning is  in the context of 
the role of new goods in utility (Lancaster 1 9 66 ; I ronmonger 
1 97 2 ) . Tarascio and Murphy ( 1 97 2 ) sugge s t  how this theoret­
ical problem o f  learning about u t il i ty func t ions may be 
dealt  with in a s imilar way to learning about produc t ion 
func t ions . People will make tentative decis ions , experiment , 
evaluate the outcome , and revise their decisions . 
There is evidence o f  this happening on Atiu . The C i tru s 
Replant ing Scheme and again the coffee scheme promised to be 
high yielding proj ects . The thought of  the extra money , 
and the prestige and material goods it  might buy , lured many 
growers into j oining . They soon found ou t the regular connnit­
ment to work that was needed , and how it  cut into sub s is tence 
and soc ial ac tivi ties . Af ter a f ew s easons many decided the 
extra money was no t wor th the extra work , and gave up the 
pro j ects . 
Tab l e  4 7  
E f f e c t  o f  l earned Earameters on EarticiEat ion 
* * 
8 1P t 
+ B2& t + 8 3
�
mt + 8' a 
2 ) (y t ' 9. = B + t 0 4 t 
8 8 1 82 8 3  84 R
2 
0 
Y55_59 - 3 42 . 2  6 . 9* 5 . 4  289 . 9 5 92 . 6  . 41 
(n = 19) (1.  39) ( 0 . 18) ( 1 . 00) ( 0 . 11) 
y60-64 -1 , 55 0 . 8 6 . 7*** -32 . 2* 266 . 8  6 , 435 . 7* . 91 
(n = 20) ( 2 . 61) ( 1 . 50) ( 1 . 16) ( 1 .  73)  
y65-69 331 . 7  6 . 7  - 9 . 7  3 64 . 8  -1 , 961 . 9 . 4 0 
(n = 24 ) ( 1 .  29) ( 0 . 11) ( 1 . 13) ( 0 . 15) 
Y7 0-7 l 4 93 . 7 3 . 2* 17 . 5*** 101 . 5* -2 , 98 5 . 8  . 83 
(n = 16) ( 1 .  95) ( 3 . 6 6) ( 2 . 03) ( 1 .  2 6) 
Y7 2_7 3  - 627 . 1  11 . 0*** 43 . 0*** 116 . 8** -2 , 3 11 . 5  . 93 
(n = 18) ( 3 . 92) ( 7 . 42) (2 . 15) ( 0 . 94) 
Y74 -1 , 63 7 . 9  4 . 3  68 . 8*** 138 . 8* - 937 . 8  . 96 
(n = 10) ( 0 . 56) ( 8 . 2 0) ( 1 .  91) ( 0 . 31) 
'l,74 44 . 93 o . o 1 . 9*** 4 . 2** 24 . 1  . 98 
(n = 10) ( 0 . 17 ) ( 8 . 24) ( 2 . 14) ( 0 . 2 9) I-A ........ 
........ 
Chapter 10 
Communal interdependence and bandwagon effec t s  
Grower interdependence 
A marked characteris tic of  decision making in many small 
isolated communities i s  the communal interdependence of  
r eac tions : people copy one ano ther , especially when f ac ed 
with a new and confusing choice .  When a new cash crop is 
introduced into an area , initial suspic ion is f requent ly 
followed by a bandwagon participation effec t . Growers may 
follow their neighbour s f or a variety o f  reasons : it may 
be a way to insure agains t the risky dec i sions outlined in 
Chapt er 7 ;  it may prevent a grower having to make an indiv­
idual assessment of the long-term inves tment choices of  
Chap ter 8 ;  it may be an easy way to learn (Chap ter 9) ; or 
it may be purely gregarious : people l ike to work with 
o thers , and it can be eas ier for them if they do so . This 
s ec t ion will show that , whatever their rationale , people 
faced with an innovat ion do exhibit strong connnunal inter­
dependence .  
Rogers ( 1 9 69 )  counts thi s connnunal reliance a s  a def ining 
charac teristic of peasant connnunities . In a c losed society , 
many growers are related to one another ; o thers are l inked 
by t ies of rank and patronage .  Any experiment made or de­
c is ions taken by a grower are c lo sely and critically observed 
by o thers . The outcome can then affect the observer ' s  de­
c i sions . The more ethnocentric the cul ture , the tighter 
this interdependenc e .  
Evidence on the importance o f  interdep endence comes from 
the wide literature on innovation diffusion . 1 The rate a t  
which different members of a community accept a po tentially 
attrac t ive innovat ion can vary for several reasons : some 
1see biblio graphies in Brown (1968) , Roger s  and Shoemaker 
( 1 9 7 1 )  and Gibbs (19 7 3 ) . 
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peopl e  may no t hear abou t the innova tion until later than 
o thers ; some will take longer to make up the ir minds ; some 
will wa i t  to be convinc ed by o ther s and wil l  no t partic ipate 
in a proj ect until a number of their friends do . I f  a comm­
unity hears abou t an innovation simul taneous ly and accep t s  
it  quickly , then it i s  likely that growers ' dec isions were 
highly interconnec ted : they inf luenced one ano ther . 2 
The derivat ion of  the connnon form of the innovation diff­
usion curve shows thi s . Assuming that the percentage rate 
of adoption of  a proj ect at any time i s  proportional to that 
part of the community who have already adopt ed it , diffus ion 
follows a log istic or S - shaped curve . At firs t the number 
of new adop ters is small , but it grows a t  a rising rate as 
the information base grows ; eventually the growth slows a s  
the later more reac tionary groups are induced t o  par ticipate . 
This implies that the rate of  acceptance i s  normal , a dis­
tribut ion observabl e  in many human behavioural traits . The 
relationship may be int erpreted as the diffusion of  informa­
tion between pair s  of s imilar hou s eholds (Brown 1968) , or as 
a communal learning curve (Norri s  and Vaizey 1973) . A 
measure of the degree of interdependence is  the parame ter of 
part icipation e s t ima ted from the acceptance curve . 
Of  cour s e , all households are no t equally influent ial in 
swaying others into participation . The rank and personality 
of s ome growers makes them natural leaders in the adop tion 
of new practices . Coleman ( 1 964) shows how this may b ias 
the acceptance curve . Aid administrators usually aim to 
introduce new techniques through such people . 
There is a mas s  o f  empirical evidence that thes e  accep ­
tance curves do f i t  the observed pat tern o f  proj ect par t ic­
ipa tion . Logis tic relationships have been observed for the 
dif fu s ion of agricul tural innovat ions in a wide range of  
connnunities .  
2
An al ternative explanation is offered by the theory of 
L iebenstein ( 1969)  that f irms produce ins ide production 
frontiers and there are a number of market and produc tion 
reasons why they may delay innovat ion accep tance . The 
vintages model is a special case : if t he age of  exis ting 
cap ital equipment is norma l ly distributed then the rate of  
cap i tal innovations may be normally distributed too . 
80 
The b e s t  f i t  logis t i c  curve p l o t t ing rate of accep tance 
of C i t rus Rep lant ing Scheme by growers . 
q = 164 [ l  + 10 . 2 8e- l . 04 t ) - l . 
Fig . 1 7 . Lo gistic  acceptance curve 
Source : Table 19 . 
years 
At iuan proj e c t  records provide an example ( see F ig . 17 ) . 
·When a log istic curve i s  f i t t ed to participat ion in the 
C itru s  Replanting S cheme , the rat e  of accep tance parameter 
i s  e s t imated at  1 . 04 .  In contra s t  the average parameter es­
t imated by Gril iche s ( 1 957 ) in  his s tudy o f  diffusion o f  
hybrid corn through the USA was only 0 . 54 .  Thi s  shows 
dif fusion was much faster through the Atiuan connnuni ty . 
On an island as  small a s  Atiu , informa t ion about the 
C i trus Replanting Scheme was connnon knowl edg e . By 1950 
everybody knew about the new improved orange trees growing 
on nearby Raro tonga . But no one volunteered to introduce 
them on Atiu . Eventually in 1 951 the government p lanted out 
e ight demon s t ra t ion plots on the private lands of some of the 
more influential farmer s . This encouraged ano ther s ixteen 
bolder growers to plant citrus trees later that year . This 
was the impetus that the rest needed : mo s t  growers j oined 
the scheme over the next thr ee years . From 1 954 to 1 958 a 
f ew more laggard s j oined in . 
Over the next twenty years Atiuans displayed the same 
tightly interdependent approa ch to new proj ects . On average 
it took only four years for those interes ted in a new c rop 
to decide to adop t i t . Contras t  this wi th the record of the 
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Gusii in Kenya (Gars t  1974) . Faced from 1 941 with six s imilar 
prof itable new crop s , thi s widely spread and loosely kni t  
community took over sixteen years o n  average t o  adopt each 
crop . 
I t  i s  clear from this that Atiuans place a relatively 
high value on company in new economic ventures . Work done 
with friends and neighbours is muc h  less onerous . Income 
earned and consumed with the extended household or occas­
ionally with the tribe i s  more pleasurable . In addition the 
involvement of community leaders and respec ted growers gives 
people more conf idenc e .  
Communal interdependence and individual dec i sions 
C onsider a community where there is  s trong social interde­
pendence ;  how does this aff ec t  the deci s ions of a grower 
faced wi th a new crop ? This sec tion builds a model of in­
dividual partic ipation where an explanatory variable is some 
measure of the proportion of o ther participating grower s  in 
the communi ty , weighted by how involved they are and how 
impor tant and reliable the grower believes them to be . 
The case i s  inves tigated where the company o f  o thers in a 
new proj ect is valued for i t s  own sake , a s  well a s  for the 
cro s s  effec t s  it has on o ther elements of utility . P eople 
enj oy company , but at a d iminishing marginal rate . Fur ther , 
income earned communally is  mor e  enj oyable , and communal work 
is les s distasteful than usual . There is  also the case , 
e specially in techno logically-simpl e  economies , where group 
work is physically easier ; again company help s produc tion , 
but at  a decreas ing rate . 3 
I f  a new crop is  introduced , offering riskless known re­
turns in one period , it  has been es tablished that a grower 
will apply labour up to the po int where i t s  marginal co s t  in 
terms of his utility equals the marginal revenue produc t  of 
the crop . The proj ect looks a t trac tive but no t many people 
are growing it : so the grower caut iously plants a little by 
3 A communal work party rebui lding a village meeting house 
provides an example . The j ob appears to go fas ter when 
everyone is  working ; the reward i s  the approval of all the 
villager s ; and the occas ion provides an enj oyable outing in 
its  own right . F inally , when it comes to rais ing heavy 
mater ial s without mechanical aids , many men are necessary . 
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himsel f .  Later o ther growers dec ide to j o in in . Dec ision 
making is s oc ially interdependent . How will these new part­
ic ipants affec t  the grower ' s  ini t ial dec i s ion? 
If i t  is a ssumed there is  no sub s t i tution be tween pro­
j ec ts , then the grower will work harder and p roduce more 
of the crop because the new par ticipants  have made extra 
income more desirable and extra labour l e s s  d i s tas teful , as 
wel l  as making produc t ion easier (although it is possible 
tha t  with a highly inela s t ic labour supply curve he might 
get satura ted with ex tra income) . If there are no physical 
economies o f  communality he will a lways work harder and 
produce more , in p ropor tion to the s ize o f  the marg inal rev­
enue produc t .  
I t  can als o  be seen tha t in a proj ect with many people 
involved , a maj o ri ty planter ( that i s , by definit ion , one 
who l ikes to conform to the mo s t  common p lant ing pat terns) 
will work relat ively harder than the o thers . These two 
results are no t surprising . Nevertheles s ,  they are crucial 
in proj ect administration , and are rarely fully explo ited . 
At iuan growers are gregariou s , so added company should 
increase their part ic ipation . This is commonly observed in 
Atiuan cropping . Consider the export o f  taPo . In the mid-
1 960s a few of the younger innovative growers saw the oppor­
tunities for earning money by sending the ir surplus taPo 
to be sold on the Raro tonga marke t . They earned reasonable 
returns for a f ew years and some early adopt er growers foll­
owed their example . But mo s t  At iuans would no t j oin in : 
there was some thing in the new prac tice o f  s el l ing a subsis­
tence crop to f el low C ook I slander s that d i s turbed them . 
Then in 1 96 9-7 0 s everal respected influential community 
l eaders took up the idea : a s enior akaePe, a mataiapo, the 
chairman of the I sland Council , the chief agricultural 
o f f icer , a deacon , a grower r e turned from oversea s , and later 
the chief administrative o f f icer and the f arnily o f  one o f  the 
ariki . Quite suddenly the prac t ice became respectable . In 
the next two years nearly half At iuan farmer s began to export 
the ir taPo too . I t  had only needed the acceptance of key 
people to induce the maj ority to j oin a profi table venture . 
The hypothesis that company i s  important in encouraging 
gregarious growers to j o in a proj e c t  may be s ta t i s tically 
tested . A sugge s ted measure o f  an individual grower ' s  per­
c ep t ion o f  the value of  company in a proj ect (C ) is  the re­
lative e ffort put into tha t p roj e c t  by every o ther participant 
Table 48 
Effect of communa l and o ther Earameters 
* * = B o + B 1 C  + B2P + B 3  + B4 i + B so 2 ) (y ' i m 
---
B o 8 1  B2 8 3 B4 B s  
Y55_5 9  -42 5 . 6  4 0 , 47 9 .  2*** 6 . 7** 8 5 . 7** 5 . 4  -87 55 . 4** . 7 7 
(n = 19)  (4 . 31)  ( 2 . 35)  ( 1 . 90) ( 0 . 1 2 )  ( 1 . 9 2 )  
y 60-64 -42 0 . 6 5 ,  021 . 9 4 . 3** -21 . 7  23 1 . 0* 94 1 . 2  . 84 
(n = 2 0) ( 0 . 44 )  ( 2 . 18 )  ( O .  4 2 )  ( 1 . 4 6 )  ( 0  . 1 5)  
y65-68 -3 , 74 0 . 1 51 , 488 . 6  10 . 6*** 82 . 3* 6 . 8  -15873 . 0  . 7 8 
(n = 24 ) ( 1 . 18 )  ( 2 . 61 )  ( 1 . 4 0) ( 0 . 20)  ( 2 . 7 0) 
Y7 0_7 1  -184 . 1  1 2 , 07 0 . 4*** 1. 3 19 . 6*** 22 . 9* -1027 . 9  . 9 6 
(n = 16)  ( 5 . 94) ( 1 . 18)  ( 8 . 58 )  ( 1 .  57 ) ( 1 . 1 5 )  
Y7 2_73 -7 68 . 8  14 , 627 . 2** 3 . 3  4 2 . 2*** 38 . 8  -7 02 . 2  . 93 
(n = 18 ) ( 2 . 4 6) ( O .  7 9) ( 7 . 68) ( 1 .  2 6 )  ( 0 . 3 2 )  
Y7 4  -115 . 1  8 '  969 . 6* -10 . 9  6 0 . 5*** 3 5 . 3  -274 0 . 8  . 98 
(n = 10) ( 2 . 03)  ( 1 . 1 2 )  ( 8 . 98 )  ( 0 . 93)  ( 1 . 02 )  
£7 4  1 5 . 9  2 96 . 4** -0 . 54** 1 . 6*** 0 . 28 -95 . 8  . 9 9 
I-' 
(n = 10) ( 2 . 65 )  ( 2 . 18 )  ( 8 . 81 )  ( 0 . 2 8 )  ( 1 .  28)  00 w 
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we ighted by the subj ective value the grower p laces on each . 
To meas ure th is the simplifying as sump tion that each grower 
regards all other growe rs s imi lar ly is made ; the re lative 
lab our efforts of the community on a proj e ct are approximated 
by the numb er involved in that proj ect at a time as a prop­
ort ion of  the number invo lved in all proj ects . 4 
Now individual participat ion in a proj ect is regres sed on 
the level of community parti cipation ( C) , as we ll as on the 
o the r previously dis cus sed technical features : the proj e c t ' s  
prof i tab ility ( P ) , timing (a) ,  labour requi rements ( i  ) ,  and 
riskiness  ( o2 ) . 5 The same data base is used . Re sul t� are 
shown in Tab le 48 . The variab les seem to provide a good ex­
p lanat ion of  proj ect involvement . As expe cted , the coef fic­
ient o f  community participation is  always st rongly pos it ive 
and high ly s ignifi cant . On this evidence the hypothesis is 
not rej ected . Indeed th e interest of other growers seems to 
be the maj or inf luence on an indecis ive grower . 
It  is also like ly that a ' maj ori ty ' planter will work re­
lat ively harder than o thers on a popular proj ect . On At iu 
this is the man who is happ ies t  doing as the o thers do : 
j o ining in the communal work group , planting the common s ub ­
s istence crops , j o ining in the popular proj e cts , and drinking 
in the b ush beer s chools with his friends . This is the role 
exemplif ied by Toru , the type cast maj ority adop ter of Chapter 
5 .  He participated keenly in the mos t  popular proj e ct , the 
Cit rus Rep lanting Scheme , looking af ter three plots . He 
also p lan ted coffee , but like most growe rs did not b o ther 
looking after his crop . Today he has j oined the Pineapple 
Incorporat ion along wi th many of  his friends , and he enj oys 
the communal work organizat ion ; he spends longe r hours there 
than he ever did on h is proj ect crops . 
4Thus C is eas ily calculated by th e data in Part I .  An under­
lying idea is that s omeone j oining a new p roj e c t  wi ll prob ­
ab ly be les s interes ted in h i s  old ones . 
5 The simul taneity prob lem inherent in this test funct ion 
should be no ted . Put simply ,  the model says each person ' s 
labour e f fort depends partly on their concep t ion of the 
value of company in the proj ect . But this company dep ends 
by de finit ion on the re lat ive lab our ef fort of  the other 
growe rs involved . We assume this chi cken and e gg prob lem 
is not too disturb ing . 
Chap t e r  1 1  
Proj ect administrat ion 
The ro le of government 
The las t four chapters have analysed the effects of pro­
j e ct de s ign on a connnunity and have found that risky long­
term de cis ions which require learn ing are common , and comm­
unal pressure on an individual is important . So far it has 
been assumed these proj ects have been availab le on the open 
market for a grower to assess on his own initiative . In 
practice it is usual for an adminis tration to int roduce an 
aid proj ect and play an act ive role inf luencing grower 
participation decis ions . 
For a varie ty of rational p rivate reas ons a grower may 
re fus e to grow a new proj ect crop . Then the government can 
step in to make it more attrac tive . 1 The government should 
do th is if the public iP-tere s t s  of the community diverge 
from the private ones . For example , growers may be more 
caut ious , more short- s igh ted , more ignorant and less indiv­
idualis t i c  than is good for the connnunity as a whole . Thus 
the government can identify a particular proj ect character­
istic and ar tificially manipulate it . Many obj e ctives and 
poli cies are pos s ib le .  In this chap ter four roles of gov­
ernment ,  each correspond ing to a previous chap ter, are in­
vest igated : it can act as insurer cushioning the impact of 
risk , it can ac t as banker providing cred it to help inves t­
ment , it  can act as teacher providing in formation to cope 
with new techno logies , it can act as co-ordinator inducing 
peop le to participat e together for their mutual benefi t .  
The po tent ial need for such act ion is  seen from the vig­
orous growth of pub li c  and private insurance , banking and 
educat ion inst i tut ions and unions in wes tern countr ies . 
Whether these roles are best as sumed by cent ral or local 
1 A government is  here defined as a body administering a pro-
j ect in a community ' s  pub lic interest . 
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government or  p rivate enterprise depends on the economic and 
polit ical culture of  the particular connnunity . In a less 
developed count ry a pub lic b ody is more like ly to  show the 
e conomic tolerance required in a learning s i tuation . The 
danger is that a governmen t ins t itut ion can also become 
exce s s ively pa ternal , s t ifling local initiative , and ul tim­
ately alienating growers from their own crops . 
It is  no thing new for a central authority t o  as sume these 
roles : ch iefly classes  dealt with s imilar problems in pre­
European times , especially in areas where there was a poten­
tial conf lict between pub li c  and private intere s t s  ( for 
examp le small is land communit ies ) . Firth ( 19 65 )  reported 
that in Tikop ia chiefs filled all these roles : by collecting 
produce as tribute and redistrib �ting it  to those who needed 
it becaus e of  mis fortune they insured agains t localized risk . 
By us ing the ir right to prohibit innnediate consumption of  
certain crops they en couraged inves tment for the future ; 
furthermore , they controlled mos t  of  the capital equipment . 
Ch iefs and the ir prie s t s  were holde rs and dissemina tors o f  
the s tock of  agricultural knowledge accumulated over genera­
tions . Above all , ch iefs co-ordinated economic act ivity , 
cal ling out members for agricultura l  work , war , or feas t s , 
for the communal good . 
The following four sections inves t igate in detail the 
effect of government participation in proj ect  introduction . 
Eac h  s ec t ion build s a g overnment sec tor on to the non-gov­
ernment models developed in the preced ing chapter s . 
Government as insurer sharing risk 
A government has the resources to make risky proj ects  more 
palatable to small producers . And there are reas ons why it  
may wish to  do s o  at  s ome cos t to itsel f . Low-income growers 
are very vulnerab le to risk , b ut it  may be in the community 
int erest that they should nevertheles s attemp t some risky 
proj ec t s : the s oc iety ' s risk premium is  usually less than 
the private grower ' s . In most less developed countries there 
are few wes tern-type ins t itut ions to protect against risk : 
insurance companies , and s tock and s ta tion agencies are rare ; 
banks will not lend to small producers and there is no way 
they can divers ify the ir portfolios on o ther capital markets . 
Ins tead farmers rely c losely on t ies of kin and on informal 
ins titutions l ike money-lenders and sharecropping . S t iglitz 
( 19 7 4)  argues this is  a maj or role o f  sharecropping : the 
richer and less risk-prone landlord shares the variat ions in 
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yields by cont rac t ing for a f ixed shar e of those yields in­
stead of a f ixed land rent . 
Government-sponsored insurance occurs in dif ferent forms 
in many proj ect packages ; one scheme wi l l  b e  analysed in 
detai l . Cons ider a new crop requiring lab our for cult iva­
tion , and also some other traded input , say fert ilizer ( or 
land in a sharecropping arrangement) . The grower must decide 
how hard to work and how much fertilizer to app ly . But in 
common with many proj ect crop s , yields are highly s ensit ive 
to climat ic dis turbances and price fluctuat ions . Then , as 
in the risk model of Chapter 7 ,  the grower will be most sat­
i s f ied by working and app lying fertiliz er to the crop until  
their respe c t ive factor prices equal the result ing marginal 
revenue produc t again d iscounted by a measure of  relative 
risk avers ion ; this implies les s fert ilizer and less labour 
is used than for a non-risk crop . 
In an effort to overcome this dis taste f or risk the gov­
ernment decides to handle all fer ti lizer sale s . Instead of 
requiring exact payment for fert ilizer bought each year , 
they require the grower t o  pay back some share of  his crop 
proceeds , calculated so that he will j us t  pay for the input 
in an average year . Th is i s  an actuarially neutral f ixed 
rate payback s cheme . The advantage of this s cheme is that 
it evens out the grower ' s  net return to lab our . In a good 
year when he can afford to , he pays more for his fertilizer 
than he would on the open marke t ;  in a bad year he pays les s . 
Unles s the government collects a premium to cover operating 
expens es , or allows its elf to absorb input price increases , 
the grower ' s  fert ilizer b ill should average out at  the market 
level over a series of  years . Thi s  effe c t ively reduces the 
felt disturbances from the variab ili ty of tot al returns to 
the small variab ility of ne t re turns . Figure 18 demons trates 
this for the s imp le case of  constant fac tor costs . The net 
revenue is the same for both cases but les s variab le in the 
second . The grower ' s  risk premium is less with the govern­
ment scheme . 
This quest ion may also b e  approached algebraically . We 
assume that the grower buys fertilizer ( at a constant price) 
from the government ,  paying in return that fixed share of  
crop proceeds whi ch would be expe cted to cover input costs  
in an average year . 2 The grower ' s  prob lem then reduces to  
2
rn practice this repayment ratio will vary b etween growers 
because it dif fers for each input comb inat ion . This is 
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N e t  revenue from c rop (equal i n  2 case s) . 
Total returns from crop Total re turns from crop 
Input repaymen ts 
t ime 
( i )  constant prop o r t i on of total returns ( i i )  cons t ant level 
Fig . 18 . Effect o f  insurance s cheme 
Note : Consider risky product ion with constant input 
requirements . 
Net revenue in ( i )  is less variable t han in ( ii ) . 
t ime 
max1m1z 1ng his expected satis fact ion from managing a crop 
whi ch is subj ect to variabi lity in ne t proceeds rather than 
gross proceeds . He should work and also apply fert ilizer 
until the marginal real cost of each fac tor equals i t s  mar­
ginal revenue product , dis counted by his avers ion to the 
risk in net (not total) proceeds . Consequent ly he wi ll work 
h arder and use mo re fertilizer to produce more ouput than 
witho ut the insurance s cheme . The magnitude of the increase 
in output will depend on how large a part fert il izer cos ts 
2 ( Con tinued) 
equivalent to the crop share that has to be st ipulated as 
part of the decis ion prob lem faced by landowner and share­
c ropper in s i gning a contrac t ( S tiglitz  19 7 4 ) . We assume 
th at growers do not vary much in their input allocat ions 
and so the rat io se t by the government for the average 
response is an appropriate one . 
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are of  total proceeds . I f  the fert ilizer prices f luctuate 
too , then the cush ioning ef fects of the scheme are even 
more pronounced . 
Such an arrangement is  in practice in At iu : the Cit rus 
Rep lant ing S cheme offers growers a private account with the 
governmen t to which fertilizer , spray and tract or input cos t s  
are deb i ted . Thes e  are paid f o r  b y  deduction of  a fixed 
proportion of crop yields until the accumulated deb t  is paid 
off . Initially three-quarters of crop revenue was deducted 
for this , later de creased to two-thirds , and then one-half 
by 19 63 . Given the very poor crop yie lds achieved this has 
been insufficient to pay off most deb t s . In re trospect the 
average repayment rate should have been higher for the s cheme 
to be se lf-supporting . 
Some idea of the reduction in risk obtained may be had by 
considering a typical orange plot , for example that belonging 
to Toru , the maj ority adop t2r ( and typical p lanter ) of Chap­
ter 5 .  Though exaggerated by unre corded variation in labour 
and o ther inputs ,  the coe f f ic ient of variat ion in net revenue 
from 19 5 2  to 19 74 was 1 . 1 ,  considerably less than a coe ff ic­
ient of 5 . 2  had he produced the same amount outs ide the 
s cheme . 
I t  is impos s ib le to quantify the effect on grower part ic­
ipat ion caused by this risk reduction . Growers questioned 
did not cons ider growing oranges under the Cit rus Replant ing 
Scheme to be a risky venture . Mos t  of them worked as it 
harder than they did on the truly high risk crops l ike cof fee 
and peanuts . A s imi lar but minor scheme used to operate for 
tomatoes : growers were levied 4 pence per cas e exported to 
cover fert ilizer costs . This was inadequate to cushion the 
severe uncertainty caused by having to transport a perishab le 
crop with irregular shipping . 
There are more direc t ways o f  dealing wi th price f luctua­
t ions . Price s tabi lization schemes may set minimum or maxi­
mum leve ls for produce prices which they may no t exceed . 
This reduces the known variance .  Hence risk averters can be 
expec ted to produce more . Such s chemes require strong f in­
ancial backing and frequently face admini strative prob lems . 
The government might be tempted to s ide-s tep risk complete­
ly by of fering a grower the opt ion of working for a fixed 
wage ins tead of on his own crops . A s imilar s ituat ion with 
a s imi lar result occurs when the government (or large 
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entrepreneur) h ires the lands o f  a grower a t  a f ixed rental , 
and the grower may work on them at a f ixed wage rate . A 
risk averse grower may b e  induced to hire ou t more land and 
work more for wages than he would otherwise . But as S en 
( 19 75 )  points out , labour working for wages is qualitatively 
different and in many cultures less desirab le than working 
for oneself . 
At iuans appear to consider this type of  work pres tigious 
rather than inferior , however .  The Pineapple Incorp oration 
rents all its lands from landowners who th en have the right 
to work on the crop for a wage . Thi s  type of  work has 
proved popular : most household s have a memb er who works on 
the p ineapples for perhap s 20  hours per week and spends the 
res t of the time growing his own crops . 
Government as banker sharing credi t 
A se cond characteri s t ic of  proj e c t  crops i s  that they 
of ten require considerab le effort and expense be fore they 
bear fruits ( Chap ter 8) . Th is involves the grower in an 
inves tment prob lem : whether or not to work now and forego 
present for future consumption .  A government has the 
resources to provide credi t  to such growers allowing them 
to reallocate their consump t ion over t ime . 
Why should a government wish to do thi s ? Malinvaud 
( 19 7 2 : 244)  writes : 
In actual s o cieties it s eems to be connnon that 
s oc ial choices deviate from consumer [ and prod­
ucer ] preference s  in the assessment of the 
relevant importance of future needs with respect 
to present needs . I t  is frequently�held that 
individual cho ices contain too marked a prefer­
ence for present consumpt ion and that it  i s  
necessary to bring about a larger volume o f  
savings th an appears spontaneously . Pub lic 
saving and legal arrangements such as compulsory 
pension s chemes allow this obj ec t ive to b e  
realised . 3 
3with this in mind , Al lais defined an optimum where indiv­
idual preferences would be retained for all choices except 
in tertemporal ones . 
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Many small producers in under-deve loped countries do not 
have the resources to pos tpone immediate consumpt ion for a 
high yield ing but slow maturing crop ; hence the ir low priv­
ate rates of time preference are qui te rat ional . 
Consider a new proj ec t tree crop that promises good re­
turns , b ut wi ll take several years b efore it bears any fruit , 
and even longer b e fore it is at  ful l yield . Again it re­
quires lab our and some traded input like fertilizer for b e s t  
growth , espec ially during the crucial infant st age . How is  
the grower to provide these ? Indigenous arrangement s  such 
as kinship borrowing or p rivate dealers lending at extraord­
inary rates have evolved to deal with the limit ed s easonal 
bridging f inance prob lem of traditional crop s . But these 
have proved inadequate for long gestation proj ect crop s . 
I f  there is no cap ital market availab le at all , then the 
grower will only apply fertilizer to the crop until  the sum 
of future f lows of discounted utility from the extra yields 
induced by the extra fertilizer equals the input pr ice . 
This is  like ly to imp ly very low or zero fertilizer input s , 
for i t  will make no difference to income in th e immediate 
(non-mature) future and the grower ' s  low rat e o f  t ime pre­
ference means he is not interes ted in looking further to the 
future . S imilarly , his lab our input will be small ini t ially 
because returns from the crop are low ,  owing to its natural 
immatur ity and it s lack o f  fer tilizer . 
Th is is one reason why the crops indus t ry never succeeded 
on Atiu . Serious copra-making required new trees . Coconut 
palms do not yield nuts for ten years . The administration 
suggested p lant ing trees in the 1960s , and set up several 
fertilizer demons trat ion plot s on private lands . But they 
offered no lending s cheme . Growers often planted a few nuts 
and left them to b e  suffocated by weeds or to grow into low­
yield ing palms , b ut they were not p repared to invest t ime and 
money in proper tree management . 
I f  commerc ia l  capi tal market s exist ,  their poorly deve loped 
structure and the r isks of lending without security probab ly 
limit loans t o  short-term with p enalty rates o f  interest . 
Some governments have s e t  up rural b anks specifically to off er 
low income growers low intere s t  long-term loans for proj ect 
partic ipat ion . By f inanc ing input b ills a b ank can allow the 
grower to reallocate h is c rop returns into a more desirab le 
pattern over t ime . This makes a s low maturing tree crop 
where ini t ial net returns are nega t ive more at tract ive to a 
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grower with a low rate of t ime pre ference . As a resul t he 
will care for his trees bet t er in the crit ical early s tages , 
and they wi ll b ear more fruit later . 
One particular type of government loan s cheme is  invest­
igated here . The administrat ion agrees to market a new pro­
j ect tree crop and handle fert ilizer sales . When growers 
b uy fert ilizer they do not pay immediate ly but run a deb i t  
ac count . After s ome years the fruit b egins to mature and i s  
s old ; then the adminis tration automatically deducts a f ixed 
share of the proceeds . This share is predetermined to pay 
off  the costs of fert ilizer wi th interest over some t ime 
period , for example over the lifet ime of the proj ect . 4 
Then the grower will work unt il the current marginal dis­
ut ility of  extra lab our equals the sum of d iscounted f lows 
o f  future marginal ut ility derived from the share o f  extra 
income that he receives from working harder plus the part of 
his to tal fertilizer b ill that he can pay off by doing so . 
This net income is  always p o s i t ive . He will keep on apply­
ing fert ilizer unt il the sum of discounted f lows of future 
marginal ut i lity derived from the share of  extra income that 
he receives from a b e t ter fertilizer crop p lus the part o f  
h i s  total bill  that he can pay off  f r om  this better crop 
equal s  the extra cos ts involved . These co s t s  are the dis­
counted future marginal ut ility forgone through having to 
pay back part of the extra fert ilizer cost each period . As 
this repayment is relat ed to income , it will not s top the 
grower app lying fert ilizer in early years when the tree is 
no t yielding . 
Figure 19 i llus trates the potential advantage o f  such a 
s cheme . As suming a logis t ic growth curve and cons tant in­
puts , then , if he cannot borrow , a grower mus t  accep t  nega­
t ive early ne t income growing s lowly to high ly pos itive 
returns . I f  he can pay b ack deb t s  as a p roport ion of re­
turns his initial net income wi ll b e  small b ut positive , 
growing to a lower peak than before . Thi s  s econd stream of  
returns is prob ably pre ferab le to him .  
4Like the insurance s cheme , this payback rate i s  uniquely 
determined by each grower ' s  long-t erm fac tor allocation 
dec is ions . We assume these are s imilar among growers , 
hence the s ing le rate set by the government for al l .  
� � Net revenue from c rop ( c ase ( i) + interest = case ( i i ) . 
Total returns from crop Total returns from crop 
t ime 
( i )  constant level ( i i )  constant proportion of total returns 
Fig.  19 . Effect of repayment scheme 
Not e : Cons ider increasin g  output from constant output 
requirement s .  
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t ime 
Net revenue in ( i )  is negat ive un t i l  t� 
t hen highly 
posit ive , whil e  in ( ii )  it is more graaually 
increasin g . 
How attractive such a scheme is to a grower over o ther 
types of credit depends on the rate of interes t ,  the likely 
pat tern of crop yields , and the grower ' s  time preference 
scheme . I f  it is we ll des igned , it should of fer a s tream 
of returns at trac t ive to growers p lant ing a part icular crop . 
There are , however , some prob lems with this dual purpose 
support s cheme . It doe s not offer the grower the optimal 
degree of intervention . The most appropriate community pay­
back rate for insurance is not necessarily the same as for 
credit . In general the payback mechanism allows a grower 
less f lexib il ity than does a connnerc ial capital market . 5 
5Anoth er practical prob lem is that in det ermining a payback 
rate the administrat ion in ef fec t is reach ing a long-t erm 
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The main advantage of the scheme is its s imp licity of 
operat ion ; i t  uses no rmal gove rnmen t records , it  helps exten­
s ion work , it is eas ily explained to farmers , it is s e l f­
financ ing and relatively riskless , and it is  easily admin­
i s tered . On At iu a f ixed share dual purpose payb ack arrange­
ment has operated for the Ci trus Replanting Scheme s ince its  
inception . It  required only two clerks to administer it . 
The administrat ion had problems determining the approp­
riate rate of payback : init ially set at three-quarters , it 
was progre s s ively reduced , an admiss ion that grower time 
prefe rences were lower than ant ic ipated . At this rate re­
payments bare ly covered increasing input costs . By 19 74 
only 20 per cent of  growers had paid off their plo t s  part ly 
because growers realized that they could eas ily break their 
cont racts : abandoned plots are taken over by th e admini­
s trat ion and worked at the latter ' s  expense to pay o ff the 
debt . 
However ,  despite i t s  shortcomings and mis calculations , 
the scheme has produced a long-term grower commitment not 
s een in the other proj ect crop s . For most growers the s cheme 
yielded a more pre fe rab le s tream of ne t returns from citrus 
than would otherwise have b een received . 
The other long-term crop was coffee : to finance early 
work and materials the government offered general loan s  at 
5 per cent interes t  for three years for approved growers . 
Only 40 per cent of  coffee producers used these loans which 
were too sho rt to cove r the gestation period of the invest­
ment and required cons iderab ly more grower init iative than 
the Citrus Scheme d id : as a result fewer than 20 per cent 
of producers ever marketed their crop . 
Government as teacher , sharing knowledge 
Chap ter 9 es tab l ished how important knowledge ab out a new 
technical p rocess is for op timal decis ion-making . Peasant 
cult ivators do not like making decisions under ignorance ; 
they cannot afford to - the cos ts o f  errors are too high . 
5 ( Cont inued)  
agreement with each grower that he will produce a predeter­
mined quantity of this crop for a period . S ince the latter 
may only be learning about a new technique , he is in no 
position to s i gn such a contract . Evidence comes from the 
number of s chemes where growers never pay off their deb t s . 
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Yet  they also  do  not  have the resource s to exper imen t and 
learn for themselves ; furthermore , typ ically in less dev­
eloped countries , b arriers of cas te , educat ion , language and 
location divide peasants from agricul tural expert s .  Wh ile 
they may be recep tive to properly presented new techniques , 
they may also f ind it  diffi cult to ob tain inf ormation about 
them . 
The government ,  as proj ect administrator , possesses this 
information or can gather it  from exper ts . If its agricul­
tural extens ion force is effe ctive , it can transmi t it to 
planters . 
Why should the government wish to share knowledge ? She ll 
( 19 6 6 )  points out that informat ion i s  both a pub lic and a 
common good , for i t  can be used by any number of uni t s , and 
it is durable with low cos t s  of transmiss ion . Arrow ( 19 62b )  
con s tructs  a model which shows that a community operating 
under perfect compet it ion will achieve suboptimal accumula­
t ion , because i t  is an indivis ib le uncertain pub lic good . 
This difference between the p rivate and social optimum levels 
of  inves tment in learning p rovides the clas s ic case for 
government interven t ion . 
How can a government help ease learning pains when intro­
ducing a new proj ect ? As in Chap ter 9 ,  learning ab out some 
aspect of product ion is  int erpreted as imp lying some init ial 
viewpo int and p rogress ively revising it in the light of a 
ser ie s  of new obs ervations over t ime ( or space ) , s o  that ex­
p ected p rob ab ilities of out comes become progress ively les s 
subj e c t ive . The government can help this pro cess in s everal 
ways . 
Faced by a brand new crop , growers derive their ini t ial 
expectations from government advice on its performance . A 
technology import ed from overseas may perform dif fe rent ly in 
a new environment ,  making this advice unreliab le . In ex­
perimentat ion the great est  rate of accumulat ion of knowledge 
is expected from the first few trials . The government can 
help the produc t ion of knowledge by bearing the cos ts of 
these few mos t  risky experiments itself and then transmit t­
ing the results . For example it may be worth its  while for 
a government introducing a new tree crop to set up nursery 
trials and withhold crop seedlings for a few years until the 
most serious faults (or advantages ) of the crop are known . 
Thi s  may reduce the number of  growers who try out new crops 
1 9 6  
and after a period find thems elves ' locked in ' to a second 
be s t  variety . 
In learning by trials growers mus t con t inually revise 
their earlier e s t imat es by s ome amount after each new obs er­
vation . A reac t ionary grower is loath to change h i s  ideas ; 
a very impuls ive grower th rows previous experience s  away in 
favour of the late s t . Somewhere be tween these two extremes 
is a s oc ially op t imum rate of  revis ion . The government can 
encourage growers towards thi s . One way is  to  point out the 
varying re liabi lity of different trial s : confirmed results 
of an experimental station or a good farmer can be trus ted 
more than mere rumour .  Trials carried out in a climatically 
unusual year should be treated with caut ion . 
Furthermore ,  learners need a good memory for information 
they have already accumulated and ac ces s to other relevant 
experiences happening e lsewhere concurrent ly .  Arrow ( 19 69 ) 
claims that a maj or p rob lem in innovati on d i f fusion i s  the 
capaci ty of communicat ion channels : how good growers are 
at hearing ab out and remembering relevant information . The 
government can help this by keeping records of past trials 
and pub lic i z ing resul t s  of experimen ts oc curring in other 
communities . 
Other gove rnment s chemes aim to transmi t knowledge aut o­
mat ically . An input s ub s idy s cheme th at would normally lead 
to  ine f f icient res ource allocat ion may be j us t i f ied , because 
growe rs ignorant or suspic ious of it s effects use les s  than 
is socially des irab le .  For example , planter s may refuse to 
use enough fert ilizer on young trees b e cause they do no t 
unders tand the potent ial produc t ivity gains later on . 
Hirschman ( 19 6 7 )  believes that mos t  proj ects meet teeth­
ing prob lems but these may be solve d by experimenting if only 
partic ipan t s  have the self-conf idence to  do so . He sugges t s  
that a de liberate technique of  proj ect adminis trators should 
be to  pretend that the proj ect is  s traightforward and ex­
aggerate i t s  b ene fi t s . I f  Hirschman is wrong and grower 
reluctance really means their dis like of  risk and ignorance , 
then he is  on ly confusing their ra tional decis ions . Further­
more , growers may assume that o ther proj ects have been s im­
ilarly exaggerated . 
The dangers o f  this p rac t ice are clear on At iu . There 
the administrat ion exaggerat ed the bene fits to  be had from 
several of  the proj ects , and minimiz ed the cost s . As a result 
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they l o s t  grower conf idence . For example , a 1950 report on 
the Citrus Replanting Scheme (which p resumab ly contains the 
same informat ion given to growers in pub lic mee tings on Atiu 
in 1949 -50 ) advert ises the likely yield of a 15-year-old plot 
of 45 t rees as 16 , 000 lb nett ing a return of $ 310 . In fact 
the b es t  plot on Atiu only reached about 11 , 000 lb and be­
cause cos t s  were s o  much higher than expected , has ne tted 
only ab out $ 115 annua lly ( in 1950 price s ) . The average plot 
on At iu yielded only 8 , 000 lb and $ 7 5 . Such high predict ions 
should never have been given : evidence of well managed orange 
orange plot s in o ther countries at th at t ime sugges ted At iuan 
yields would b e  much lowe r . 6 Furthermore , no suggestion was 
given of the likely f luctuations in returns . This sad s tory 
of  unfulfilled expectations is seen in Fig . 8 .  A few ex­
perienc es like this s oon create a connnunity of growers who 
mis trus t adminis trative claims and s teer clear of sub sequent 
proj ects . 
In some of  the se sub sequent proj ects the Atiu administra­
t ion has b een more success ful in passing on informat ion . 
They operate an agricultural nursery . In preparation for 
the fores try p roj ect , 1 , 000 trees of many different var ie ties 
were p lanted out here for several years before the alb izzia 
type was selected . This shortened the grower ' s  learning 
proces s .  
Mino r changes in recommended proj ect cultivat ion are passed 
on to agricultural off i cers at instruct ion cours es in 
Rarotonga , and sub sequent ly reach grower s  at infrequent f ield 
days . Radio Cook I s lands carries an agricultural program and 
the government newspaper runs an agricultural column aimed at 
improving crop technique . At iuan growers are well aware of 
experiment s in progress on At iu , but do not take much not ice 
of deve lopments on other i s lands . 
More b as ic deve lopmen ts in crop cult ivat ion are pas sed on 
by the government ,  but information t ransmiss ion is s low . For 
example , among imp roved techniques for growing orange s  in New 
Zealand in the 19 60s were the use of trifoliata roots tock , 
denser p lant ings and me chanical pruning , to ob tain small 
tree s  and high per hectare yields . These were rec ommended 
to the Cook Islands Agriculture Department ( s ee Fletcher 
(197 2 ) . By 19 7 5  the Rarotonga nursery had begun to grow 
6 For examp le Wes t and Howard ( 19 38)  reported yields of around 
13 , 000 lb for s imilar sized plots of  s imilar varieties of 
orange trees in Australia . 
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seedlings on new rootst ock . I t  wi ll be several more years 
before such practice s  are in us e on At iu . 
Government as co-ordinator 
As ob served in Chap ter 10 many growers in clo s ed connnun­
it ie s  will no t j oin in a proj ect unless  other local growers 
are invo lved too . They enj oy doing things to gether ; and 
i t  may b e  safer and easier to work this way . If enough 
people feel like this a new potent ial ly profitab le crop 
may no t be accepted : each grower is unwilling to grow it  
by himse lf . 
The government can manipulat e this p rivate reluctance for 
soc ial b enefit . By artificially encouraging a few growers 
into planting a crop they may be ab le to induce many others 
t o  follow in a connnunal b andwagon effec t .  Typi cally , they 
may off  er free plots to a selected group of respected connn­
unity leaders ( rather than to the technically b es t  growers ) . 
The participation of  these inf luential peop le is a drawcard 
for other more dependent growers to follow .  The j us t i f ica­
t ion for doing thi s  is  again the d ivergence of private from 
social end s . 
Co-ord ination of  group ac t ivity is  nothing new .  Organ­
i z ing many men to work together in a connnunal task for their 
mutual b enefit  was always a maj or role of chiefs in most 
societies . More formalized ins titut ions fill  this role in 
the western world : uni ons and farmers ' federat ions group 
people toge ther in a common interes t ,  whether i t  b e  lobby­
ing or marke ting their produce . In an under-deve loped 
country this may be the ro le of government .  
The high ly inter-dep endent community of At iu illustrates 
thi s . The Citrus Rep lant ing S cheme init ially met with s trong 
grower res istance . The adminis trat ion concentrated on con­
vincing community leaders of i t s  b enef it s . It planted out 
eight demons trat ion p lots  on the lands of respected older 
growers in one village . By the end of  the next year all the 
ariki families and many o ther senior t i t le-holders had _­
plant ed orange plots and mos t  o f  the res t of the community 
followed suit within two years . 
To introduce the vegetab le s cheme in 19 7 4 , a Rarotongan 
agricultural officer offered a dozen of the b es t growers free 
s eed and advice ,  hoping there would b e  demons tration effec ts 
on o thers . But these dozen growers , through technically 
knowledgeab le , lacked the prestige and s t anding t o  convince 
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others . Today only a few teachers and full-time casual 
growers p lant vegetab les . I t  seems thi s  technique o f  in­
duced communal act ion was unders tood b et ter by more trad­
it ional organizations l ike the tribe and the church . 
Tab le 49 
Government participat ion in At iuan P roj ec t s  
Proj ect 
I Ci trus Rep lanting 
S cheme 
I I  Forestry 
I I I  Tomatoes 
IV Peanut s 
V Taro 
VI Coffee 
VI I Citrus Extension 
VIII Private pineapples 
IX Vegetab le s  
X P ineapple Incorporat ion 
Key : I = Government insurance 
B = Banking 
T Teaching 
C Co-ordinat ion 
Government role 
I , B , T , C  
( I ,  B 1955 -60 
( - 19 61-74 
( I ,  B 19 64 only 
( - 195 7- 7 4  
( - 19 65-66 
( I , B , T 19 6 7- 7 4  
I ,  B ,  T 
T ,  c 
Emp loyer 
Dummy 
variable 
1 
0 
1 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
1 
1 
0 
1 
2 
In general ,  the adminis tration on At iu has helped inter­
pret the relat ively newly monetiz ed cash cropping system 
for the sub s is t ence grower . They have done this by laying 
down rules for the dis tribut ion of money p ro ceed s  from the 
produc e . Thi s  is a comp lex prob lem owing to the nature of 
At iuan communal work habits  and j oint land ownership . Th ey 
have also acted as a quality contro l ler , regulat ing growers 
N 
Table 5 0  0 0 
Effect  of government and o ther Earame ter s 
* * 
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who have tried to take advantage of the impersonal marketing 
sys tem where consumer and producers are isolated from each 
other . 
The overall aim of this intervention is  to increa se grower 
participat ion by reconciling private and social end s . The 
generalized hypothes is is now tes ted for At iu : that govern­
ment intervention in a p roj ect induces more growers to j oin 
than would otherwise do s o . Because the government applies 
several schemes in dif ferent proj ects , its intervent ion is 
denoted b y  a dummy exp lanatory variab le .  This takes on a 
zero value for proj ects without ac tive government support ; 
a value of one for proj ects with a pub li c  insurance , credit , 
information or co-ordination s cheme ; and a value of  two for 
proj ects where the government assumes total managerial res­
ponsib ility for product ion and employs At iuan growers on 
wages only . Tab le 4 9  documents the level of government 
intervention in each p roj ect . 
The government intervenes in crops that are unsui tab le 
because of their r isk , their gestation period , and their 
lack of communal participation . I t  is logical to assume 
all these are exp lanatory variab les of grower interes t too . 
Tab le 50 records the r esult of an extended multiple linear 
regres s ion . The p resenc e of a government variab le improves 
the goodnes s  of  f i t ; in every case but one it has a posi t ive 
influence , but it is s ignificant only in recent years . There 
may b e  s ome mul ticollinearity b etween government invo lvement 
and the other explanatory variab les . Indeed if the govern­
ment is cons istent then there should be , for admini stra-
tive act ion is spec ifically aimed at these o ther proj ect 
charac teris t ics . Overal l ,  s tatist ical evidence and observa­
t ion are both convincing that an active government has the 
power to involve more growers in a proj ec t on At iu . 

Port 3 
Conclusions and 
policy implications 

Chap ter 12  
Analys i s , ·contro l and evaluation of  aid proj ects 
wi th variab le lab our response 
The theoretical chap ters of this monograph point out some 
of the more important is sues that a producer weighing up a 
new proj ect has to consider . This producer has been repres­
ented as aiming to maximize his leve l o f  ut ility in the face 
of a given product ion opportunity introduced from out s ide . 
In the simp lest one-input , static , riskles s ,  full infor­
mation case this can b e  represented by Fig . 20 .  For a long 
t ime a grower has worked at point el . Now an alternataive 
attrac t ive new process p2 is  o ffered to him .  How hard 
should he work on i t ?  Chapter 6 shows that h e  will d o  best 
for himself at e2 , where the increas ing marginal cos t  of  
labour on new h igher ut i lity curve u2 equals the decreasing 
marginal revenue product of lab our on new func tion p2 ; it  
also gives s ome idea of the relat ive pos it ion of  this equil­
ib rium for d ifferent cult ures and technologies . 
S ub sequent chapters relax some o f  the assump tion s  about 
the product ion proce s s  and the community ' s  at t i tude to it . 
To s implify the result s :  Chapter 7 shows how risk averters 
will work less on risky proj ects . Chap ter 8 shows how in­
creased s ingle-period productivity and capacity yields , and 
decreased maintenance lab our requirement s in a proj ect wi ll 
generally increase part icipation ; also relat ively far-sigh ted 
people will work relatively mor e  on s low maturing , s low res­
ponding proj ects . Chapter 9 shows how growers disliking 
ignorance will work more on proj ec ts they are familiar with . 
Chap t er 10 shows how conformist growers will seek out the 
mos t  popular proj ects . Finally Chap ter 11 shows how an ac­
tive government can manipulate a proj ec t to cushion a prod­
ucer from undesirab le risk , wait ing , ignorance or solitude . 
These results are summarized in Tab le 5 1 .  
The value o f  this analysis a s  an exp lanat ion o f  dec is ion 
making depends crit ically on the as sump t ions made . As noted 
in the introduct ion , a numb er of  assump t ions s implify the 
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leisure 
prob lem into an estab lished pattern in order to use estab­
lished result s .  The problem lies in reinterpreting these 
results in a more realistic set ting . 
The theoret ical assumpt ions are bas i c : that att itudes 
may be represented by a neoc lass ical utility function , 
technologies by a production func t ion ,  and rat ional behaviour 
by their interac t ion . It has also been specif ically assumed 
that growers regard participation in each proj ect indepen­
dent ly of the o ther proj ects . This may b e  the worst  assump­
tion for it is certainly not realis t ic in general . In the 
case of At iu it probab ly caused lit t le bias in result s , 
because growers seemed to concentrate on one proj ect at a 
t ime . 
Most of  the chapt ers init ially assume a technology simpli­
fied in all but the s ingle charac ter istic under invest iga­
t ion .  Resul t s  from this part ial analysis are then extended 
to the generalized case of a technology s imultaneously com­
plex in a number of ways . I t  is assumed that no unexpected 
cross effects arise from ,  say , risky technology and fas t 
maturing technology . 
Table 51  
Summary of proj ec t effects on participation 
Decision 
Ch 7 Risk 
Ch 8 Dynamic technologies 
Proj ect charac teristics  
Variance in returns [cr2 ] y 
Produc tivity [k] 
Capac ity yield [q]  
Maintenance labour [ Q, ] m 
Growth rate [a ] 
Response Pd 
Ch 9 Knowledge Informat ion [A] 
Ch 10 Connnunal inter-
dependence Company [ C ]  
C h  11 Govt par ticipation Govt role [G ] 
At titude of  recipients participa tion 
Risk premium 
) U tility o f  income + ) and labcmr + ) 
) 
) Rate of time + 
) preference + 
Ignorance premium + 
Att itude to company + 
All the above + 
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The illus trat ions drawn from At iu generally appear to 
support the model hypothes es ; but there i s  a danger (which 
the reader cannot check) that they may be selective ones . 
Partly as a control , part ly to learn the s tat i s t ical ex­
tent of exp lana t ion , this evidence is supplemented by re­
gress ion equat ions . This involves emp irical e s t imates of 
grower participation and proj ect parameters . Mos t  primary 
data come from good admin is trat ion crop records . These are 
supplemented by my own (emp irically le ss reliab le)  grower 
surveys . As a result most pr imary data are re lat ively 
reliab le .  The parame t ers of crop variance , p roj ect commun­
ality , s ingle-period produc t ivity , and maintenance labour 
are all conceptually di fficult or unob s ervab le ; therefore 
their e s t imates are quest ionab le ,  though they generally re­
flect the desired aspec t s  o f  the proj ects . 
In estimat ing the equations two assump tion s  are made : 
firs t ly that the relationship between variab les is  approx­
imate ly linear ; s econdly that all growers in the samp le 
pos sess  the charac teris t ic s  of a typical grower ( this is 
reasonable for At iu , and is  eas i ly relaxed ) . 
The es t imates of  proj e c t  parameters appear t o  provide a 
good explanat ion of grower par t ic ipation . Only a very loose 
( signed) hypothes is tes t is appl ied . However ,  in view of  
all the assumptions , a good fit and coeff icient s o f  the 
expected sign are not conclus ive evidenc e of a comp lete 
understand ing of  grower b ehaviour . 
I t  is found that maintenance labour requirements do not 
appear to have affec ted growers as might b e  exp ect ed , and 
the effect of learning has no t b een captured very well . But 
none of the other hypotheses are rej ected . It seems reason­
able to accept that grower response to this s ituat ion does 
depend on these charac t er is t ic s  in the direction hypothes­
ized ( for example At iuans dislike risky proj ect s ) , but it 
may not be pos s ib le to say anything very useful about the 
magnitude of respon se . l 
1This is a familiar prob lem in microeconomics . For examp le , 
forecas ts of  the e ffects o f  a pric e change on consumer 
behaviour may be b as ed on theory predic ting the direct ion 
of movement ;  but estimates of  size  of  the change are little 
more than guesses based on past experience .  
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Thus this analys is offers few direct quant itat ive implica­
tions for the des ign and evaluat ion of aid proj ects with 
variable labour response . Nevertheless , i t  does offer a 
framework for the analysis of the interac tion of proj ect and 
community . With th is foundat ion to bui ld on , the designer 
is much bet ter equipped to start formulat ing rules of thumb 
about proj ec t impac t .  This area of proj ec t control is now 
considered . 
Control of proj ec ts with variab le labour response 
Ex ante proj ect des ign .  Envisage the situation where 
there is a chance to design a proj ect from the b eginning . 
What will be  the best type of production process to intro­
duce to a community? In the s imp le s ituat ion of Fig . 17 
this p rob lem is how to des ign p2 (given any constraints on 
the resources to be used ) in view of a given ut ility form­
ulat ion to derive the optimal partic ipation leve l e2 . 2 
In prac tice , new aid proj ects usually arise  out of some 
perceived need and some potent ial produc t ion capab ility of  
a c ommunity . However ,  they are  rarely des igned exp licitly 
to use the latter to meet the former in the best way . The 
intermediate technology movement was intended to do this 
( see S chumacher 19 7 4 ) . It works on the general izat ion that 
smal l-scale s imp le technology based on indigenous material s 
and design is like ly to be mo re techni cally viab le and more 
culturally accep tab le in a rural deve loping community than 
imported wes tern techniques . 
It  should be pos s ib le to  ref ine this princ ip le , and de ­
sign a proj ect more sensitive to community need s and 
capab ilities . 3 A way to db. this is sugges ted . 
2Hirs chman ( 19 6 7 )  sees an important aim of proj ect aid as 
changing the rec ipients ' atti tudes to work and its rewards 
through learning by proj ec t involvement . He cal ls this 
trait-making . This involves shaping p2 so as to induce u2 
to change its shape too . We are not init ially concerned 
with these long-term demons trat ion effects  (nor with the 
moral quest ion of the des igner ' s  right to impose them) . We 
merely aim to des ign the best proj ect that f its current 
tas tes . Hirschman calls this trait-making . 
3we are talking here of crop des ign , but des ign of techno l­
ogie s for associated machinery , small industry , etc . follows 
the same princ iple .  
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S tep ( i) : Identify the relevant charac teris tics of a commun­
ity that are likely to make a difference to the way people 
there view a proj ect . ( In terms of the simp le figure th is 
means identifying the components and shape of u2 ) .  These may 
be cultural at titudes , historical exp eriences ,  social organ­
izat ions or psychological out look ; they may be as spiritual 
as religious feeling or as phys ical as customary b ody 
posit ions . 
This is  really a j ob for the community it self , though it 
may require someone like a social anthropologist  to artic­
ulate feelings in wes tern terms . This has b een done , for 
example , in Chimbu Province in Papua New Guinea , us ing 
' rural planning workshops ' to express local needs ( see 
Howlett et a l . 19 7 6 ) . 
S tep ( ii) : Ident ify the range of  possible new product ion 
ac tivities and how they are likely to operate in the part­
icular phys ical environment .  ( In terms of the figure this 
means identi fying a range of poss ib le p2 curves differing 
in shape . )  This is the j ob of a techno logis t and requires 
knowledge of the connnunity setting . It can be done concurr­
ent ly with step ( i) . 
For example , in the case of a fertilizer proj ect it means 
gathe ring information on all the possib le d ifferent fertil­
izer packages and the way they might affec t output , not in 
controlled trials in developed count ries , but in field prod­
uction in developing countries . Market information such as 
costs and supply of the fertilizer is also necessary , and 
whether it is mined , processed locally or totally imported . 
S tep ( iii) : Select and if necessary modify a suitable proj ect 
to maximize communal welfare subj ect to any exogenous con­
straints . This is the j ob of the economis t  armed with the 
informat ion of steps ( i )  and ( ii) . (On the figure this means 
selec ting a suitab le p2 to opt imize e2 . )  
The economist must  pick out what he considers the crucial 
economic characteris tics from each of  the technical options . 
For a process such as growing labour-intens ive crop s these 
charac teris tics will be the parameters used in the earlier 
model . He can then use the knowledge of connnunity attitudes 
to predict ( from an exp licit or imp licit model )  whether 
growers will find this particular charac teris tic at trac tive , 
unattract ive , or irrelevant . 
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A proj ec t may appear most  attrac t ive on all counts .  More 
likely the proj ect that performs bes t  on the risk criterion 
will no t perform best on , say , the growth rate criterion . 
Here a formal model is l i ttle use for select ing the best 
overall characteris tic , and the designer may have to rely on 
experience and rules of thumb . 
Frequently a person introduc ing new types of economic 
ac tivity has neither the resources , nor time , nor ability , 
to des ign it from the beginning specif ically for a part­
icular community . He must  then select from processes that 
are already available , p icking out small components that may 
be independently adap ted to local condi tions . This is a 
cheap pragmatic approach that is  of ten used . For example , 
with At iuan citrus this might mean fertilizing trees wi th 
a mixture of locally available lime and seaweed rather than 
expens ive imported fertili zers . 
The designer must  work within cons traints imposed by the 
government of the recip ient country . For example � it may be 
laid down that a proj ec t should be fas t-ac ting to alleviate 
immed iate need : this will prevent a ' learning proj ec t ' .  In 
a similar way the government may rationally specify a proj ect 
design f i t ting in with any number of pub lic policy obj ec tives : 
conrrnunal equality ,  employment expansion , overseas exchang e 
earning, etc . These requirements constrain the des igner ' s  
cho ic e ,  and may eliminate otherwise attractive proj ec ts . 
How then should a proj ect be designed on Atiu? In step 
(i)  the strong taste Atiuans have for leisure compared with 
their limited needs for income , their dislike of r isk and 
ignorance ,  their short time horizons , and the p sycholog ical 
at trac tion of company , should be identified . 
S t ep ( ii)  should accumulat e information on how a range of 
trop ical cash crop s might perform (physically and connner­
cially) in the Atiuan environmen t .  This mus t  take account of 
the leached so ils , the erratic c l imate,  tropical diseases , 
l imited management skil ls , and isolation from a market . I t  
must  include what sort o f  returns are likely from different 
input s ,  what the likely variance of yield s and revenue is , 
how the crop changes as it  grows older , how much Atiuans 
know about it , and whether there are economies of scale . 
Giv en all this inf ormation , s tep ( iii) requires the des­
igner to pick a proj ect that is relatively highly prof itable , 
has low risk ,  fast growth to maturity , and requires 
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interact ion among the community . These were shown to b e  the 
mos t  important proj ect characteris tics by the tes ts  of Part 
I I . ( Careful ob servat ion should show the same . )  Less vital 
but st ill favourab le charac teris t ics are a high capac ity 
yield , fas t rate of adj us tment to  inputs , a lot of exper­
ience , and probab ly low maintenance requirements . 
The designer s of the f irs t proj ect , the Citrus Replanting 
Scheme in the la te 1940s , failed to carry out step ( ii)  prop­
erly : they assumed that orang es would grow in Atiu as they 
had in temperate countries . The nine subsequent proj ects 
gave them plenty of opportunities to learn bet ter . Progres s  
was very slow, bu t proj ec t design did improve . 
The P ineapple Incorporation proj ec t embodies these im­
provements : wages of 4 0  cents per hour (1974)  make it re­
latively profi table by Atiuan s tandards .  Po tential returns 
can be very high for a man prepared to work long hours . A 
worker is paid for tnightly - a quick and riskless return on 
labour . If he works particularly hard one for tnight , then 
his reward is an immed iate increase in pay . Little  prior 
knowledge is  needed becau se the men work tog ether in gang s 
d irected by foremen; they enj oy one ano ther ' s  company and 
they approve of working for a coIIllllunity proj ect . From these 
characteris tics the P ineapple Incorporation might be consid­
ered a good proj ect cho ic e . It is  cer tainly the most  pop­
ular one at  present . 4 
Ex poste proj ect adminis trat ion . Of ten a proj ect is form­
ulated without ref erence to the community : it  will then need 
revision . Even if all the designing s tep s have been carried 
faithfully through , the proj ec t is s t ill unl ikely to turn 
out to be perfec t . How can a proj ec t that has already been 
designing be adminis tered in order to induce a bet ter res­
ponse? In the simple f igure , p 2 and u2 are g iven ; how can 
knowl edge of them be used to manipulate p 2 to raise equil­
ibrium point e2 on to a higher utility level ? This problem 
d iffers from that of the previous section by being based on 
ex poste exper ience of the proj ec t in ac tion . 
S tep (iv) : The rules are the same whether proj ec t admin­
istra t ion i s  aimed at correcting an imposed proj ec t package 
or f inely tuning a specially des igned one . The admini s trator 
4But the scheme is suffering from severe management problems ; 
this underlines the importance of  the next sec tion . 
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must observe why the proj ec t is fail ing , and this may prove 
dif f icult . Then he must  use the resources of government to 
adap t or disgu ise the undesirable proj ect charac teris t ic so 
as to suit the connnunity better . He may introduce schemes 
to insure against risk , provide credit , spread information , 
co-ordinate action , or compensate for o ther proj ec t short­
comings ( see Chap ter 11) . This way he can change the grow­
er ' s  percep tion of the proj ec t ,  and make it more attractive . 
Again the adminis trator mus t  ac t within constraints .  Us­
ually the money that may be spent on administration schemes 
is  limited , encourag ing self-financ ing ones . A government 
may require proj ec t adminis tration policy to correc t the 
biases of introduc ed proj ect des ign to its  own obj ec tives .  
For example , the Citrus Replant ing Scheme , planned by the 
New Zealand Government , proved to be poorly designed for 
Atiuan need s .  The efforts  of adminis trators to improve it 
illus trate their ability to manipulate proj ec t design . Based 
on the experiences of Rarotonga , a repayment scheme was form­
ulated to share risk with the growers and allow them credit . 
Citricul tural techniques were taught through agricultural 
off icer s . The proj ec t wa s made more connnunity-based by en­
couraging connnunal work groups and competit ion .  Whatever 
success the Citrus Replanting Scheme eventually enj oyed was 
due to  this adminis tration . 
Ex ante proj ect evaluations with variable labour response 
The introduc tion criticized cos t-benefit  analyses for 
their unreal assumptions of  total grower partic ipation . I s  
it po ssible to d o  any better? In order to carry ou t an ex 
ante cost-benef it analysis of a proj ec t already designed bu t 
not yet in use , labour response to it mus t  be predicted . The 
knowledge of grower participation in earlier s imilar ac tivit­
ies and the resul ts of the model , may be used as a basis for 
predicting changes in behaviour toward� the new proj ec t .  
In terms of the simple figure , the proj ec t evaluator must 
use his knowledge of the previous ly observed equilibrium e ' 
(and guess the shape of p ' and u ' ) to predict R-2 . He can 
then derive an estimate of y2 from his knowledge of the new 
p2 , and carry ou t traditional cost-benef it analysis based on 
these .  
How can likely labour response be predicted in practice? 
It  is necessary to observe the effect s  that a s imilar produc­
tion proc ess has had in that or a similar community . The 
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d is tribu tion of response must be analysed - how many growers 
were enthusiastic and successful , how many uninterested ? 
Also the timing examined :  whether growers worked hard in 
the early s tages or no t .  
I f  the new process is very d ifferent from the old , the 
conclus ions of Chap ters 7 -11 might be used to guess at the 
eff ec t this could have on response . I f  the studied community 
i s  not the one where the proj ect is to take place , cul tural 
d ifferenc es between them mus t  be allowed for . In this way an 
estimate of labour response is  ob tained . If  there are many 
unknowns the estimate may be best represented as a conf idence 
region . In prac tice , a proj ec t evaluator may use his general 
knowledge and follow these step s  impl ic itly . 
S tep (ii)  above provides some knowledge of the new produc­
tion proces s . The rang e of produc tion levels the labour 
response will yield may be predic ted . Given the necessary 
price data and administrative cost s , a trad it ional cost­
benef it analysis may now be carr ied ou t .  
This i s  shown , by a very s imple ex ante co st-benef it 
analys is of the Citru s  Replanting Scheme . The aim is no t to 
thoroughly analyse the proj ec t ;  rather to show how the admin­
is trator s of the scheme might have u sed the informat ion then 
available to them to predict grower interes t and anticipa te 
the proj ec t success or failure . No formal evaluation was 
initially carried out ,  but information from the orig inal 
proj ec t proposal s is  used to calculate the rate of return 
they imp licitly expec ted . 5 The experience of grower involve­
ment in native orange production in the 193 0s allows the 
reac tion to a new proj ec t to be pred icted . 
The administration apparently assumed mo s t  grower s would 
j oin the new scheme and work on it  as requ ired . In this 
analysis , the production f igures they antic ipated in 1946  
are used and a f low of  costs and returns are calculated over 
a proj ect l ife-time of twenty f ive year s .  I t  is assumed 
there are no administra tive costs  ( the proj ect was meant to 
be self-f inanc ing) . Ex ternalities and shadow pric ing are 
no t considered . This yield s an internal rate of return of 
2 2  per cent , a very reasonable reward for a risky proj ec t of 
this typ e .  
5nerived from 1 94 6  files of the Atiu Adminis tration o n  the 
C itrus Replanting Scheme . 
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Bu t administrator s did no t allow for a variable labour 
response ,  and they did no t use real istic produc tion figures . 
The obviou s yard st ick to pred ict likely participation rates 
was the native orange cultivation . Incomplete record s from 
the 193 0s suggest nearly a quar ter of households did no t 
export oranges ,  and the other three-quarters of  the popula­
tion spent varying leng ths of time earning money this way . 
At iuan labour involvement is approxima ted by four labour 
levels .  Would one then expect the same response to the 
Citrus Scheme? 
The new ac tivity dif fered in several important ways from 
the old one . Chapter s  7 -11 suggest  that the most  impor tant 
technical d ifferences were the increased risk (imp lying les s 
partic ipation) , the increased labour productivity (more 
partic ipation) , the decreased knowledge available (less 
partic ipation) , and the increased government role (more 
partic ipation) . The conclusion is that these d iff erences 
are so wide , that the bes t that can be done is to as sume a 
new response similar to the old , then inves tigate what 
happens if it  varies . 
The evaluation may be improved in a second way .  The early 
estimates of produc tion capabil ities were clearly exaggerated . 
Drawing on the (pre-proj ec t )  results of West & Howard ( 1 938 ) , 
the technological estimates may be improved . Using these 
and the labour predictions in the non-stat ionary produc tion 
func t ion ( equation (4)  of Chap ter 8 ) , returns and costs may 
be estimated more realistically . 
The results are shown in Table 52 . Now the rate of return 
is negative . Moving the labour es timates over a range of ± 
20 per cent makes no difference . This is  a much less ro sy 
result than had been expec ted . I f  such an evaluation had in 
fac t been carr ied ou t ,  it  should have at least meant a re­
designing of the scheme . This could have saved some of the 
$ 2  million loaned and granted to the scheme in the whole of 
the C ook I slands , as well as hours of wasted ef fort and lo st  
conf idence among grower s .  In fact many o ther things have 
changed over this 25-year period . However , these p seudo­
predictions of labour response and produc tion capabilities 
have both been roughly borne out . Today this type  of evalua­
tion of  variable labour response is rarely p erformed explic­
itly though sometimes implicit adj us tments are made . 
The second sec tion of this monograph provides an analysis 
of grower response , not j u s t  to small changes in prices or 
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Year 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
1 0  
11 
12 
Note : 
rate 
Table 52 
Ex ante es timates of  cos t s  and returns in Ci trus 
Replanting Scheme ( $ )  
Administrative estimates Revised e s t imates 
(a) (b)  ( c )  ( d )  
To tal re turns To tal costs  To tal returns To tal costs  
14 , 1 2 0  11 , 623 
5 , 48 0  4 , 003 
5 , 833 4 , 2 3 0  
6 , 123 4 , 313 
5 , 4 00 8 , 02 8  2 , 083 5 , 45 2  
1 0 , 8 00 8 , 3 93 2 , 487  5 , 897  
1 3 , 5 00 8 , 411 2 , 922  6 , 2 2 2  
1 6 , 200  8 , 317 3 , 37 2  6 , 44 1  
18 , 900 8 , 29 9  3 , 801 6 , 7 09 
21 , 600 8 , 4 21 4 , 173  6 , 7 62 
27 , 000 8 , 673 4 , 2 54 6 , 81 2  
27 , 000 8 , 67 3  4 , 32 6  6 , 8 58 
Administrat ion e s timates yield 2 2  per cent internal 
of re turn over 25 years ; revised es timates yield nega-
tive rate . 
Sources : (a)  and (b)  Files of Atiu Administration , 1 94 6 .  
( c )  Generated from produc tion func tion ( 4 ) , Chapter 8 ,  using 
parameter estimates q = 12 , 3 2 0 ,  k = . 0234 , a = 1 . 0 , i = 15 , 
y = 0 . 2 5 ,  for 4 labour inputs  ( 0 ,  2 0 . 4 ,  2 6 . 6 , and 33 .? days , 
each for � of Atiu household s) . 
(d)  Labour costs and interest charges from ( c ) , other costs 
a s  in (a)  and (b) . 
All f igures are in 1946 values . 
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c o s t s  as  is usually considered b y  agr icul tural economis ts , 
bu t to the more fundamental changes in the s truc ture and 
organization of crop production that are frequently encoun­
tered in planning development . This la st chap ter has shown 
that there are impor tant implications for the des ign , admin­
istra tion and evaluation of such proj ec ts . Bu t to put these 
theor etical results into prac tice does no t prove easy : the 
policy-maker mus t  s till rely mainly on experience , rules of 
thumb , and common sense . 

B ib liography 
Allen , B . J . , 1969 . Development of Commercial Agriculture on Mangaia , M . A .  Thes is , 
Massey Univers i ty of Manawatu . 
Arrow, K . J . , 1962a . ' The economic impl ications of learning by doing ' ,  Review of 
Economics and Statis tics , 49 : 155- 7 3 . 
19 62b . ' E conomic welfare and the allocat ion of resources for invent ion ' ,  in 
Rate and Dire ction of Inventive Activi ty, R. Nelson ( ed . ) , New Jersey , 
Prince ton . 
1969 . ' Class ificatory notes on production and transmission of technological 
knowl edge , Ame:r>ican Economic Review, 59 : 29--35 . 
19 7 1 . ' Theory of risk aversion ' ,  eh . 3 of Essays in the Theory of Risk 
Bearing (ed . l rrow.' , Chicag o ,  l•.arkham. 
2 19 
Atkinson , A. and S t iglit z ,  J . , 1969 . ' A  new view of technolgical change ' ,  Economic 
Jou:r>na l, 7 9 : 5 7 3-8 . 
Awad , M . H . , 19 7 1 . ' The supply of risk bearers in the underdeve loped countries ' , 
Economic Deve lopment and Cu l tu:r>a l Change, 2 0 : 4 61-70 . 
Bake r ,  M. B . , 19 52 . ' C itrus growing in the Co0k I s lands ' ,  New Zealand Science 
Review, 4 : 185- 7 .  
Baldwin , R . E . , 19 6 3 . ' Export technology and development from a sub s istence leve l ' , 
Economic Jou:r>na l, 7 3 : 80-92 . 
Barrau, J . , 1961 . Subsis tence Ag:r>icu ltu:r>e in Polynesia and Mic:r>onesia, Honolulu , 
Bernice P .  Bishop Museum Bulle t in N o .  2 2 3 . 
Basse t t ,  I . G .  ( ed . ) , 1969 . Pacific Peasan.�:r>y, Palmerston North , New Zealand 
Geographical Society . 
Beaglehole , E . , 195 7 .  Soci a l  Change in &he South Pacifi c :  Rarotonga and Ai tuaki, 
London , Allen and Unwin . 
Behrman , J . R . , 19 6 8 .  Supp ly Response in Unde:r>deve loped Ag:r>icultu:r>e, Ambs terdam, 
North-Holland . 
Belshaw, C . S . , 1964 . Unde:r> the Ivi T:r>ee ,  London , Routledge and Kegan Paul . 
Be lshaw , H .  anct S tace , V . D . , 1955 . A Program f or Economic Development in the Cook 
I s lands , Wellington , unpub lished ms . 
Berg , E . J . , 19 61 . ' Backward-slop ing labour supply functions in dual economies - the 
Africa case ' ,  Qua:r>te:r>ly Jou:r>nal of Economics, 7 5 : 46 8-9 2 .  
Bernar d ,  R . R . and Pelto , P . J . , 19 7 2 .  Technology an d  Social Change, New York , 
Macmillan . 
Bes t ,  E . , 1922 . The Maol'i Division of Time, Wellington , Dominion Museum Monograph 
N o .  4 .  
B icch ieri , M. G .  ( e d . ) ,  1972 . Hunters an d  Gathe:r>ers Today, New York , Hol t , Reinhart 
and Wins t on .  
2 20 
Blaug , M. , 19 63 . 'A survey of the theory of process innova t ions ' ,  Economica, 
30 : 13-32 . 
Bliss , C . J . , 19 7 0 . Statist�' cs fr1. Bic log;1 , vol . 2 ,  New York , McGraw-H i l l .  
B l i t zer , C . R . , 19 7 3 .  On the Social Rate of Discount an d  Price of Capi ta l i n  Cos t­
Benefit Ana ly sis, Washington , IBRD E conomic Staff Working Paper No . 144 . 
Bollard , A. E . , 1 9 74 . The Impact of Mone t i sation in Tonga , M . A .  Thes i s , Univers i ty 
o f  Auckland . 
19 7 6 .  ' Dualism i n  Tongan commerce ' ,  Pacific Viewpoint, 17 : 7 5-81 . 
19 7 7 a .  ' Role of money in development :  the Tongan experience ' ,  New Zea land 
Economic Papers, 11 : 122-34 . 
1 9 7 7b . Des i gn and Evaluat ion of Proj ects with Var iab le Labour Response : Case 
Study of Agricul tural Aid on At iu , Ph . D .  The s is , Unive r s i ty o f  Auckland . 
Bose , S . P . , 1964 . ' The d i ffus ion of a farm prac t i ce in Indian vil lages ' ,  Rura l 
Sociology, 2 9 : 5 3-66 . 
B oulding , K . E . , 19 6 6 .  ' The economics of knowledge and the knowledge of economics ' ,  
American Economic Review, 5 6 : 1- 2 3 . 
B r ookf ield , H . C . , 19 7 1 .  Me lanesia: A Geographica l Interp1•e tation of an Island 
World, London , Methuen . 
Brown , L . A. , 1968 . Diffusion Processes and Location, Philadelphia , Regional 
S c ience Research Ins t i tute . 
and Lentrek , B . , 19 7 2 .  ' Innovation d i ffus ion in a developing e conomy : a 
mesos cale view ' , Economic Development and Cu ltura l Change, 2 1 : 2 7 4-9 2 .  
Cancian , F . , 19 7 2 .  Change and Uncertainty in a Pe asant Economy : The Maya Cor>n 
FGX'fTlers of Zinacantan, S tan ford , Cal iforni a ,  S t anford Unive r s i ty Press . 
Carte r ,  W . , 19 7 2 . Repor t to the Government of the Cook I slands on P ineapple Wil t 
Diseas e ,  Rarotonga , unpub l ished ms . 
Chow, G . C . , 19 7 4 .  Analysis an d  Control of Dynamic Economic Sys tems, New Jersey , 
Prince ton.  
Coleman , J . S . , 1964 . In troduction to Mathematical Sociology, New York , Free Press 
o f  Glencoe . 
Cook I slands , various dates . Fi les of the Agri cu l ture Department, Rarotonga . 
various dates . Fi les of the A tiu Administration, At iu . 
various dates . Fi les of the Marketing Board, Raro tonga .  
various dates . Papers o f  the Legislative Assemb ly, Raro tonga , Government 
Printer . 
19 19- 7 4 .  Minute Books o f  the Maori Land Court, Rarotonga . 
1956-74 . Fi les of the A tiu Co-opera tives , Atiu . 
2 2 1  
Cook , J . , 1 9 6 8 .  Labour an d  Employment in the Cook I s lands , Raro tonga , unpub l ished 
ms . 
Crocombe , R . G . , 1960a . A Century of Change in a Land Tenure Sys tem ( S tudy of Atiu) , 
Rarotonga , unpub li shed ms . 
19 60b . The Reconstruction of a P re-Con tact Land Tenure Sys tem , Rarotonga , 
unpub l ished ms . 
1964 . Land Tenure in the Cook Islcrnds, Melbourne , Oxford Univers i ty Press . 
1967 . ' From as cendancy to dependency : the polit ics of Atiu ' , Journa l of 
Pacific His tory, 2 : 9 7-111 . 
1 9 6 8 .  Improving Lcrnd Tenure, Noumea , South P a c i f i c  Commiss ion Handbook . 
( e d . ) ,  19 7 1 .  Land Tenure in the Pacific, Melbourne , Oxford Un ivers ity P res s . 
19 7 2 . ' Land Tenure in the South Pacific ' ( Case Study of At iu) , eh . 9 in Mcrn 
in the Pacific, R .  Gerard Ward ( ed . ) , London , Oxford Univers i t y  Press . 
n . d .  Aid for Atiu : A Case S tudy in the Prob lems of Fore ign Aid , Suva , 
unpub lished ms . 
Curson , P . H . , 1 9 7 3 . Populati on in the Cook I s l ands , Ph . D .  Thes i s , Macquarie 
Univers i ty . 
Dal ton , G. ( ed . ) ,  1967 . Triba l  and Pe ascrnt Economies , Garden C i ty ,  N . Y . , Natural 
History Press . 
( e d . ) ,  19 7 la .  Economic Deve lopment and Social Chcrnge, Garden C i ty , N . Y . , 
Na tural Hist ory Pres s .  
( e d . ) ,  19 7 lb . Studies i n  Economic Jr: thropo logy, Washington , American 
Anthropological As suci&t ion . 
Dasgup ta , S . , 1 9 7 0 . Agricu lture : Produaers ' Rationality and Te chnical Change , 
London , As ia Pub lishing Hous e .  
David , P . A . , 19 7 5 . Technica l  Choice, Innovation and Economic Growth, London , 
Cambridge Univers ity P res s .  
Davids on ,  B . R .  and Mar t in ,  B . R . , 1968 . Experimenta l Research and Farm Production, 
Nedlands , University o f  Wes tern Aus t ralia . 
Diamond , P . A . , 19 6 7 .  ' The role of a s to ck market in a general equilibr ium model 
with technological un cer tainty ' ,  Americcrn Economic Review, 5 7 : 7 59- 7 6 . 
Eckaus , R . S . , 19 6 6 .  ' Notes on invention and innovation in less developed 
count ries ' ,  Americcrn Economic Review, 56 : 9 8-109 . 
Eps tein , T . S . , 19 6 2 .  Economic Deve lopment and Socia l Change in South India, 
Manches ter Univers i ty Press . 
1965 . ' E conomic change and differentiation in New Britain ' , Economic Record, 
4 1 : 17 3-92 . 
19 6 8 . Capitalism Primi tive and Modern :  Some Aspects of To lai Economic 
Growth, Canberra , ANU Pres s .  
2 2 2  
1 9 7 0 . The Indigenous Ro le in Business Enterprise, New Guinea Research 
Bullet in ,  No . 35 , Aus tral ian Nat ional University .  
19 7 3 .  South India :  Yes terday , Today and Tomorrow, London , Macmillan . 
and Penny , D . H .  (ed . ) ,  19 72 . Opportun i ty and Response : Case Studies in 
Economic De ve lopment ,  London , Hurs t .  
Falcon , W . P . , 1964 . ' Farmer response to price in a sub s i s tence economy : the case 
of We s t  Pakistan ' , American Economic Review, 54 : 5 80-9 1 .  
Fellne r ,  W . , 19 6 6 . ' Profit maximisat ion , ut ility maximi sation,  and the rate and 
direct ion of innovation ' ,  American Economic Review, 5 6 : 2 4-52 . 
1969 . ' Specific interpre tat ions of learning by doing , Journal of Economic 
Theory, 1 : 119-40 . 
Findlay , A . G . , 1884 . South Pacific Ocean Directory, London . 
Firth , R . , 195 9 . Economics of the New Ze a land Maori, 2nd e d . ,  We llington , 
Government Printer . 
19 6 5 .  Primi tive Polynesian Economy, 2nd ed . , London , Rout ledge and Kegan 
Paul . 
19 69 . ' Social s truc ture and p easant economy : the influence of so cial 
s t ructure on peasant economies ' ,  in Suhsis tence Agri�u lture and Economic 
Deve lopment, C .  Wharton (ed . ) ,  Ch i cago , Aldine . 
and Yamey , B . S . , 1964 . Cap i ta l, Saving and Credit in Peas an t  Socie ties, 
London , Allen and Unwin . 
Fis k ,  E . K . , 1964 . ' P lanning in a primi t ive economy : from pure sub s i s t ence t o  
product ion of a market surplus ' ,  Econo�ic Record, 40 : 1 5 6-7 4 .  
and Shand , R . , 1969 . ' The early s t ages o f  development i n  a p r imi t ive economy : 
the evolution from s ub s i s tence to trade and specialisation ' , in Suhsis tence 
Agricu l ture and Economic Deve lopment, C. Wharton ( ed . ) , Chicago , Aldine . 
Fle t cher , W . A . , 1957 , 19 72 , 1975 , 19 7 6 .  Reports o n  C i trus Growing i n  the Cook 
I s l and s ,  Auckland , unpub lished ms s .  
F . A . O . , 1966 . Statis tics of Crop Responses to Ferti lisers , Rome , F . A . O .  
Forman , s . , 19 7 0 .  The Raft FisheT'fTlen : Tradi tion and Change in the Brazi lian 
Economy, Bloomington , Indiana . 
Fos t e r , G . M. , 19 6 2 .  Tradi tional Cul tures and the Impact of Techno logical Change, 
New York , Harper and Row . 
Fox , J .  and Grange , L . , 19 5 3 . Soi ls of the Lower Cook Group, We l lington , DSI R  
Bulletin .  
Friedman , M .  and Savage , L . J . , 19 48 . ' The util ity analys is o f  choices involving 
risk' , Journal of Po litica l  Economy, 56 : 2 7 9-304 . 
Gars t ,  R . D . , 1974 . ' Innovation d i ff us ion among the Gus i i  of Kenya ' ,  Economic 
Ge ography, 50 : 300-12 . 
Gibb s ,  D . B . , 19 7 3 .  A Review of the Adaption, Diffus ion and Communication of 
New Ideas and Practices in Rura l Situations, We lling ton , New Zealand 
Department of Agri culture . 
Gill , W . , 1868 . Gems from the Coral Is lands, London , Ward . 
1 8 7 6 . My ths and Songs from the South Pacific, London , King . 
1 885 . Jottings from the Pacific, London , RTS . 
Gold f ie ld , S . M.  and Quand t ,  R . E . , 19 7 2 .  Non-Linear Me thods in Econome trics, 
Ams terdam, North-Holland . 
Gril i che s , Z . , 1957 . ' Hyb rid corn : an explorat ion in the economies of 
t e chno logi cal change ' ,  Econome trica, 2 5 : 501-2 2 .  
Hayden , H . , 1954 . Moturiki : A Pi lot Project i n  Corrununi ty Deve lopment, Noume a ,  
S outh Pacific Commis s i on .  
Heady , E . O . , 1 9 60 . Economics of Agricultural Production and Resource Us e, New 
Jersey , P rent ice-Hall . 
Heal , G . M . , 19 7 3 .  The Theory o f  Economic Planning, Ams terdam , Nor th-Holland . 
Henderson ,  J .  and Quand t ,  R . , 19 7 1 .  Microeconomic Theory, 2nd ed . ,  New York , 
McGraw-Hill . 
223 
Herdt , R . W .  and Me l lor , J . W . , 1964 . ' The con tras t ing re sponse o f  rice t o  nitrogen : 
India and the Uni t ed S t ates ' ,  Journa l of Farm Economi cs, 46 : 1 50-60 . 
Hi lgard , E . R . , 1956 . Theories of Learning, 2nd ed . ,  New York , Appleton - Century -
Crof t s . 
Hirschman , A . O . , 1958 . The Strategy of Economic Deve lopment, New Haven , Yale 
Univers ity Pres s . 
19 6 7 .  Deve lopmen t  Projects Observed, Washington , Brookings Ins t i tute . 
Hoselit z , B . F . and Moore , W . E . , 1963 . Indus tria lisation and Society, Paris , UNESCO . 
Howle t t , D .  et al. , 1 9 7 6 .  Ch imbu : Issues i n  Deve lopment, Development Studies Centre 
Monograph No . 4, Canb erra , Aus tralian Nat ional Unive rs ity . 
Inj ac , B . N . , 1 9 7 3 . P roj e c t  Formulation and Evaluat ion : Atiu Pineapple S cheme , 
Suva , unpub lished ms . 
Ironmonger ,  D . S . , 1 9 7 2 .  New Commodi ties and Consumer Behaviour, London , Camb r idge 
Univers i ty Pres s .  
Johnson , A . W . , 19 7 1 .  ' Securi ty and r isk-taking among poor peasants : a Braz ilian 
case ' , in Studies in Economic Anthropology, G .  Dal ton ( ed . ) ,  Washington , 
American An thropological Associa t ion . 
Johns ton , K . M . , 19 6 7 .  Vi l lage Agricu lture in A ituaki, Cook Islands, Wellingt on ,  
Victoria University .  
Johns ton , W . B . , 195 1 .  ' The c itrus industry o f  the Cook Islands ' ,  New Zealand 
Ge ographer, 7 : 121-3 8 .  
2 2 4  
Ke lly , J . L . , 1885 . The S outh Seas I s lands : Pos s ib il i t ies o f  Trade wi th New 
Zea land , Auckland , unpub lishe d ms . 
Kirk ,  T .  and Boucher , W . , 190 3 .  ' Report on th e Cook I s lands ' ,  RPpoPt of Now 
Zea land :;r;;:, CU' r;ment of Agn'.-:u ltuPe, 1 1 : 4 2 3-34 . 
Klausen , A . M . , 19 6 8 .  KePala FisheT'f11en and the Indo-Nor>Wegian PPoject, Oslo , 
Unive r s i t e t s forlaget . 
Ko lff , J . , 1964 . Nat ional Income of the Cook I s l and s , M . A .  Thes i s , Victoria 
Univers i ty o f  We llington . 
Lamberton , D . M .  (ed . ) ,  19 7 1 .  Economics of Information and Know ledge, Harmondsworth , 
Penguin . 
Lancas ter , K . , 1966 . ' Change and innovat ion in the technology of consumpt ion ' ,  
AmeY'i�an Economic Review , 5 6 : 14-23 . 
Large , J . T . , 19 1 3 .  ' S ome Notes o n  At iu I s land ' , Journal of the Polynesian Society, 
2 2 : 67- 7 6 .  
Lave , L . B . , 19 6 6 .  Techno logical Change : Its Concep tion and Me asurement, New 
Je rsey , P ren t i ce-Hall . 
L i ebens t e in , H . , 1969 . ' Organisat ional or frict ional equilibria : X-e ffic iency 
and the rat e  of innovat ion ' ,  QuartePly Journal of Economics, 83 : 600-2 3 .  
Lip ton , M . , 1968 . ' The theory of the op t imis ing peasant ' , Journal of Deve lopment 
Studies, 4 : 327-5 1 .  
L i t tle , J .  and Mirrlees , J . , 1968 . Manua l o f  Industria l Project Ana lysis in 
Deve loping Coun tY'ies, Par i s , O . E . C . D .  
Lo ckwood , B .  and Moulik , T . K . , 19 7 2 .  ' Seeds o f  development in a De lhi village ' ,  
in OppoPtunity and Response ,  T . S .  Epstein and D . H .  Penny (eds . ) , London , 
Hurs t .  
Malinowski , B . , 1 9 2 2 . APgonauts of the Wes tern Pacific, London , Routledge and 
Kegan P aul . 
Malinvaud , E . M. , 19 7 2 .  MicPoeconomic TheoPy, Ams terdam , North Holland . 
Malmgren , H . B . , 19 6 1 .  ' Informa t ion ,  expectat ions , and the theory of the f i rm ' , 
QuaY'tePly JoUPnal of Economics, 7 5 : 399-4 2 1 .  
Mansf ield , E . , 19 6 1 .  ' Technical change and the rate o f  imi t a t ion ' , Econome tY'ica, 
2 9 : 7 4 1- 6 6 . 
1968a . The Economics of Techno logical Change, New York , Norton .  
1968b .  IndustPial ReseaPch and Techno logical Innovation, New York , Norton . 
Marschak , J . , 19 7 4 . Economic InfoT'T11ation, Decision and PY'ediction, Dordrech t , D .  
Reide l .  
Marshall ,  P . , 1930 . Geo logy of Rarotonga and A tiu, Honolulu , Bernice P .  B i shop 
Museum Bullet in N o .  7 2 .  
Mat thews , R . , 1 9 7 2 .  Taxation in the Cook Is lands, Suva , UNDP . 
McAr thur , N . R . , 1968 . Island Populations of the Pacific, Canberra , ANU Pre s s . 
Mead , M. ( ed . ) ,  195 8 .  Cu ltura l Patterns and Technica l  Change, New York , New 
Ame r i can Lib rary . 
2 2 5  
Mel lor , J . W . , 1969 . ' The economic b ehaviour o f  sub s is tence farmers ' ,  in Subsis tence 
Agricu lture and Economic Deve lopment, C .  Whar ton (ed . ) , Ch icago , Aldine . 
Menzie s , B . J . , 19 70 . A S tudy of a D�velopment Scheme in a Polynes ian Community : 
The Citrus Replanting Scheme on Atiu , M . A .  Thesis , Massey University of 
Manawa tu. 
Merchan t s , Planters and Traders of the Cook I s land s , 1920 . Cook Is land s  
Adminis tration : An Imp artial Inquiry into t h e  Causes of Declining Trade 
and Growing Disconten t , Rarotonga , unpub lished ms . 
Mikese ll , R . F . , 196 8 .  The Economics of Foreign Aid, Chi cago , Aldine . 
Moerman , M . H . , 19 6 8 .  Agricultural Change and Peasant Choice in a Thai vi l lage, 
Berkeley , Univers i ty of California Press . 
Moulik , T . K . , 19 7 3 . Money, Motivation and Cash Cropping, Canb erra , New Guinea 
Research Bulletin , No . 5 3 , Aus tral ian Nat ional Univers i ty .  
Myrdal , G . , 19 6 8 .  As i an  Drama , New York , Pantheon . 
Nakaj ima , C . , 19 65 . ' S ub s i s t ence and commerc ial family farms : some theoret ical 
models o f  sub j e c t ive equi lib r ium ' , in Subsistence Agriculture and Economic 
Deve lopment, C .  Wharton ( ed . ) , Ch icago , Aldine . 
Nash , M . , 1 9 5 8 .  Machine Age Maya, Wis cons in , American Anthropological As sociat ion . 
Neale , W . C . , 19 7 1 .  ' Mone t ization , market orientat ion , and market dependence ' ,  in 
Studies in Economic Anthropo logy, G. Dal ton (ed . ) ,  Washington , Ameri can 
Anthropologi cal As sociat ion . 
Nelson , R . F . , 19 7 3 .  ' Mi croeconomic theory and economic deveopment ' ,  Ch . 11 in 
Micro Aspects of Deve lopment, E . B . Ayal ( ed . ) , London , Macmillan . 
Nelson , P . R . and Phelps , E . S . , 1966 . ' Inves tment in humans , t echnological 
diffus ion and economic growth ' , American Economic Review, 5 6 : 69 - 7 5 . 
Ne rlove , M . , 19 5 8 .  ' Adap t ive expec tat ions and cobweb phenomena ' , Quarterly 
Johrnal of Economics , 7 2 : 2 2 7 -40 . 
New Zealand , various dates . Appendices to the Journa ls of the House of 
Representatives, We llington . 
New Zealand Parliamentary Delegat ion , 1936 . Report on rhe Cook Is lands Frui t  
Indus try, Appendix t o  the Journal o f  t h e  Hous e of Representatives , H-44A , 
We llington . 
Norris , K .  and Vaizey , J . , 19 7 3 .  The Economics of Research and Te chnology, 
London , Allen and unwin . 
Organisat ion for E conomic Co-operat ion and Developmen t , 19 7 4 .  Choice and 
Adaptation of Techno logy in Deve loping Countries , Paris , OECD . 
Ozga , S . A. , 19 60 . ' Imperfe c t  markets through lack of knowledge ' ,  Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, 74 : 29 - 5 2 . 
2 2 6  
Parsons , T . , 19 5 0 . Theories of Socie ty, New York , Free P ress . 
196 1 .  ' An  ou t l ine o f  the social system ' , introduc t ion t o  Theories o f  Society , 
Parsons et a l .  ( eds . ) , Glencoe ( I l l . ) ,  Free P ress . 
Prat t , .  J . , 1964 . ' Risk ave rsion in the small and in the large ' ,  Econome trica, 
32 : 1 22-36 . 
Price , G i t t inger , J . , 19 72 . Eeonomic Ana lysis of Agricu l tural Proje cts ,  Washing ton , 
IBRD. 
Rao , V . M .  and Shetty , N . S . , 19 68 . ' A  principal component s  s tudy of the 
technological p rogress iveness of farmers ' ,  Indian Economic Journa l ,  15 : 4 7 8-9 5 .  
Roge rs , E . M. , 1962 . 2iffusi Qn of Innovations, New York , Free P re s s .  
and Shoemake r ,  1971 . Commun ication o f  Innovations i n  a Cross Cu l tural 
Appro�ch, 2nd ed . ,  New York , Free Pres s .  
and Svenning , L . , 19 69 . Modern isation Among Pe asants , New York , Holt Rinehart 
and Wins t ori .  
Rosen , S . , 19 7 2 . ' Learning by exper ience as j o int produc t ion ' , Quarterly Journa l 
of Economics , 86 : 3 6 6-82 . 
Rosenberg , N .  ( ed . ) ,  19 71 . The Economics of Techno logica l Change, Harmondsworth , 
Penguin . 
Ro ttenberg , S . , 1952 . ' Income and leisure in an underdeve loped e conomy ' , Journal 
of Po lit ical Economy, 60 : 9 5-101 . 
Roy ,  P .  et a l . , 19 68 . Patterns of Agricu ltura l Diffusion in Rura l India, 
Hyderabad , Nat ional Ins t i tute of Community Development Research Report No . 12 .  
Rut tan , V . W . , 19 59 . ' Usher and S chumpe ter on invent i on ,  innovat ion and 
technological change ' ,  Quarterly Journa l of Economics, 7 3 : 596-606 . 
Sadaraka , S . M . , 19 61 . A S t udy of the Factors Af fe c t ing the Development o f  
Commerc ial Agr icul ture i n  t h e  Cook I s lands , M . A .  Thes is , Vic toria University 
of Wellington . 
Sahlins , M. D . , 19 7 2 .  Stone-Age Economics, Chi cago , Aldine-Atherton . 
Salisbury , R . , 19 62 . From Stone to Stee l, Parkville , Melbourne Univers i ty Press . 
Salte r ,  W . E . G . , 1960 . Productivity and Technica l  C"nange, Camb ridge , Camb r idge 
Univers i ty P ress . 
Sansom , R . L . , 19 70 . The Economics of Insurgency in the Mekong De l ta of Vietnam, 
Camb ridge (Mass . ) , M . I . T .  P ress . 
S chumacher ,  E . F . , 19 74 . Sma l l  is Beautifu l :  A Study of Economics as if People 
Mattered, London , Blond Briggs . 
Sen , A. K . , 1960 . Choice of Techniques, Oxford , Blackwell .  
196 6 .  ' Pe asants and dualism with or without surplus labour ' , Journal of 
Po l itica l Economy, 7 4 : 4 2 5-50 . 
1 9 7 5 . Emp loyment, Techno logy and Development, Oxford , Clarendon Press . 
Shand , D . A . , 1 9 7 3 . Report of Corrmi ttee of Inquiry into the Cook Is lands - New 
Zea land Fresh Frui t  Trade , We llington , Government Pr inter . 
Shand , R . T . , 1965 . ' The development of trade and specialisat ion in a primitive 
e conomy ' ,  Economic Record, 4 1 : 193-200 . 
1 9 69 . ' The early stages of development in a primitive economy : evolution 
from sub s istence to trade specialisat ion ' ,  in Suhsis tence Agricu lture and 
Economic Deve lopment, C .  Wharton ( ed . ) ,  Chicago , Ald ine . 
19 7 1 .  ' The spectrum of cash crop part icipation in New Guinea villages ' ,  in 
Opportunity and Response, T . S .  Epstein and D . H . Penny (eds . ) , London , Hurs t .  
( ed . ) ,  19 7 3 . Technical Change i n  Asian Agricu lture, Canb erra , AN U  Press . 
22 7 
Shell , K . , 1966 . ' Toward a theory of inventive activity and cap i tal accumulat ion ' ,  
American Economic Review, 5 6 : 6 2- 8 .  
Sheshinski , E . _,  196 7 .  ' Tests o f  the "Learning b y  Doing" hypothesis ' , Review of 
Economics and Statis tics, 34 : 568- 7 8 .  
Smelser , N . J . , 19 6 3 . ' Towards a theory o f  modernisation ' , in Indus trialisation 
and Society, W . E .  Moore and B . F . Hoselitz ( eds . ) , Paris , UNES CO .  
Solo , R . A . , 19 6 6 .  ' The capaci ty to assimilate an advanced te chnology ' ,  American 
Economic Review, 5 6 : 9 1-7 . 
and Rogers , E . M. , 1972 . Inducing Techno logical Change for Economic Growth 
and Deve lopment, Michigan S tate University Press . 
Spi cer , E . H .  ( ed . ) ,  19 5 2 . Human Prob lems i� �echno logical Change, New York , 
John Wiley and Sons . 
Squire , L .  and Van der Tak , H . , 19 7 5 .  '1!,'con :;rnic Ana lysis of Projects, Washington , 
IBRD . 
S tace , V . D . , 1966 . E conomic and Financial S tocktaking and Development P l anning 
Survey for the Government of the Cook Is lands , Wellington , unpub lished ms . 
S taubb , W . J .  and Blase , M . G . , 19 7 4 .  ' Induced technological change in developing 
agriculture : implications for income distribut ion and agr icultural 
development , Journal of Deve loping Areas, 8 : 581-9 6 .  
S tein , J . , 19 7 1 .  Money and Capacity Growth, New York , Columb ia University Press . 
S tigler , G . J . , 19 61 . ' The e conomics of informat ion ' ,  Journal of Po li tical Economy, 
69 : 2 13-2 5 . 
S t iglitz , J . E . , 1974 . ' Incentives and risk sharing in sharecropping ' ,  Review of 
Eaonomia Studies, 4 1 : 2 19-54 . 
Tangatapoto , V . R. , various dates . Papers Re lating to the History of Atiu, Atiu . 
Tarascio , V . J .  and Murphy , J . L . , 1972 . ' Uncertainty , learning and dynamic utility 
theory ' , Quarterly Journal of Economic Business, 12 : 19-33 .  
2 2 8  
Thorby , R . G . , 1954 . ' Af forestat ion in the Cook I s lands ' ,  South Pacific Bu l letin, 
4 : 15-16 . 
Turnovsky , S . J . , 1969 . ' A  Bayesian approach to the theory of expectat ions ' ,  
Jourtza �  �f �conomic TheoPy, 1 : 220- 7 7 .  
We issman , S .  ( ed . ) ,  19 7 4 .  The TPojan HoPse : A Radi ca l Look a t  FoPeign Aid, San 
Franc i s co , Ramparts Press . 
Wes t ,  E . S .  and Howard , A . , 1938 . Some Effe cts of GPeen ManuPing on :i tPus TPees 
and on the Soi l, Melbourne , CSIRO Bul le tin No . 120 . 
Whar ton , C . R . ( ed . ) ,  1969 . Subsis tence AgPicu ltu:re and Economic Deve lopment, 
Ch icago , Aldine . 
197 1 .  ' Risk,  uncert ain ty and the subsistence farmer : technical innova t ion 
and resis tance to change in the context of survival ' ,  in Studies in Economic 
AnthPopology, G .  Dalton ( ed . ) ,  Washingt on ,  Amer ican Ah thropolog ical 
As s ociat ion . 
Wickens , M. and Greenf ield , J . , 19 7 3 . ' Econome trics of agr icultural supply ' ,  
Re view of Economics and Statis tics, 60 : 4 3 3-40 . 
DEVELOPMENT STUDIES CENTRE PUBLICATIONS 
Monographs 
No . l  Labour and the law in Papua New Guinea , D . W .  Smith , 1 9 7 5 . 129 + 
vii pp . A$4 . 00 .  
No . 2  
No . 3  
No . 4  
No . 5  
No . 6  
The role of the Papua New Guinea Defence Force , Paul Mench , 19 76 . 
2 31 + xii pp . A$6 . 00 .  
Educat ion , employment and migrat ion in Papua New Guinea , J . D . 
Conroy , 1 9 7 6 . 2 4 8  + xii pp . A$6 . 00 .  
Chimbu : is sues in development , Diana Howlet t ,  R .  Hide an d  Elspeth 
Young with J. Arb a ,  H .  Bi and B. Kaman , 19 7 6 .  3 84 + xlix pp . 
A$6 . 00 .  
Profess ional st ructure in South East As i a ,  ed.  T . H .  Silcock , 1 9 7 7 . 
306 + xi pp . A$6 . 00 .  
Educat ion an d  nat ion-building in plural societ ies : the West 
Malaysian experience , Chai Hon-Chan , 19 7 7 .  116 + ix pp . A$6 . 00 .  
229  
No . 7  Bougainville in t ransit ion , T . K . Moul ik ,  19 7 7 .  200 + xii pp . A$6 . 00 .  
No . 8  
No . 9  
No . 10 
No . 11 
No . 12 
No . 13 
No . 14 
No . 15 
Man and environment in Eas tern Timo r ,  Joachim Met zner , 197 7 .  
380 + xxi . A$6 . 00 .  
Micro-macro links in plannin g ,  P . B .  Krishnaswamy , 19 7 7 .  116 + ix pp . 
$A6 . 00 .  
Appet ite for educat ion in contemporary Asia , ed . K .  Orr , 19 7 7 .  
1 6 5  + vi pp . A$6 . 00 .  
The adaptat ion of t radi t ional systems o f  agri culture , ed . E . K . Fisk , 
19 7 8 .  400 + x pp . A$9 . 00 .  
Taim Bi iong Mani :  the evolution o f  agricul ture in a Solomon Island 
So ciety ,  John Connell , 19 7 8 .  2 71 + xii pp . A$ 9 . 00 .  
Pract i ce Without Policy : genesis o f  lo cal government in Papua New 
Guinea , D . M. Fenbury , 1 9 7 8 .  309 + xvi pp . A$9 . 00 .  
Cust oms o f  Respect : t he t radit ional basis o f  Fij ian communal 
polit ics , John Nat ion , 19 7 8 . 165 + xx pp . A$8 . 00 .  
Agricultural proj ect design and evaluation in an island community ,  
Alan Bollard , 1 9 79 . 228 + xiii pp . A$ 9 . 00 .  
Occasional Papers 
No . l  Motivational factors affec t ing Bougainville villager ' s  money earning 
activity ,  T . K. Moulik , 1 9 7 5 . 27 pp . A$2 . 00 .  Now out o f  prin t . 
No . 2  Food dependency in the Pacific : a preliminary st at ement , T . G .  
No . 3  
No . 4  
McGee , 19 75 . 19 pp . A$2 . 00 .  
Burma ' s  rice surpluses : account in g  for the decline , H . V .  Richter , 
1 9 7 6 . 51 pp . A$2 . 00 .  
The fading o f  earthbound compulsion in a Hong Kong village : 
population mob ility and i t s  economic implicat ion s , Rance Pui-leung 
Lee , 197 6 .  15 pp . A$2 . 00 .  
2 30 
No . 5  
No . 6  
No . 7  
No . 8  
No . 9  
No . 10 
No . 11 
No . 12 
The defence forces of small s t ates : a compar i son of defence 
statist ics in 26 s t ates o f  Tropical Africa , Papua New Guinea and 
Fij i ,  Paul Mench , 1 9 7 6 . 32 pp . A$2 . 00 .  
Hunt ing and gatherin g :  the fo rage economy of the Siwai o f  
Bouga inville,  John Connell , 19 7 7 .  2 8  pp . A$2 . 00 .  
The l imi t s  of economics for t h e  s tudy of developmen t , R . M .  Sundrum ,  
19 7 7 .  16 pp . A$2 . 00 .  
Pub l i c  housing in the city s t at e s  o f  Hong Kong and S ingapore , David 
Drakakis -Smith and Yue-man Yeung , 1 9 7 7 . 17 + iv pp . A$2 . 00 .  
The i sland o f  Niue : development o r  dependence for a very small 
n at ion , E . K . Fisk , 19 7 8 . 12 pp . A$2 . 00 .  
The regional e conomy o f  Bougainville : growth and s t ruct ural chan ge , 
M . L .  Treadgold , 1 9 7 8 . 81 pp . A$2 . 00 .  
The s t ruct ure o f  rural supply t o  the Honiara market in the Solomon 
Islands , M . A .  Bathgate ,  1 9 7 8 . 65 + iv pp . A$2 . 00 .  
Primary indus t ries in Papua New Guinea, Julius Chan , 1 9 7 8 . 1 1  + iv pp . 
A$2 . 00 .  
MADE Research Series 
No . l  
No . 2  
The dynamic replacement problem in the rubber indus t ry o f  Sri Lanka , 
S . K . W .  Jayasuriya , 1 9 7 6 . 112 + xi pp . A$5 . 00 .  
Rational farm plans for land sett lement in Indonesia , M . A. Wardhan i ,  
1976 . 136 + xiii pp . A$5 . 00 .  
Thesis Ab s t racts 
No . l  Studies in the economics of agricul t ural developmen t , D . M .  Etherington 
and B .  Carrad (eds) , 1976 . 45 + vi i  pp . A$ 3 . 00 .  
MA in Demography Research Series 
No . l  Im. exploratory demographic s t udy o f  the Nupe o f  Niger State : t he 
case of Sakpe Village , Abubakar Kat cha, 115 + ix pp . A$5 . 00 .  
Pub l i cat ions are available from the AN U  Press , P . O . Box 4 ,  Canb er�a , A . C . T . , 
Aust ral i a .  Please enc lose money including po stage with o rder . Post age 
rates are : Monographs : O ' s e as A$2 . 00 ,  Aust . :  N . S . W .  $1 . 15 ,  A . C . T .  9 0 c ,  
S . A. , Vic . , Tas . and Q ' lan d  $2 . 25 ,  W . A. and N . T .  $2 . 60 .  Occasional Papers : 
O ' s eas 5 5 c ,  Aus t . 45 c .  
Sub s cript ions t o  the Monograph series are available for five is sues for 
A$30 . 00 plus postage ( O ' seas A$10 . 00 ;  Aust . :  W . A . and N . T .  $13 . 00 ,  N . S . W .  
$ 5 . 75 ,  A . C . T .  $4 . 50 ,  S . A . , Vic . ,  Tas . an d  Q ' land $11 . 25 .  Set s o f  the first 
ten i ssues in three bound volumes are available at a cost o f  $A80 . 00 plus 
postage ( O ' seas A$5 . 10 ,  Aust . :  W . A. and N . T .  $4 . 60 ,  N . S . W .  $1 . 55 ,  A . C . T .  
$ 1 . 1 0 ,  S . A. , Vic . ,  Q ' land an d  Tas . $ 3 . 25) . 
D i str i buted by A N U  Press Alan Bo l l a rd is a grad uate of the Un iversity of Auc k l a nd . As 
PO Box 4 Canberra ACT 2 600 A ustra l i a  an economist w i t h  i nterests i n  agr icu ltura l  deve l opme nt and 
anthropo logical  m ic roeco nom�cs he has stud i ed projects 
I S B N  0 708 1 1 07 1  1 widely through the Pacif ic .  This  monograph ar ises fro m  
h i s  PhD thes is .  I n  1 97 7  he w a s  appo i nted Ass istant Econo­
m i st with the So uth Pacif ic  Com m i ss ion in N ew Ca ledon ia . 
